

Herman Ridder

HYPHENATIONS

BY
HERMAN RIDDER

A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ON THE WORLD WAR OF 1914
WHICH HAVE APPEARED FROM TIME TO TIME
IN THE
NEW-YORKER STAATS-ZEITUNG
UNDER
"THE WAR SITUATION FROM DAY TO DAY"




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O those Americans in whose veins German blood still flows, whose undivided sympathy and loyalty to the ideals of these United States of America is coupled with the immutable remembrance of all that is noblest and highest in the Fatherland, these pages are respectfully and affectionately dedicated.

U. G. & Co., 1915

FOREWORD

The articles which appear in the following pages were originally published in "THE WAR SITUATION FROM DAY TO DAY," a column conducted in The New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, since the beginning of the war, in the English language.

This column was begun to correct for many readers less acquainted with German than English the countless false impressions of Germany and Austria-Hungary that were even then being sown by a hostile press broadcast throughout the country. This purpose has continued with it.

There have been moments when it has not been easy to write temperately under the sting of indefensible attacks upon Germany by her enemies here and abroad; but I have sought always to temper my words that they should be no more bitter than theirs and far more just. Whenever it has been a question between my own country and that of my fathers I have given wholehearted support to the former. Only when it was a question of supporting Germany or her enemies have I given rein to an ineradicable affection for the Fatherland. The composite character of the American people is not to be denied its significance. This country has been built up by the toil of hands drawn from every nation on the globe and by their toil these hands have won for their voices an equal right in its political and social councils.

FOREWORD

If the column has made some enemies for me, it has made many friends for itself; and I read in this that the spirit of fair play is not dead entirely in America. I find my only reward in the reflection that what worth has been its is derived from common service to the land of my birth and the land of my for-bears.

A large share of the actual labor of conducting the column has fallen to my son, Mr. Bernard H. Ridder, and Mr. Hamilton Butler, to whom I owe this public acknowledgment of unfaltering enthusiasm in the cause of truth and justice, to which the column is dedicated. I wish to thank, also, the thousands of readers who have supported me with words of encouragement or aided by valuable suggestions and contributions.

When "THE WAR SITUATION FROM DAY TO DAY" was started I hoped that the war would soon be over, and peace reign again abroad and concord at home. Alas, after many months the end is not yet in sight. The warring nations still grapple at each other's throats with daily increasing relentlessness. And for what? Do they know, more than we?

HERMAN RIDDER.

New York, October, 1915.

CONTENTS

ARTICLE		PAGE
I	When War Expends Itself, August 16, 1914.....	11
II	Tsingtau, and Its Meaning to America, August 27, 1914....	14
III	Reflections, September 6, 1914..	18
IV	Wilhelm II, September 18, 1914..	21
V	Servian Ambitions, Oct. 1, 1914..	25
VI	What the Jew May Hope from Russia, October 2, 1914.....	30
VII	Capsuled War, September 25, 1914	36
VIII	A Day of Prayer, October 4, 1914	42
IX	Harvard Americanism, October 6, 1914	45
X	Europe's Death-grapple, October 8, 1914.....	52
XI	Yap and Nip, October 9, 1914...	56
XII	Belgium's Grey Book, October 12, 1914	61
XIII	A Fair Judgment, October 15 and 16, 1914.....	67
XIV	Europe's War, October 23, 1914.	83
XV	Blockading America, October 24, 1914	87
XVI	A Fair Judgment (Continued), October 25, 1914.....	91
XVII	Turkey, October 31, 1914.....	97
XVIII	Tsingtau, November 1, 1914.....	101
XIX	"Starving Germany Out," November 2, 1914.....	104
XX	A Ray of Sunshine, November 7, 1914	108

CONTENTS

ARTICLE	PAGE
XXI German Barbarities, November 12, 1914	113
XXII Machiavelli Up-to-date, November 13, 1914.....	119
XXIII The "Kaiser's War," November 17, 1914.....	124
XXIV "G. B. S." on the War, November 18, 1914.....	130
XXV Thanksgiving Thoughts, Novem- ber 26, 1914	135
XXVI German Atrocities Abroad, De- cember 1, 1914.....	138
XXVII A War-proof Nation, December 9, 1914.....	144
XXVIII Congress, and Arms and Ammuni- tion, December 11, 1914.....	149
XXIX The Burden of Humanity, Decem- ber 13, 1914	155
XXX Orange Peel, December 16, 1914	158
XXXI Counselling Germany, December 20, 1914.....	162
XXXII Pulpit and Prescience, December 24, 1914.....	166
XXXIII Xmas Thoughts, Dec. 25, 1914..	173
XXXIV "War against the Barbarians," December 26, 1914.....	176
XXXV "What Have I Done To-day?," December 27, 1914.....	181
XXXVI Germans Militant, December 29, 1914	186
XXXVII Britain and American Commerce, December 31, 1914.....	191
XXXVIII New Year's Greetings to Great Britain, January 1, 1915.....	196

CONTENTS

ARTICLE	PAGE
XXXIX The Solitary Sword-walker, January 2, 1915.....	199
XL Why German-Americans Take up Their Speech, January 3, 1915..	205
XLI National Independence vs. Partisan Sentiment, Jan. 4, 1915..	209
XLII New Year Thoughts for Americans, January 5, 1915.....	213
XLIII Staying Glorified Murder, January 7, 1915.....	219
XLIV "The American Wants to Know," January 8, 1915.....	224
XLV 'Arms, and the Country,' I Sing, January 10, 1915.....	231
XLVI Belgium's Betrayal, January 11, 1915	237
XLVII "1812-1915," January 12, 1915...	246
XLVIII The Case of the "Dacia," January 13, 1915.....	251
XLIX Humbugging America, January 15, 1915	256
L Hustling for England, January 17, 1915.....	261

HYPHENATIONS

WHEN WAR EXPENDS ITSELF.

Sooner or later the nations engaged in war will find themselves spent and weary. There will be victory for some, defeat for others and profit for none. There can hardly be any lasting laurels to any of the contending parties. To change the map of Europe is not worth the price of a single human life. Patriotism should never rise above humanity.

The history of war is merely a succession of blunders. Each treaty of peace sows the seed of future strife. War offends our intelligence and outrages our sympathies. We can but stand aside and murmur "The pity of it all, the pity of it all."

I cannot lose my faith, however, that the human race continues to advance despite all obstacles; it snatches what benefits it can from every situation. I am optimist enough to think that a better and greater Europe and a better and greater German Empire will emerge from the hopeless chaos of to-day.

We are living in a day of great surprises. History does not often furnish such examples of sudden and swift changes. The course of events may lead into unexpected channels.

Europe is likely to change more in the next year than it has in the last fifty. It is about time for the politics of Europe to emerge from the mediaeval shadow of diplomacy and be conducted in twentieth century fashion. In my estimation the diplomats have played a very important part in bringing about the war, by isolating Germany and Austria.

It will be necessary to reconstruct the boundaries of Europe. Let it be done this time so justly, so humanely and so intelligently that there will be no necessity for doing it over again for some time. There is a close relationship, or should be, between racial and territorial boundaries. Most treaties have been dictated by the conquering nations with total disregard for natural or fixed boundaries.

I have a steady conviction that we shall witness, within the year, the formation of a great Teutonic Empire. Germany, like other empires, was founded upon military supremacy and maintained by a successful commercial policy. It cannot be that it is to be laid away upon the shelves of history before it has developed its full usefulness and power. The German contributions to science, commerce and literature are too real to permit the belief that its work is finished and a new order is to replace the old. Yet the panorama of changes may unfold with such startling suddenness that the dream of Liberalist and Socialist may soon be realized.

War breeds socialism. At night the opposing hosts rest on their arms, searching the heavens for the riddle of life and death, and wondering what their to-morrow

will bring forth. Around a thousand camp fires the steady conviction is being driven home that this sacrifice of life might all be avoided. It seems difficult to realize that millions of men, skilled by years of constant application, have left the factory, the mill or the desk to waste not only their time but their very lives and possibly the lives of those dependent on them to wage war, brother against brother.

The more reasonable it appears that peace must quickly come, the more hopeless does it seem. I am convinced that an overwhelming majority of the populations of Germany, England and France are opposed to this war. The Kaiser emphatically does not want war. And yet war is raging. Let some keener mind than mine solve the grewsome riddle. If I were to guess an answer to it—I would say Russia. A fight between the highly civilized nations fomented by the miserable intrigues of a petty Balkan state. Russia has yet to make its first substantial offering on the altar of human progress.

A thousand times rather would I prefer to see the organization and genius of the Teutonic races regulate the continent of Europe than to permit the autocracy of the Romanoffs to extend its sway by a single province. My heart aches to see the German national life, fostered with such loving care for so many years, made the stake in a war brought about by the inflated ambitions of the Russian Slavs.

To shut down the laboratories and clinics and deprive the German genius of its opportunity for further-

ing science is alone a crime crying to heaven for vengeance.

War deals in human life as recklessly as the gambler in money. Imagine the point of view of a commanding general who is confronted with the task of taking a fortress. "That position will cost me five thousand lives; it will be cheap at the price, for it must be taken". He discounts five thousand human lives as easily as the manufacturer marks off five thousand dollars for depreciation. And so five thousand homes are saddened that another flag may fly over a few feet of fortified masonry. What a grim joke for Europe to play upon humanity!

I feel sure that every American will join in the hope of an early and lasting peace. The sword has been forced into the hands of an unwilling German nation, but if we read aright their history and know their traditions they will acquit themselves as well upon the battlefield as they have during the last forty years in the fields of science, literature and commerce.

TSINGTAU, AND ITS MEANING TO AMERICA.

The expected and the inevitable has happened. The great guns of Japan are thundering at Tsingtau. I am informed, from a reliable source, that Germany suggested to Japan the neutralization of the Far East. The advisers of the Mikado referred the matter to Britain, and the Japanese ultimatum was the result. The two answers to this ultimatum reveal the fearless determination of the German people to defend them-

selves with Spartan courage. "We cannot be frightened by another war," comes from Berlin. "If you wish Kiaochow you must take it", is reported to have been the challenge of its German governor to the Japanese. Such words lose none of their heroic strength from having first been uttered by the Lion of Thermopylae to the Asia of his day. The odds were not greater then—the cause no more just.

The developments of the week have not conduced to a clarification of the situation. As a matter of fact, Japan's motive is more mysterious than ever. We were told, in the beginning, that she sought only to preserve the territorial integrity of China and secure to the Far East the blessings of permanent peace. When the Japanese come bearing gifts it is well to be on one's guard. Who has ever read Japanese diplomacy in its entirety? Not I, and I venture to question if there lives the Occidental who has so read it, or can. But enough of Japanese methods and aspirations have been discovered by a half century of contact with the civilized world to show the trend of a national policy which bodes no good to the American nation.

It appeared later that Japan had been moved by a sense of loyalty to her ally to protect the latter's interests on the China Main. In just what way the protection of British interests in Chinese waters may be expected to work for lasting peace, may be judged from the fact that for two centuries such "interests" have been the disturbing factor in the intercourse between China and the West.

The Japanese press is now clamoring for the reten-

tion of the German Leased Territory as a prize of war. What a change in a week! What a pity that the world might not have perished seven days ago, that we might have left this war-wrecked sphere in the vain but happy delusion that the Samurai's sword was about to be plunged into the back of Germany that peace might come to a hemisphere! Alas that one short week should alter "peace" to "plunder"!

Neither Kiaochow nor the coal mines and wheat fields of all Shantung will pay the price to be exacted later by Japan of Great Britain for this local and temporary blow to German prestige.

If Japan succeeds in taking and holding Kiaochow, she will be able to resume her former policy of expansion, the annexation of all northern China. If anyone believes for a moment that Japan will stop at Tsingtau, let him read the story of Manchuria.

Aside from the question of Great Britain's desire to limit the activities of her yellow ally, the sincerity of which I doubt, there arises the further question of her *ability* to do so, or even *courage* to attempt it. Will Great Britain dare, when Japan says to her: "Hands off!" to imperil all that her ally means to her, by opposing her activities in any sphere in which outside of strictly "British interests" she may choose to pursue them?

In this connection I cannot do better than quote from an editorial in the "Penang Gazette and Straits Chronicle" of May 30th, 1914, for a copy of which I am indebted to Mr. T. R. Helms of Chiswold, Del., on a speech of General Sir Ian Hamilton in which he

warned the people of Australia that they lived under the shadow of an impending race struggle with the "rice-eaters" of Asia. The leader says:

"When self-constituted, stay-at-home critics in their absurd adulation of our shrewd and capable Japanese allies, likened Togo to the Great Nelson on the strength of 'Tsushima, they blundered, and blundered sadly. When they took enterprising students with the imitative faculty highly and wonderfully developed into the naval yards of Britain their admirers made an even worse mistake. And when they—with a marvellous foresight as they plead—formed, before then, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance they sowed the seeds of a sinister crop to bridge temporary troubles. Britain and Britain alone has fostered the quiet little men's burning ideas of dominance in Asia."

With this warning before us, do we not owe it to ourselves and to our children and our children's children to open our eyes to the danger of it all? If we believe, as we say we do, in the virtues of our institutions, are we not bound in moral duty to vouchsafe intact to our posterity what we have inherited from our forefathers—a white man's civilization?

If there are those so blinded by the lotus-fumes of Oriental adulation as to be no longer able to discern the insidious approach of the East, I bid them read, mark and digest the following statement of an official of the Japanese Embassy at Washington on August 25th:

"Despite Japan's assurances to this country," says the Sun, "that she intended to confine her war activi-

ties to the China seas, the Japanese diplomat who for obvious reasons refused to be quoted, said the scope of Japan's action depends largely upon her ally, Great Britain.

"If the war exigencies of England should require assistance by Japan outside of the Far East, this Japanese official stated, Nippon would by her treaty obligations be forced to seriously consider giving assistance outside of Asia."

I put it to Great Britain frankly: Does she intend to invoke the arms of the yellow man of Japan against the white man of Germany? I put it to the American people: Cannot they see in this pronouncement of the Japanese diplomat the loosening of the leashes?

I plead with the American people to open their eyes to the danger which confronts them. The day cannot be long postponed when the Island Empire of the East will call upon the Island Kingdom of the West, and together they will strike at our own land, even as they are now striking at Germany and Austria. When that day comes, we shall turn back to the month of August in the year 1914, and read the first chapter of the cataclysm.

REFLECTIONS.

I have stolen a few days from the excitement and turmoil of New York to find some rest from the fierce activity of the past month. As I passed through the green fields and happy hamlets, I felt the contrast between this peaceful, mellow September evening in Jersey and the rack and ruin of the same September

day on the fields of France. I have never been more grateful for the long three thousand mile expanse of ocean that separates us from this miserable quarrel.

I dare say, you as well as I have pondered on the uselessness of it all. If the representatives of the nations involved were to gather round a table to settle the matter, the first difficulty to determine would be the answer to the question, "What is it all about?" History may well call it "the causeless war."

I can imagine the oriental point of view towards the *melée*. With what a smile of sarcastic superiority the Japanese can view this "white man's war". Have we, then, white men to spare that we can lose hundreds of thousands of the youngest and best of our kind? Picture the magnificent manhood of Britain, the sturdy sons of France, and the peace-loving Belgians destroying and being destroyed. Opposed to them is the flower of young Germany and Austria offering itself up as a sacrifice to the Gods of Conflict. It is all too horrible, too impossible.

The losses must have been already enormous. One German regiment that I saw in Berlin but two years ago is no more. There is hardly a town, nay hardly a home in all Western Europe that will not be mourning its most vigorous and able bread-winner. In one month war has undone the work of decades.

It is well for us that there is a sharp difference of opinion and sympathy in this country regarding the events that are now taking place in Europe. It is our best protection against being embroiled in them. Were we all of one mind and one heart we might be tempted

to allow our feelings to outrun our judgment. In this case there is safety in division.

I feel that the time is at hand for a cessation of hostilities. The results are too staggering for a continuation. The warring nations must realize, despite their being blinded by hopeless patriotism, that it is better to end it all, before severe reverses make a quick solution impossible. Whatever honor was at stake, and I for one do not believe that the honor of any of the parties was at question, has long since been satisfied. Germany can well afford to rest content. Her men are as powerful in war as they are in peace. Britain can point with pride to the heroism of her soldiers on the retreat from Mons to Paris. France has rallied to her colors and made her sacrifices with the bravery characteristic of that wonderful nation. These three sons, the favorites of fortune, should lay aside their arms and return to the commercial rivalry that has advanced the cause of civilization so materially in the past forty years.

I am tempted to sentimentalize over the terrific losses during the bloody campaign of August. I am old enough to see the tragedy of it all. It hurts to think of the loss of that splendid manhood, robbed of the fullness of life, robbed of the joys of maturity, for not all the pleasures of life belong to youth. They are cut down in a mad, hysterical scramble of the nations.

There is a pathological reason for this war. It is nothing more nor less than an expression of the intense nervousness of the age. We are too highstrung. The

nations are suffering acute neurasthenia. The fear and suspicion of the one of the other is but the hallucination characteristic of their nervous condition.

I believed that an adjustment to the normal would follow the first few weeks of fighting. I had high hopes of peace, but the promise seems already too long in the keeping.

Have you ever noticed how some grim detail of a great tragedy will cling in the memory and how the mind will continue to revert to that one fact? One afternoon of last week a flaring headline of one of our dailies caught my eye. "*6,000,000 men in battle.*" I have seen that headline in my waking as well as my sleeping hours. It tells the story better than a volume could describe it. One naturally broods over the chain of thoughts such a suggestion makes. Misery and confusion will come to us all. The thing comes nearer to us every day. The bonds that hold us to Europe have not been severed without considerable business aches. They will not be reestablished without the hurt being generally felt.

WILHELM II.

The present war has been made the occasion for renewed outbreaks on the part of the press throughout the world against the Kaiser. Ever since the day, twenty-six years ago, when Wilhelm II. ascended the throne of his fathers, he has been the subject of constant editorial attack. The mass of calumnies, of distorted motives and of petty vituperation that has been levelled at him has been in direct proportion to the

measure of success which has attended his efforts for the peaceful promotion of the legitimate interests of his people.

I have followed the career of the Emperor from the day of his accession, through the long years when Germany struggled for a greater national existence, down to the present day of storm and stress. I have felt honored by his acquaintance and by his friendship. I am a sincere admirer of his extraordinary ability and resourcefulness. I can understand the devotion of his German people and their complete unity of purpose under his leadership. Whether the standard be German or American, the answer is inevitable, the Emperor is a man with all that such a term implies. He is a great man, a just man and a well-beloved man.

The Emperor has almost a religious conviction in regard to his duty towards his country. No personal motives play any part in his scheme of life. He is as much devoted to his particular calling of governing and brings the same point of view towards his profession as the young man towards the vocation of priesthood. The Emperor believes that he has been called to perform a great work, and he brings a noble sense of duty towards its fulfillment.

Less than any man whom I have studied does he yield to the prejudice of any particular group that happens temporarily to surround him. He favors the army, "his beloved army", because the army is the staff upon which Germany leans in times of peril. Imagine where Germany would be to-day without an army to

defend her borders from the enemies that are being hurried from all parts of the world against her.

The confidence of the Emperor in the German army has not been misplaced. It is a great machine and has proven itself capable of great deeds. When the history of the campaign of France is written it will show that von Moltke was not "an accident", as so many American papers delight in saying. The first rush for Paris did not succeed, but the next advance will have an entirely different character. There have been no German routs, no great reverses. Fortunately the reports from London and Paris do not alter the facts of the case. Regardless of the coloring given at the time, sooner or later the facts appear. As the London Times naively remarks, "The truth must out."

The advice of Dr. Dernburg, given in a speech at a benefit performance for the German Red Cross, is well worthy of the attention of German-Americans:

"How can you help the Fatherland in this most difficult situation? Above all by a quiet demeanor and dignified attitude. It accomplishes no useful purpose to quarrel because the American people have no sympathy for that sort of thing. In the days of our victories we will rejoice, but we will not whine when we suffer the reverses which the fortunes of war may bring. We will emphasize the justness of our cause in those circles where it is worth while. We have too much respect for ourselves to answer the attacks of our opponents, lie for lie or exaggeration for exaggeration. We refute with contempt, but nevertheless with moderation of expression, the charges of German

cruelties which we know to be foreign to our civilization and our temperament. Your own character and your own experience in this country furnish the best evidence of that fact.

"What we should, however, bring home to the American people are the facts of our mutual ideals, our mutual commercial interests and a century of friendship between the United States and Germany. If they hold the term 'militarism' before you, ask them which other nation in the world always had more than one enemy to protect itself against, and if they assert that the German people through this 'militarism' were led into a war, then you can point to the fact of the unity of the German people and in what a firm and noble manner it is fighting its battle.

"I consider the 4th of August of this year as one of the most inspiring days that it has been my fortune to live. At the opening of the German Reichstag in the Palace of Berlin, I stood in the first row and saw, calm and determined, the elected representatives of the German People, the assured and stern generals, and simple and alone, without decoration or attendance, the Emperor in his field uniform. With hope and confidence in his voice, the Kaiser read his speech. As this man in this hour held the responsibility for the history of Germany in his hands, as this man stepped from the platform, he said those few words which will always have an immense importance in German political history: 'What I told my beloved people of Berlin from the balcony of the palace, I repeat to you: From to-day I know no distinction in rank, no diversity of

parties, no difference of religions. I am a German with my German people and I call on the leaders of all parties to swear the same oath with me and to confirm it by laying their hand in mine.' As these men stepped forward to shake the hand of the Emperor, the spirit of a great hour fell over the assembled thousands and as we sang the National Anthem, I can assure you it sounded different from a school festival or a veterans' anniversary."

SERVIAN AMBITIONS.

The publication of the Russian "Orange Paper" throws important, and what may be regarded as practically definite light on the question of immediate responsibility for the present war of the nations. The British and German "White Papers" already given to the reading world have contained nothing that approaches in definitiveness the confession of the Russian Foreign Office of the fatherly interest taken by Russia in the affairs of Servia, and the filial obedience with which Belgrade responded thereto. I have had occasion previously to draw attention to the well-defined policies of Russia and Servia. It remained, however, for the Russian Government to show how closely interlocked they were and with what complete accord both were working, or being worked, toward their fulfillment.

The ambitions of Servia may be described as the extention of her territory and the increase of her population by the detachment from the Austro-Hungarian

Empire of those adjacent provinces in which the Slavic element predominates. These ambitions, in themselves, may be regarded as laudable or otherwise, according to the political and ethical frame of mind of the observer. It is perhaps possible that Mexico would like to see returned to her all that southwestern portion of the United States which once was hers. As long as such feelings remain within bounds they do not constitute a *casus belli* with Mexico. But should the Mexican people attempt by a campaign of education, backed by secret murder and open assassination, to secure the restitution of this territory to Mexico, and should it be discovered that this campaign had the support of the authorities in Mexico City, I do not believe we should hesitate long in demanding of Mexico an understanding quite as vigorous as that which Austria-Hungary asked of Servia. Were such a campaign to culminate in the assassination of the President of the United States or of his Secretary of State, as in Servia it ended in the murder of the Austrian Archduke, I am sure our act of retribution would be swifter. That Austria should have taken the stand which she eventually took is not surprising. It is cause for marvel only that she did not assume it months before.

The frame of mind of the Servian people upon the conclusion of the Balkan war may be compared with that of the Japanese after their successful war with Russia. They had beaten the enemy and, consequently, could lick the world. If we carry the comparison further, however, we must admit that the Servian Government, like the Japanese, held a more conserva-

tive estimate of its powers. And it is, and all along has been, impossible of conception that Serbia would have maintained herself in the position of defending the anti-Austrian propaganda unless she had been able to depend implicitly upon the support of a strong ally. The ambitions of the Servian people could not be realized without the aid of Russia, and in return for that aid Serbia was willing to act as a cat's paw to draw Austria-Hungary into a conflict in which Russia would come to her support, and at the same time find an excuse for annexing, if possible, the Galician provinces.

All this has been known by those who have followed the course of events in the Balkans in recent years. It is confirmed now by the Russian Foreign Office.

If Serbia had depended impartially upon the powers signatory to the several Balkan conventions, why was it that the Austrian note of July 23rd reached St. Petersburg the same day from Belgrade, and was not communicated to the Foreign Offices of the other interested powers? It reached them apparently only through the diplomatic channels of Austria-Hungary. If Russia and Serbia were not playing a concerted game of political intrigue, what excuse can be offered for this oversight on the part of the Government in Belgrade? If Serbia wanted peace, why did she refer her troubles only to Russia, who, she knew, wanted war?

The oft-repeated assertion that the Czar did his best to preserve the peace of Europe is contradicted by the published documents of his own Foreign Office. It develops from a reading of the telegram of July 24th,

the day before the time limit set in the Austrian ultimatum elapsed, from the Prince Regent of Servia to His Majesty the Emperor in St. Petersburg, that Servia was "ready to accept the Austro-Hungarian conditions which are compatible with the situation of an independent State as well as those whose acceptance shall be advised us by your Majesty." In other words, Belgrade was ready to submit to the just and natural demands of Vienna, if only His Majesty gave the word. Had the Czar counseled Servia as every consideration of propriety demanded he should counsel her, there would have been no conflict between Austria and Servia. In this hour of opportunity, however, the Czar chose to be consistent rather than correct. Having encouraged the Servian propaganda for his own purposes and by the promise of support, it was perhaps too late for him to retrace his steps. It was easier, apparently, to go ahead and attempt to see the thing through, and that is what he did. With the long-sought pretext at hand, it would have been bad management from the Russian point of view to pass it up. The Russian army and the French had been whipped into shape and the British fleet was being held in leash. It was now or perhaps never for Russia to strike for the accomplishment of her aims.

But even when war had become inevitable between Austria and Servia, the impossibility of Russia not coming to the aid of Servia can be explained only on the grounds of consistency. There could have been no possible outcome of such a conflict which called upon Russia to intervene on one side or the other, ex-

cept that she had backed Serbia against Austria to a point from which she could not retreat without "losing face." It is clear now what Russia stands and has stood for—intrigue against neighboring states, murder and assassination. The pretense that she sought peace by asking delay on the part of Austria is too shallow to hold much water. To her, and to her alone, was it given to counsel Serbia in the right direction and she refused to do so. Even then it was given her to allow Austria and Serbia to settle their dispute without her interference. When she failed in this, she failed to preserve the peace of Europe.

It is idle to talk now of what the German Emperor might have done. As an ally of the Austrian Emperor he could not be expected to counsel Austria against demanding of Serbia the righting of wrongs which had come to be intolerable. He did what he could to localize the war, did more than any other sovereign of Europe, and his efforts to this end ceased only when it became unmistakably apparent that Russia could not be swerved from her purpose of attacking Austria.

The then position of Germany was sufficiently explained in the note handed to the British Government, on July 24th, by the German Ambassador at the Court of St. James.

"The Imperial Government want to emphasize their position that in the present case there is only question of a matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor to reserve it to those two immediately concerned. The Imperial Government de-

sire urgently the localization of the conflict, because every interference of another power would, owing to the different treaty obligations, be followed by incalculable consequences."

It was not the entrance of Germany into the war that started the conflagration, but the unwarranted interference of Russia in a quarrel which was not hers, and when history writes the story of 1914 the name that will stand out pre-eminently before all others, written in letters of blood, will be Nicholas II.

WHAT THE JEW MAY HOPE FROM RUSSIA.

The well known Secretary of the American Jewish Committee, Mr. Herman Bernstein, in his preface to the "American Jewish Year Book," which appears to-day, says:

"The Beilis affair has constituted the darkest tragedy of the Jews in recent years. The evil forces of the Russian Empire conspired against them, an innocent Jew was tortured in prison for two years and a half, and the entire Jewish people in Russia was threatened with pogrom panics through this political conspiracy. In the Beilis affair, the Russian Government's policy of cruel, militant anti-Semitism reached its culmination. Just as the civilized world was shocked at the Kishineff massacres, so it was appalled when the Russian Government revived the infamous blood legend for the purpose of discrediting the Jewish people and justifying new massacres.

"The list of events in Russia during the past twelve-

month recorded in this scheme reveals a painful state of affairs. The sufferings and hopelessness of the Jew in the Pale of Settlement are shown in the simple records of 'ordinary' happenings, of wholesale expulsions,—silent, wordless progress—of new devices of persecution, of the suppression of education, and of the ritual murder delirium with which the Russian Government has crazed the minds of the Russian masses."

Some weeks ago it was reported from Europe that the Czar had issued an ukase promising to the Jews in Russia complete civil rights. Using this ukase as his text, Israel Zangwill, the noted Jewish author and playwright of England, sent out to the Jews of neutral countries, not long after, an appeal for Jewish sympathy and Jewish prayers for Great Britain in her present "war for freedom."

It is apparent from the tone of the Jewish press in the United States and from letters written by prominent members of the Jewish community, that Mr. Zangwill's "manifesto" has fallen, so far as this country is concerned, upon sterile soil. The British advertising clique was unfortunate in the choice of Mr. Zangwill as the man to address the Jews of the world, for great as his work has been in the field of literature, he has come to be regarded by Jews the world over, with the possible exception of those in England, as one no longer in touch with the sufferings of his race in less tolerant countries and one who has little sympathy with the true racial aspirations of his people. But even had Mr. Zangwill been the one man to appeal, on the

strength of the Russian ukase, for Jewish sympathy for England, what had he to offer them in return for such sympathy or as an excuse for his appeal?

The story of the Jew in America is known to all—of the Jew in Europe to not so many. I know it sufficiently well to state, however, that in England alone have the Jewish people received complete civil rights. In France and Germany their condition is not so good as in England, but it is as far divided from their condition in Russia and the Balkan states as high heaven is from hell. The great majority of the Jews in this country come not from the British Isles but from Russia and southeastern Europe and have come here to escape the horrors of the persecutions to which they were subjected there. These Jews have not forgotten what they and their fathers suffered from the lash of the Cossack and the riflebutt of an ignorant and bigoted soldiery. They remember the pogroms of Kishineff as vividly as Mr. Zangwill the banquets at which he has been feasted in London. And many of them have friends and relatives submitting to this same treatment to-day, unable to escape from Russia. It is not probable that such Jews will lend their prayers to the Anglo-Russian combine until the condition of their race in Russia has been definitely and concretely improved.

And what is Mr. Zangwill's assurance that in the event of a Russian victory over Germany such will be the case? Sir Edward Grey has said that in that event he will "encourage" Russia to alter her present attitude toward her Jewish subjects! I do not wish to impugn

the word of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Above all, he is "a man of his word." So true was he to the promises that he had given behind the backs of Parliament and the British people to Russia and France, that he plunged his country into an unpopular war. The combined efforts of the cinematograph, the spell-binders of the Government and a press campaign by such writers as Mr. Zangwill, have failed to rouse England to Sir Edward's duty. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs will undoubtedly carry out his promise and "encourage" Russia, when the Cossack is in Berlin, but of what avail will it be? We have had our own experience in such things. When Russia accepts the abrogation of her American treaty, as a protest against her treatment of the Jew, without turning a hair, what respect may she be expected to show for the "encouragement" of her ally?

The attitude of England toward the suffering Jew in other countries is already in black and white. A clause of the "Berlin Tractate" of 1878, to which Great Britain was signatory, demands of Rumania that she accord to her Jewish subjects equal rights with those of other religious beliefs. The treatment of the Jew in Rumania to-day is known to be and for years to have been no less brutal and revolting than that experienced in Russia. And yet, can we doubt that England, and especially Sir Edward Grey, has "encouraged" Rumania to alleviate these conditions? England is true to her treaties. She has told us that so often these last few weeks that it would seem impossible for anyone but herself to doubt it. But what good has

come of it? Has all England's encouragement brought back to life a single Jew foully murdered because he chose to worship God in the manner of his fathers? Has it erased the scars from one Jewish back, wrought there by the lash of an avaricious police? Has it won him the right to live where he will, to possess property in security, and to educate his children in the schools which he is compelled to support? It has done no one of these things, and it will do no more to Russia. Instead of looking forward to a contingency which at best is highly problematical, Mr. Zangwill should have looked back and told the Jews what England has already done for them in the dominions of the Slav.

We have seen what the Jew may expect from England in return for his sympathy and support. Let us look for a moment at what he may rightly expect from Russia.

The "word of a Romanoff" is a proverb among the downtrodden subjects of the Czar. Its value is known to Jew and Christian alike. It is given to-day and retracted to-morrow. When the voice of the oppressed rises to the ears of the Little Father in times of peace it is stilled by the crack of the knout and the clank of Siberian chains. When the throne rocks on the waves of an unpopular war it is necessary to meet it with other weapons. It is then the open season for conciliatory ukases. Alexander I. promised Finland its autonomy under conditions not dissimilar from those which exist to-day, and what has Finland profited thereby? The Russo-Japanese war purchased a Duma, but so emasculated that its place is rather with the

sewing circles of Victorian England than with the parliamentary bodies of civilized States. The present conflict has developed the inner dissension of the Russian Empire to the limit. Poles are asked to fight Poles, Jews to fight not only other Jews but a country which has treated the race with a large measure of justice.

We have had, therefore, two examples of "the word of a Romanoff." The first was to Poles, but that has since been retracted by the Russian commanders in Galicia, when they found Austrian Poles fighting against them. The second was to "my beloved Jews." But what proof has the Jew in America that the signature of the Little Father has been affixed to this other ukase, promising his people in Russia full civil rights? It has even been asserted, and on authority quite as good as that on which the publication of the ukase in question was made, that the whole story of the Czar's promise to his "beloved Jews" is a fabrication for foreign consumption.

I do not doubt that Russia wishes to conciliate the Jews at the present time, not only at home but abroad. She has spurned their religion and cannot, therefore, care very much for their prayers. She can use, however, and to good advantage, their money, their brains and their lifeblood. In the last analysis it is that which she seeks. If Mr. Zangwill had been moved by a spirit of loyalty to his race it is that which he would have penned in his manifesto.

When, however, he comes before them with the plea that England is fighting a war of freedom against German "militarism" he misjudges his audience. The

Jew can read through the tenuous fabric of his words as easily as anyone. It is not a war of England against Germany, but so far as England is concerned, a war for the destruction of German sea power and the seizure of Germany's outlying colonies. So far as internal Europe is concerned, it is a war between Russia and Germany. True, Germany has her militarism, but she has also her culture, her refinement and her justice. Russia has only militarism, in an exaggerated and brutal form. She can offer no one redeeming trait of government or polity. Of the two the Jew will know which to choose. The appeal of Mr. Zangwill asks the Jews of America to forget too much. It asks them also to believe too much. They have no fight with England, but they will not help England to help Russia. When Mr. Zangwill can guarantee that equal rights will be accorded to the Jews in Russia, they will listen to him. When he can secure the guarantee of Sir Edward Grey to the same effect, they will listen to him. When he can offer the guarantee of anyone but a Romanoff, they will listen to him. But not before.

CAPSULED WAR.

As I glance through the New York papers from day to day and see the amount of criticism that is being heaped upon my head because of my editorial policy with regard to the *Staats-Zeitung*, I often wonder wherein lies the blame which attaches to me. Do my critics believe for a moment that the *Staats-Zeitung* should follow the path of the New York Herald, for

instance, and become a French paper published in the German language? Do not misunderstand me, for I have the most sincere admiration for the New York Herald and its frank declaration of friendship for France.

An editor must have the courage of his conviction and no man can truthfully tell me that I am afraid to print what I believe to be true. If I were to publish an American paper printed in the English language I would conduct it in the same vigorous and definite manner that I conduct an American paper printed in the German language. I, for one, have no patience with the journalistic code that permits a publisher to conduct one paper for one side and another for the other. As an example, consider Mr. W. R. Hearst, and anyone will do for an example. He prints a picture of British troops in his New York American of Sept. 9th, and the descriptive matter reads: "This is the type of English soldier who is doing such tremendous work on the battle front in France." The same day he brings the same picture in his German paper and the descriptive matter is arranged to suit the German taste, reading: "British troops that run so fast that it is not possible for the Germans to capture them." However, that is the business of Mr. Hearst and not mine. If he is successful in keeping his left hand from knowing what his right hand is doing and at the same time in satisfying his constituents on both sides, he is performing a feat of journalistic legerdemain which calls for applause from all galleries.

I do not doubt that England and the friends of Eng-

land would like to see the war in Europe sugar-coated and capsuled for the particular benefit of the inhabitants of the British Isles. Among those friends of England I class a certain element of the American press, which is to-day crying out against the partial destruction of the cathedral at Rheims. Two weeks ago this same element of the press featured in its Sunday editions the utilization by the enemies of Germany of cathedral towers to mount guns against airships. I have been attacked and villainized because I could see in the damage done to the cathedral in Rheims nothing beyond what was required by the circumstances of the case. It is the purest piffle to say that because Rheims has been spared through seven centuries it should be spared to-day. During no one of those seven centuries was Rheims the center of conflict between a million men fighting for their hearths and homes and a greater number bent on the destruction of the same. It is not necessary to go into the details of military privileges in the time of war. The most simple-minded editorial writer must admit not only the possibility of unintentional damage to the prominent landmarks in the theatre of operation, but also the right of each belligerent to protect himself against the employment of such landmarks by the enemy. We cannot discuss the war at all unless we are prepared to accept the word of each side with the same faith in its integrity. The German Emperor has expressed himself clearly and unmistakably in the sense that the armies of Germany will not resort to unnecessary acts of destruction. Let us be candid and fair-minded and

accept this assurance until the contrary is proven. We have to date absolutely nothing in controversion thereof. It is not without the bounds of probability that the fortunes of war should bring the allied armies to the banks of the Rhine and that the great Gothic cathedral at Cologne should suffer a fate similar to that of the cathedral in Rheims. If that day should come to pass, England would have a very different line of argument to offer.

It is a simple matter to talk of reprisals, when the war has been carried into German territory. Such talk, however, can serve but one purpose: to justify what German arms have done in Belgium and France. In the same breath England cries out against the destruction of Louvain and Rheims and then promises to destroy the first piece of art she can lay her hands upon in Germany. Would it not raise a greater meed of sympathy in the world at large if that self-satisfied nation which has stirred up this world conflagration would take its stand solidly on one side of the fence or the other?

I feel as keenly as any man can the irreparable loss to art and architecture involved in the present war, but what I cannot and will not allow myself to be talked or wailed or bulldozed into thinking is that the destruction of material things can be compared with the wiping out of the thousands of human lives that are being cut short in this unholy struggle forced upon Germany. I have been assailed on every side because I have not joined in the general pro-English outcry against the inevitable results of war in the country of the enemy.

If I could see one single point where Germany has been wrong or the wail of the Allies justified I would go half way to meet my assailants.

On the contrary, I cannot but feel that the American people are being asked to forget a great deal in order that they may place their faith implicitly in the logic of England's present expression of horrified surprise at the eventualities which have taken place on the Continent. The halls of the national museum of London are crowded with the loot of the world. It is well-nigh a century now since Byron taunted Britain with the theft of the "Elgin Marbles" and they have not yet been returned to the Parthenon. In the smallness of our occidental vision we are inclined to magnify the value of Europe's treasures of art, to the disadvantage of those of the East. Those who are loudest in their criticism of the necessary results of armed conflict in Europe, forget the blackened swath of British arms in India, carved from one end of the country to the other by the ruthless policy of instilling respect by the wanton destruction of religious edifices. It does not matter whether reared to Jehovah, Jove or Lord, religious houses should be spared when possible and British arms forgot this fact in India and China. Why then should Britain and a pro-British press in this country raise their voices when a temple meets an unfortunate fate in a city held and defended by the enemy?

The whole plaint is too hypocritical, too much in keeping with England's whole plan of campaign against Germany, to be deserving of serious consideration on

this side of the water. The value of England's sincerity in condemning Germany's conduct of the war is measured by her talk of reprisals in kind on German soil. By virtue of German foresight and preparedness the conflict is now being waged in the territory of the enemy. But does one single misguided soul on this side of the Atlantic believe for a moment that were the theatre of war now on German soil British and French arms would respect Germany's art treasures one whit more than German arms, bound by the necessities of war, have respected those of France and Belgium? The answer is in the Louvre and the London museum.

I don't like war. I have written against it and spoken against it, but as long as we must have this dignified sort of murder on earth let us be fair and square with one another and recognize its inevitabilities. England sifted out the nations of the world for her allies to destroy Germany, and now sits back and watches them do her bidding. When Germany, with the world at her throat, avails herself of the rights of war, England is horrified. If we go deeper, the reason for it all will become readily apparent. Great Britain, with all her allies, has bitten off a much larger piece of war than she can comfortably masticate. The fear of German submarines and of German dirigibles has found a place in the hearts around Bow Bells, and cannot be explained away on the grounds of "strategic retreats." At last Germany is after Great Britain and as the sugar-coating falls off from the war, and Great Britain begins to feel what she has brought upon herself, she raises the cry of the spanked child that Germany is not

playing fair. It is a late day, however, to try to create sympathy by any such means.

A DAY OF PRAYER.

This day has been set aside by proclamation of the President of the United States as a day of prayer and supplication, to petition Almighty God to "restore once more that concord among men and nations without which there can be neither happiness nor true friendship nor any wholesome fruit of toil or thought in the world."

Whatever the feelings of power that were aroused at the thought of a world war, the event has more than justified expectation. We were too confident that this thing could never be and yet it has come, and now we stand aside and watch the orgy of blood, we argue and quarrel and lay the blame now on the one and again on the other. We sentimentalize and we scold and yet, we, a nation of one hundred millions, are helpless to stay the hands that blast so many lives as unconcernedly as though they were dealing in scrap. It seems too gruesome to think that this thing can continue day for day with all the devilish ingenuity of the developed modern mind and that it threatens to bridge the weary months with its millions of losses in lives and money.

Often I am so oppressed with the horror of it all, so utterly tired of stories of barbarity, atrocity, cruelty and death, that I shudder when I take up the morning paper. War places a heavy hand upon the heart—a heavy weight upon the mind. We can but pray that

in some miraculous manner peace will come, and that with the passing of the blood-red harvest moon we can go back to our every-day toil without the spirit of this great calamity hanging over our heads. It was, indeed, a whimsical fate that reserved this greatest of all wars for our twentieth century.

If our prayers for peace are heard, a great burden will be lifted from the women in Europe. After all they pay the greatest price. We men sacrifice so recklessly the life they create with so much loving care and desperate suffering. For each soldier who bleeds his life away prematurely, some woman has gone down into the Valley of Death, to give him that life from which humanity has received so little return.

The human body has been reared at a cost of suffering, expense and experience; it is an investment of civilization resting on years of development; it embodies the results of centuries of evolution and it is being wasted more hopelessly than the maddest spend-thrift squanders his patrimony. It is difficult for a man whose point of view towards living things is effected by countless generations imbued with the desire to kill and the lust for battle, to look upon this frightful carnage and realize the waste from the point of view of a woman.

Says Olive Schreiner in the "Century":

"There is, perhaps, no woman, whether she have borne children, or be merely potentially a child-bearer, who could look down upon a battlefield covered with slain, but the thought would arise in her, 'So many mothers' sons! So many young bodies brought into

the world to lie there! So many months of weariness and pain while bones and muscles were shaped within! So many hours of anguish and struggle that breath might be! So many baby mouths drawing life at women's breasts;—all this, that men might lie with glazed eyeballs, and swollen faces, and fixed, blue, unclosed mouths, and great limbs tossed—this, that an acre of ground might be manured with human flesh, that next year's grass or poppies or karoo bushes may spring up greater and redder, where they have lain, or that the sand of a plain may have a glint of white bones!' And we cry, 'without an inexorable cause this must not be!' No woman who is a woman says of a human body, 'It's nothing!' ”

I confess to a belief that woman should have a direct voice in the control of affairs. The producer should have a say in the thing he or she produces. Woman produces human life and war destroys it. If woman had a larger voice in the council of nations there would be no dictate, there would be no shibboleth, no war slogan, no dream or necessity of empire which could lead her into the sacrifice of that life of which she and she alone knows the real cost.

We need not urge women to pray for peace; their souls cry out in anguish at the thought of war. It is rather to us men that the proclamation of our President is issued. This war arouses in us such great emotions that we are inclined to overlook the voice of humanity. So in a spirit of meekness let us pray not only for peace but “also to this end that He forgive us our sins, our ignorance of His holy will, our will-

fulness and many errors, and lead us in the paths of obedience to places of vision and to thoughts and counsels that purge and make wise."

HARVARD AMERICANISM.

Under recent date Dr. Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, in a letter to the Times, gives an able exposition of the point of view of those Americans whose sympathies are confined to the cause of the Allies and who are grieved by the misconduct of Germany and Austria. I say "grieved," because they all take great pains to emphasize their admiration for the achievements of the Germanic people and defend their present renunciation of sympathy with Germany on the ground that after forty years of unparalleled development in the arts and sciences the nation has, in an hour as it were, thrown away the ideals of the past and gone off after the false gods of bloodlust and conquest.

The claim of Dr. Eliot to an audience on almost any subject of abstract thought is recognized. In dealing with concrete facts, however, he has not shown, in the letter under reference, equal ability or openness of mind. As a foremost thinker of a neutral nation, writing for a neutral reading public, a greater distinction between "American sympathies" and his own sympathies might rightly be expected from Dr. Eliot's pen. A greater importance might equally well have been given to things as they are and not as the sentimentalist would have them.

Affirming the "immense obligations under which Germany has placed all the rest of the world," Dr. Eliot now feels "that the German nation has been going wrong in theoretical and practical politics for more than 100 years and is to-day reaping the consequences of her own wrong-thinking and wrong-doing."

It is very hard to take these conclusions of the eminent Doctor seriously. They are neither derived logically from his premises nor defensible by comparison with the political history of other countries in Europe during the last century. Only the great respect which I entertain for Dr. Eliot's accomplishments restrains me from dismissing them without comment.

The "political and social history of the American people and its governmental philosophy and practice" is the standard by which Dr. Eliot judges Germany. In this test Germany, from the point of view of Dr. Eliot, is found wanting. I do not question the propriety of such a comparison nor the justness of Dr. Eliot's judgment in the premises. The point I wish to make is this: Why should Germany alone, of the eight powers now engaged in this world war, be measured by this standard? Why should her departure from our methods of government and lines of thought alone be proclaimed to the American people and the inference given that her enemies are one with ourselves in these things? The same argument would condemn France and Russia, England, Servia, Belgium and Japan. They have all differed from our standards; four of them more than Germany, two of them not less. They have all "been going wrong" these hundred years and must

now be "reaping the consequences," if we are to carry Dr. Eliot's reasoning to its logical conclusion. If I may presume for myself some right to an opinion on the world's history, I would not say that Germany has been "wrong-thinking and wrong-doing for over 100 years." I would not even allow my sympathy with German ideals and their concrete attainments to lead me into saying that any one of her present armed foes had been doing so. They have all differed from us, but they have all differed one from another; they have all made mistakes, and so have we; and they are all striving, each according to the light that has been given them, for the same end. It is ungenerous and unfair to single out Germany and attempt to make her support a blame which should attach to all Europe.

Dr. Eliot goes into great detail to show the "many important matters concerning which American sympathy is strongly with Germany" and his presentation of such points is masterly. The value of his tributes to German greatness is lessened, however, by the suspicion that he has advanced them only to safeguard his reputation for fairness, and to lend strength to his subsequent arraignment of the Germany of to-day. "The German practices which do not conform to American standards in the conduct of public affairs" are enumerated in seven paragraphs, and I will take them up *seriatim*.

A. The objection is to "Germany's permanent executive and secret diplomacy." As an American, I say: "Objection sustained." I would extend it, however, to cover England, Russia, Servia, Belgium, Japan

and France, the executives of the first five of which are quite as permanent as that of Germany, unless we make allowance for Russian anarchy and Servian regicide, and the "secret diplomacy" of all of which has shown itself far more dangerous to the peace of Europe than that of Berlin.

B. The objection is to Germany's mobilization by executive order. Again, as an American, I say: "Objection sustained." I would ask Dr. Eliot, however, what about Russia and Japan? Were their armies mobilized and their fleets assembled by order of Duma and Diet? What of England's "warlike preparations" five days before war was declared? Where were the Deputies when President Poincaré ordered the French mobilization on the strength of a Cabinet consultation?

C. The objection, in greater detail, is to the "secrecy of European diplomatic intercourse and of international understandings and terms of alliance in Europe." Again, as an American, I say: "Objection sustained." But is it not true that so far as we can judge from the facts that have been made public, England at the outbreak of the present war had more secret alliances than any other country in the world? And is it not equally true that so far as we know Germany and Austria were the only countries in Europe which had none? The terms of the Triple Alliance and of the Austro-German Alliance had been public property for years. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey was compelled to acknowledge before Parliament that he had entered into undertakings with France unknown to that body. On more occasions than one in previous

years he had made technical denial of the existence of the web of diplomatic intrigue which he had silently and secretly woven about the English people.

D. The objection is to "German reliance on military force as the foundation of true national greatness." If the implication could be defended, I would say again, as an American: "Objection sustained." But it cannot be. Dr. Eliot has been reading too much of Conan Doyle, H. G. Wells and Anthony Hope and the privilege had not been his at the time he wrote to see Viscount Bryce's frank dismissal of Bernhardi as a spokesman for Germany. The German people have suffered from militarism, and no one realizes it more than they themselves, but they have suffered not from choice but from necessity. Surrounded by armed foes, what could Germany do but arm herself? And after all, who has suffered most? A large percentage of the male population of Germany have had to do from one to two years of army service, a large percentage of the males in Russia have to do from two to four years similar service, and in France the same percentage has been forced to three years of service. England alone has escaped from excessive armament on land—and has paid for it by maintaining a two-nation standard on the water. The "wooden walls" of England have been to her what the "ring of bayonets" has been to Germany—an unpleasant necessity, equally oppressive.

E. The objection is to "the extension of national territory by force contrary to the wishes of the population concerned." Again, as an American, I say: "Ob-

jection sustained"—but I cannot refrain from extending to those in the courtroom the privilege of Homeric laughter. Will Dr. Eliot tell us in a future letter wherein the allusion lies? Has Germany through forty years extended her territory one foot in Europe? Has she in the present conflict of nations given us reason to believe that she even desires to do so? On the other hand, is not the one reason for France's entrance into the war the "extension of national territory?" Is it not the spirit of the "revanche"—the desire to seize once more upon Alsace and Lorraine, that were Germany's until she was robbed of them by Louis XIV., that has moved France to her disastrous policy? The best minds of England told the world in 1870 that Germany was not only to be absolved from the charge of land theft, but was to be congratulated upon her decision to retain these reconquered provinces. I suggest for Dr. Eliot's Five Foot Shelf of Universal Learning the addition of a few volumes dealing in this connection with England in Africa, China and Venezuela, with Russia in China and Persia, with Servia in the Balkans, and with Japan in Corea and Manchuria.

F. The objection is "to the violation of treaties for no reason whatsoever." Again, as an American, I say: "Objection sustained." Perhaps Dr. Eliot refers to the "scrap of paper." But to be fair and neutral he should have called attention to the Sand River Convention and to the Italian scissors which clipped large clauses from the Treaty of 1882, on which the Triple Alliance was based. He could also have added to his collection of paleolithic treaties those conventions for the ob-

servance of the territorial integrity and neutrality of China to which both England and her oriental ally were parties and which both have now thrown to the winds of the East. I do not believe any nation tears up a treaty "for no reason whatsoever." Germany had the best reason in the world for violating Belgian soil and the world is coming to see it.

G. The objection is to the "German conduct of war." I shall not sustain this objection, in view of Dr. Eliot's subsequent remark that "all experienced readers on this side of the Atlantic are well aware that nine-tenths of all the reports they get about the war come from English and French sources, and this knowledge makes them careful not to form a judgment about details." When the London Times and writers of no less note than Jerome K. Jerome are warning England not to believe all they hear of German atrocities we need not on this side of the water give much heed to Belgian tales of German inhumanity and barbarism.

I regret that the times have called forth conditions which require me to cross pens occasionally with many an old friend. But neither Dr. Eliot nor myself nor anyone of the other Americans who have been called upon to discuss the events now taking place in Europe, was given a voice in their making. We are, equally with the victims of the war on the Continent, innocent sacrifices on an altar erected by others. I would not say one word in disparagement of the Doyen of Harvard. I am compelled, however, by a desire not to see Germany painted in misconceived color, to ask if all he has said of Germany could not have been said with

truth of the aggregate of the allies now combined against her? If, in other words, what is sauce for the goose is not equally good enough to be sauce for the gander?

EUROPE'S DEATH-GRAPPLE.

The fighting in Europe has assumed the character of a death-grapple. Whatever hopes were held of an early solution of the difficulty have been utterly blasted. It is becoming each day more evident that it is a war of extermination, a war of existence, a struggle of national life or national death. The prize of victory is world power, the penalty of defeat national bankruptcy.

The struggle lies between Germany and England. It is not a matter of a day or month, this competition for the chief place in the council of nations, but the roots lead back to the forty year clash fought first in the commercial markets of the world, and finally on the battlefield. Had the English merchant and manufacturer been able to maintain his prestige and business against the keen German competition we would not now be in the throes of a world war. We heard little about the peril of militarism until the peril of business rivalry was brought home to John Bull. During the first decade of the modern German Empire the average export total of \$1,250,000,000 did not warrant the attention of English diplomacy. During the years, however, German industry and German thoroughness brought about a remarkable change in the complexion

of the commercial situation. The British were beginning to see the handwriting on the wall. In the period immediately preceding the close of the last century German trade developed with extraordinary rapidity. In the year 1897 the London "Saturday Review" editorially expressed the view that the war between England and Germany was inevitable. Nations had fought for centuries over single cities, why not over the millions at stake in a commercial war? If Germany were to be annihilated to-morrow there would not be a single Englishman the following day who would not be the richer for it. England is the only world power that can attack Germany without risk to herself and with certainty of success. When England has finished her task she will say to France and Russia: Take what compensation you can find from Germany, you can have it. As Cato was accustomed to conclude his speeches in the Roman senate to the effect that Carthage must be destroyed, so the "Saturday Review" closed its attack on Germany with the words, "*Germaniam esse delendam.*"

This principle has become a part of the political creed of English statesmen during the last twenty years. Public opinion has been formed about it, public policy directed by it.

When Germany demanded from France during the Morocco crisis compensation in Central Africa for her withdrawal of her Moroccan interests France turned to England for help in case of war. Britain was ready to land an army of 160,000 men at Antwerp for the purpose of operating against the right flank of a Ger-

man army invading France. As a matter of fact, during the early days of the present war, England requested the permission of Holland for the passage of British troops through Flushing to Antwerp. Holland rejected the demand, observing that it was thoroughly inconsistent to protect the neutrality of Belgium by violating that of Holland.

After the Morocco crisis England adopted for a while an attitude of pretended friendship designed to lull Germany into a feeling of security. Two arrangements were undertaken between London and Berlin: one with regard to the Bagdad Railway and the Far East and the other for the settlement of the colonial question in Africa. Simultaneously with the second of these agreement, which expressed the spirit of friendship between the two great powers, England was shipping to French fortresses ammunition supplies for English artillery to be used in the event of a European war. Such an ammunition depot was Maubeuge, the French fortress on the Belgian border. The purpose undoubtedly behind this move as far as it relates to this particular fortress was to use it as a base for the operations of an English army through Belgium against the Germans. It throws a side light on the English attitude towards Belgian neutrality years before the war had started.

The relations between England and Germany became strained only when Germany grew great in the fields where England was wont to be great alone. Had Germany relied upon the grace of London for the defence of her colonial and maritime interests and not upon

a strong fleet, there might have been some method found for adjusting the difficulties. England has determined to rule the seas for all time against all nations. Germany committed the fault of aspiring to commercial greatness, and then the most unpardonable sin of building a great navy to protect those interests. The naval power of Spain and France was crushed when they interfered with the commercial aims of England. Germany must be punished because she has not read aright English history.

Ramsay McDonald, the leader of the labor party in England, says in the "Labour Leader": "Grey's policy is a misfortune for England; during the last eight years it has meant nothing but a continuous menace to the peace of Europe. Since 1906 Grey had been so deeply engaged in military arrangements, first with France, then with Russia, that he was no longer able to withdraw. His plans for military action were founded upon the basis that Belgium's neutrality must be respected. For that reason he refused to negotiate with the German ambassador concerning the question of the neutrality of England. Belgium was the pretext with him to drive England into war."

The day may not be so far distant when we, too, shall seek an outlet for our manufactures in the markets of the world. The moment we reach out for commercial triumphs we can expect to meet the hostility of England. Britain will then find some flaw in our national life, either militarism or the lack of it. As a defender of liberty and the small nations she will wage war against us until our merchant marine shall be swept

from the seas, our navy bottled up in our harbors and our dreams of mercantile expansion utterly destroyed. Britain will make war "for liberty" unto the end. Incidentally, it takes time to supplant the Germans with English goods, to restore the markets to English merchants and turn back the course of exchange to London. When that shall have been accomplished the cause of liberty and the small nations can jolly well take care of itself until it will furnish a pretext for some other time.

YAP AND NIP.

The seizure by a Japanese naval force of the Island of Yap in the German Carolines is not an important achievement of war. It is true that Yap was a station for the German cable to Berlin through the Java seas and was also equipped with a powerful wireless establishment. But as a German naval base it did not justify its purchase price. Its one harbor can be entered only by a serpentine through dangerous coral reefs and is in other ways impracticable for naval uses. As a part of the German Empire, therefore, its value was not great and its loss infinitesimal. The significance of its seizure by Japan it not to be minimized, however, and of all the nations of the world the United States should take the keenest interest and ponder deepest on the fact. The blow delivered at Yap was not dealt to Germany but to the United States. It is the insertion of the Japanese wedge into the control of the chain of islands across the Pacific which con-

stitute the stepping stones of our advent to and the bases of our defence of the Philippines. It will not be long before the wedge is driven home.

Our possessions in the Pacific are Hawaii, Midway Island, Guam, Samoa, and the Philippines. Of these, Japan wants the Philippines and Hawaii and in order to accomplish her designs on them the possession of the others is essential. In each case these smaller but still vitally important bases were "boxed" by a German possession. So long as the latter remained in German hands they were a protection rather than a menace to our interests in the Pacific. For Germany could never pretend to a dominancy in that Ocean. Once they are transferred to Japan the exact opposite is the case. The Pacific is destined to be either an American or an Asiatic sea, and Japan has taken the first step toward making it the latter.

As I have said, Yap is without intrinsic importance. Its occupation by the Japanese, however, is a distinct menace to our own possessions and promises further aggression against American supremacy in the Pacific. It is idle for Japan to characterize it as an act of temporary military necessity. Yap once Japanese will remain Japanese. It will be remembered that when Japan declared war on Germany she undertook to confine her operations to East Asian waters and that in this undertaking she was bonded by England. The necessity for allaying the apprehensions in this country as to the intentions of Japan was readily understood by her ally. The London Daily News, in discussing the subject on August 24th, said:

“The immediate gravity of Japan’s entrance into the war is its moral effect on American public opinion. Assuming that Japanese action is not limited, according to her pledges, no sensible American will hold England to blame for an event she is quite powerless to prevent. The British government ought to use its influence to restrain within strict limits the forward policy of Japan.”

The Japanese undertaking, so plausibly given by Tokio and so readily seconded by London, has now been violated. Japan has repeatedly told us that she never fails to keep her pledge, but evidently there is no reason for believing that the standards of the yellow race are in any way superior to the white. Her word is no better than that of her allies. Shall we allow her to add insult to injury by further explanations and undertakings? Her leaders are loud in their protestations of friendship for the United States, but their acts belie their words.

“The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of states to each other depend not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interests.”

These words of Richard Olney were addressed to England, but apply to-day with equal force to Japan.

The motives which prompted Japan to enter the war will be written in deeds—not words. It would be too much to expect of any Asiatic people that it should come out frankly and admit its intentions. But Kiaochow is far too small a candle for the game she is playing. She may attempt to cloak her aspirations by

advancing her "old enmity for Germany," but the pretence is too thin. The decision of Japan to join England was not by any means unanimous in the beginning on the part either of the Elder Statesmen or of the people. It was the desire not to be left out of a row in which she had so much to gain, that really brought Japan into the conflict. As soon as England declared war on Germany, Japan rushed her own mobilization, but it took some time for England to swallow the pill which she had purchased with the Japanese alliance and admit her off-color and no longer clearly necessary or even desirable friend to the party. A cessation of Japanese military activities was suddenly observable, and it took extended negotiations to convince the British Government of Japan's right to come to England's aid. I do not mean to insinuate that Sir Edward Grey had any feelings of compunction in the matter of turning Japan loose upon Germany, but the "moral support" of the United States, for which England has become so suddenly solicitous, stood in danger of impairment. So, too, the "moral support" of China, Western Canada and Australia. It was diplomacy of a high order, which could not but add further lustre to the achievements of that arch-diplomat, Sir Edward Grey, that humbled Japan to the undertaking necessary to allay the suspicions of the United States. But the ease with which Japan has departed from her pledge may be taken as throwing new light upon the value of England's secret diplomacy to anyone but England—and her allies.

I appreciate the many admirable qualities of the

Japanese people, but this appreciation does not require me to overlook the aspirations of the Japanese nation in the remote or immediate future. I have a great many friends who have lived among the Japanese and know them thoroughly. And I have yet to find the American, the German or the Britisher who has so lived among them and is entitled to speak of their history and diplomacy, who does not see in their present activity in the Pacific a direct menace to this country. The embargo on the discussion of Japanese matters which has obtained in Washington since the enactment of the Californian Alien Land Law has done much good, perhaps, but it has also done its harm. It has left the field open for the fine Roman hand of the Japanese press agency in this country to get in its work. The embargo did not, however, prevent a reporter of the Herald wiring to his paper on August 18th, as follows:

"The remarkable thing about it is that condemnation of Japan's action is heard everywhere in Congress. It comes from Northerners, Westerners, Southerners and Easterners. Out of several dozens of Representatives and Senators approached on this subject a Herald reporter found not a single one who had anything to offer in favor of Japan, while all united in expressions of strong anti-Japanese sentiments."

I put little faith from the beginning in the pledge of Japan to confine her operations to her own immediate neighborhood and now that she has violated that pledge, I can put still less faith in her promises in regard to the surrender of Yap. Nor did I believe in

either the sincerity of England when she guaranteed Japan's undertaking or in her ability to carry out the guarantee. It appears I was not far wrong. And looking forward a few years I can see the inevitable *casus belli* between Japan and the United States arise, the subjugation of Hawaii and the Philippines and the expenditure of untold lives to regain them, and all this because we have allowed the hollow prattle of England and Japan to convince us that we have nothing to fear from them. It is time that we judged others not by our standards but by their own.

BELGIUM'S GREY BOOK.

The Belgian diplomatic correspondence relating to the war has made its appearance. I try to realize, when reading any diplomatic correspondence, be it in a Blue, Orange, White or Gray Book, that its contents are carefully edited and that I am studying briefs arranged and presented by the picked intellects of a nation. It naturally follows that one does not go far wrong when taking at their face value such parts of these diplomatic documents as are not over favorable to the country which has published them.

I have frequently expressed in these columns my deep belief in the pacific and non-aggressive spirit of the German Government. This belief has been strengthened every time additional documents bearing on the European cataclysm have been published. The authors of the German brief certainly had little difficulty in presenting Germany's pacific aims clearly to

the world; and as I have had occasion to point out repeatedly, England's brief contains many dispatches testifying to the supreme effort of the German Government to safeguard Europe's peace. As to the Russian Orange Book, an analysis which appeared in the London "Economist" of September 12th, and is all the more curious coming as it does from an organ of Russia's ally, is worthy of notice. I quote from it as follow :

"The reason for the Russian mobilization is somewhat surprising. According to the Orange Book, the general mobilization orders were signed in Austria on July 28th, whereas, according to Baron de Bunsen, our Ambassador in Vienna (White Paper No. 127), general mobilization in Austria was ordered on August 1st. Since the necessity for the Russian mobilization was based on the Austrian mobilization and since the general Russian mobilization was the direct cause of the German mobilization . . ., which made war inevitable, it would seem to be important that this point should be cleared up. A further telegram in the Orange Book, from Berlin, describing the issue of German mobilization orders sometime before it actually took place, suggests that the Russian envoys were occasionally mistaken in their information."

We must wait patiently for the explanation demanded by the "Economist"—but may we not in the meantime derive a bit of satisfaction from such an authoritative English attack on the infallibility of the Russian Government and its members? It remained, however, for Belgium to give in its official papers the most

sweeping endorsement of the conciliatory attitude of the German Government which I have discovered in all the state documents I have come upon.

This is her testimony:

Mr. De L'Escalle, the Belgian Chargé at St. Petersburg, writing under date of July 30th to Brussels, made an extensive report on the state of affairs and on the diplomatic atmosphere in the Russian capital. These in part were his words:

"The days of yesterday and to-day have been spent in the waiting for events that must follow the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary upon Servia. *What is incontestable is, that Germany has striven here, as well as at Vienna, to find some means of avoiding a general conflict.*

"This morning, an official communiqué to the newspapers announces that the reserves have been called under arms in a certain number of Governments. Knowing the discreet nature of the official communiqués, one can, without fear, assert that mobilization is going on everywhere.

"England began by allowing it to be understood that she did not want to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan (British Ambassador) said that openly. To-day one is firmly convinced at St. Petersburg—one has even the assurance of it—that England will support France. This support is of enormous weight, and has contributed not a little to give the upper hand to the war party."

On August 2nd, the German Government handed to Belgium the well-known note stating that it felt itself

under the obligation to prevent a French attack through Belgium and guaranteeing the integrity of the kingdom and its possessions in return for a friendly attitude. The Belgian reply and its immediate consequence—the storming of Liége—are now familiar matters of history. The Belgian correspondence contains a wonderful endorsement not only of the pacific desires of the German Government but also of its non-aggressive spirit.

Germany has been accused in the present imbroglio of the lusting to conquer and of recklessly and greedily seizing the opportunity for conquest. On the 9th of August, however, after Liége had fallen and after Germany—bent on conquest, if we are to believe her enemies,—had apparently burned her bridges behind her, the Belgian Government, according to its own Gray Book, received a further German offer in the following terms:

“The fortress of Liége has been taken by assault after a courageous defense. The German Government regrets that such bloody encounters should have occurred. It is only by reason of the military measures of France, that it has been forced to take the grave determination of entering Belgium and of occupying Liége as a base for her further military operations. Now, that the Belgian army has in heroic resistance against great superiority maintained the honor of its arms in the most brilliant fashion, the German Government prays his Majesty the King and the Belgian Government to avert from Belgium the further horrors of war. *The German Government is ready for*

any agreement with Belgium. Once more Germany offers her solemn assurance, that she has not been actuated by any intention to appropriate Belgian territory and that such intention is far from her."

Could anything have been less aggressive than the spirit of this offer?

But the pride of Belgium had been stung to the quick and it was left to her only to fight on in her almost unaided battle.

I fancy that more has been said on the subject of the violation of Belgian neutrality than on any other topic of the war. I have myself called attention to a number of dispatches in the British "White Papers" which go far to exonerate Germany from the accusation of having proceeded ruthlessly. I have stated my belief that any country, faced by similar conditions, would have acted as Germany did. But until I read the Belgian Gray Book, I had not seen the statement of the French Minister at Brussels of July 31st that the French Government, in order "to safeguard its own defense," might modify its attitude in regard to Belgian neutrality. The German Minister at Brussels is quoted, also in the Gray Book, in the sense that the German Government felt itself under obligation "to prevent that (French) attack." I believe that the French Government chose the shrewder verbiage. I leave it to my readers to decide whether or not there is a difference of intent. I add, for the sake of comparison as to phrase and spirit, England's position in regard to the question as given to the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey on August 3rd, when he quoted approv-

ingly Gladstone's address in the same place in 1870, the Belgian neutrality treaty being then under discussion :

"There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligation under that treaty. *But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this house, what plainly amounts to the assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding to every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time, when the occasion for acting on the question arises.* The great authorities on foreign policy, to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never, to my knowledge, took that rigid, and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee."

The truth is, and it is plain enough, that no one of the three powers which had guaranteed the permanent neutrality of Belgium wished to renew or maintain that guarantee to its own disadvantage. The vindication of Germany from the charges of France and England lies not so much, however, in the fact that the other two were prepared to do as she has done, as in the fact that her interests demanded far more than theirs the destruction of the compact and that she acted under the circumstances as generously as possible.

A FAIR JUDGMENT.

Judge Peter S. Grosscup, of Chicago, to whom I am indebted for the following excellent analysis of the question of responsibility for the war in Europe, needs no introduction to the American people. As a District Court Judge for the Northern District of Illinois and later as Judge both of the United States Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, he established a reputation, equalled by few of his contemporaries, for clear-cut logic and fearless expression of views.

The application of sound judicial sense to the points involved in the present war has been avoided by England and by her ardent admirers in America for obvious reasons. I believe, and to some extent because this has been the case, that Judge Grosscup's presentation and elucidation of these points will be welcomed by all open-minded Americans.

An Appeal for a Fair Judgment.

The other day I saw a group of men in a lane some distance from the road who seemed to be in earnest conversation. Suddenly one of the men struck one of the others. Instinctively I felt that he was the aggressor—that he wished a fight. But the facts, had I been near enough to see and hear, might have been different. That first blow as I saw it may have been in self-defense; I was not near enough to see the other's clenched fist. It may have been deserved; I was not near

enough to hear the provocation. What is the only thing visible to one at a distance may not have been the fact at all as seen by those upon the spot.

American public opinion means to be fair. But we in America saw the beginnings of this war only from a distance. It looked to us as if Germany struck first. Was that the act of an aggressor wishing for a fight, or the act of one who believes he was justified in what he did? At first I thought Germany the aggressor wishing for war. The reading of the English White Paper—getting the facts from those near the scene—convinces me that the Kaiser and his councillors did not do what they have done out of desire for war. And while it does not convince me that war was unavoidable, it reveals that responsibility for it, whether it was avoidable or not, is on Russia primarily, and as much at least on England and France secondarily as on the Kaiser and his councillors. Before going to that, however, a couple of collateral considerations must be noticed.

The first of these is: How came it about that Germany was so ready for war at the moment she declared war. Is not "readiness" an evidence of "desire." Yes and No. That depends on other facts—for instance, how long has that readiness existed. One ready and wishing for war would strike quickly—would not wait forty years. Germany has been "ready" for forty-three years. Her situation, both on the west and east, has compelled her to be always ready. But while within the last sixteen years of that forty-three England has made war on the Transvaal, the United States on

Spain, Japan on Russia, and Italy on Turkey, Germany, always ready, has remained at peace. Does that count for nothing in the inquiry of whether "readiness" is evidence of "desire?" The Kaiser came to the throne in his twenties; he is now in his fifties; during that period, usually the fighting period in a man's life, he has not sent a German soldier against an enemy; of the million soldiers in the field to-day the German army alone is without a private soldier who has ever before seen actual service in battle. Does that count for nothing. Who can believe, satisfactorily to himself, that readiness of that kind is evidence of desire.

The second of these collateral matters is: How came it about that Germany invaded Belgium if she did not desire war. The White Paper shows that Germany told England she would not mobilize against France if England would assure the neutrality of France in Germany's affair with Russia. That shows she was not seeking war even with France her old enemy, much less with little Belgium that lay between them. The White Paper shows also that Germany asked England if she (England) would remain neutral if Germany, in the event of war with France, would stay out of Belgium. England professed to treat this as the offer of a bribe and declined to commit herself. The White Paper shows also that when Germany could get none of these assurances she asked for peaceful transit across the Belgian territory, offering to compensate for any losses that might follow. This Belgium refused. One other fact in this connection—the geography of the country. A look at that will show that for Ger-

many to swing her forces solely on the southerly bend through Alsace and Lorraine would leave her northern flank at the mercy of a northern army from either England or France. To keep out of Belgium, therefore, with England a possible enemy, would have been military madness. Now with all these facts in mind what was, not the technical but the moral obligation of Germany to Belgium. By going across Belgium she was not forcing war on Belgium; for although Belgium was under no duty to Germany to grant her transit, she was under no duty to England or France to resist it by force. She could have remained neutral by remaining passive, while Japan, called out by England, is going across her territory toward Germany's Chinese port, China has not given permission; she protests; but no one believes, much less anyone in England, that as a neutral she is obliged to take up arms against the country whose army is crossing. Indeed Belgium's right not to be molested, even by troops in transit, was not that of "guaranteed neutrality" at all, resting on treaty, but of territorial inviolability, resting on the fact that she was an independent nation—the same right that I have to exclude you from my house, not because you have agreed with someone else, to let me alone, but because the law gives me the right, on my own account, to be let alone.

But suppose, in pursuit of one who has attacked you or is about to attack you, you go through my house, that being the only way you can effectually overtake him. However technically it may be a trespass, will the law look upon it as a moral wrong. Some abstract

rights have to yield, on occasion, to greater concrete needs. Whether Germany was morally right in attacking France is one question; her military necessities, in case she was morally right in the attack, is another and a different question. And that public opinion lacks all sense of proportion which holds, that however morally right the attack on France may have been, and whatever the necessity of going across Belgium, there is a moral wrong in trespassing on Belgium's abstract right of territorial inviolability—compensation being guaranteed. At least, except as an excuse, no nation yet has made it a cause for war. As for France, assuming again that Germany was right in striking her, her mouth is closed against complaining of the violation of the treaty by the fact that she provoked it. And England, in declining to say whether she would be a belligerent or not, is in the same posture. As pretended guardians of Belgium they cannot provoke an attack and then fend it off by holding up their ward between them and the blows that follow; so that as a moral question, this occupation by Germany of Belgian soil for the purpose of transit, is merged in the larger moral question: Was Germany right in her attack on France—did she honestly believe that her security and honor required that that attack should be made?

Though the White Paper covers five pages of the American newspaper in which I found it, the essential facts pertinent to this larger question are few and can be compactly stated. The first of these—trite enough but never to be lost sight of—is that the Austro-Hun-

garian monarchy contains a very large Slav population—the race of the Servians also—some of it added in recent years. This constituted, to say the least, a highly inflammable anti-Austrian material to anyone disposed to start a fire within the Austro-Hungarian boundaries. Another fact—not so trite but equally important—is that Servia has been systematically distributing firebrands throughout this inflammable matter. “It was a subversive movement,” says the Austrian Foreign Minister in one of the dispatches constituting the White Paper, “intended to detach from Austria a part of her empire, carried on by organized societies in Servia, to which Servian high officials, including ministers, generals and judges, belonged, and resulting in the assassination of the heir to the throne and his wife,” not as the individual mad deed of a Guiteau or a Czolgosz, we might add, but of “an organized propaganda and conspiracy” that developed itself in several attempts, at several unconnected points, by several persons, on the same day; a statement of the Servian attitude nowhere denied in this English White Paper, either in the London Foreign Office or the Embassies at Paris or St. Petersburg. On the contrary Sir Edward Grey says he cannot help but look with sympathy on the basis of the Austro-Hungarian complaint. And Servia herself practically admits the truth of it, in her reply to the Austrian ultimatum, for though she calls whatever agitation took place “political”—that is to say, something whose object is the change of government and not private murder—she offers to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana, a revolutionary society, and

every society which may be "directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary;" to introduce a law providing for the most severe punishment of "publications calculated to incite hatred against the territorial integrity of Austria;" to remove from the "public educational establishments" in Serbia everything calculated to foment propaganda against Austria; and to remove from military service all such persons as judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of Austria-Hungary—promises no people would make unless there was a basis of fact for the complaint.

But though Serbia thus acknowledged the basis of the complaint, and promised to take measures to remedy it, she refused the "collaboration" of Austrian representatives, or the participation of Austrian "delegates," in the investigations relating thereto. She made no straight out denial of the subversive movements alleged. The most that can be made of her answer is that she neither admits nor denies, but simply calls for the proofs. But she refused the presence of Austria at the taking of the proofs. In a word, as Austria viewed it, should the promised investigation be a white-wash, or should it be a sincere effort to locate responsibility? Austria wanted a sincere investigation—the attitude of Serbia looks as if she wanted a white-wash. And it was on that that the two countries broke.

Now was Austria-Hungary right in making the demand and Serbia wrong in refusing the demand, that Austrian delegates sit in at the investigation. That is the crux of the matter as a question between Austria

and Servia. The conduct of nations, like that of individuals, must stand the test of common sense. And like individuals, nations have the right to have their word taken in matters of this kind until their word is no longer good, by being repeatedly broken; so that had this been the first complaint by Austria against Servia on this matter, and this Servia's first promise to live hereafter on friendly relations, there would have been no justification for Austria's demand, or for her refusal to take Servia's word that a fair investigation would be made and the guilty punished. But this White Paper shows that this was not Servia's first promise—that she had made former promises—that this new offer of her word was the offer of an already broken word. This is the third fact in the enquiry—the turning fact in the question of who was wrong and who was right—a fact entirely ignored in the views pressed upon American public opinion. Five years before, March 18, 1909, Servia gave her word, not to Austria alone, but to the Great Powers, that this scattering of firebands should cease—that thereafter she would live as a friendly neighbor. That shows that five years before the offense was already in existence. Did it cease? Was the word kept? In the note communicated to Sir Edward Grey by the German Ambassador July 24th, 1914—a note that called out from Sir Edward, not a denial, but an expression of sympathy—the German Ambassador, referring to that earlier promise says, "It was only owing to the far-reaching self-restraint and moderation of the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the energetic interference of

the Great Powers, that the Servian provocation to which Austria-Hungary was then (March, 1909) exposed did not lead to a conflict. The assurance of good conduct in the future which was then given by the Servian government has not been kept. Under the eyes, at least with the tacit permission of official Serbia, the great Servian propaganda has continuously increased in extension and intensity; to its account must be set the recent crime the threads of which lead to Belgrade;" an indictment that none of the Powers so much as question—neither the Foreign Offices nor Embassies of Russia, England or France—and to which Serbia practically pleads guilty in her answer to the Austrian ultimatum already stated.

Now in view of this, what was Austria-Hungary to do? Accept the word of Serbia again? We must look at it not from the standpoint of those who think the Austro-Hungarian government ought to be destroyed, but from the standpoint of Austria-Hungary herself. What would we of America do, if despite a solemn promise to desist, some neighboring nation continued to stir up racial revolution among our people—say Spain among the Porto Ricans or Philippines? Would we accept that nation's word again? It is a just and generous nature that accepts the offender's word on the first offense, but a foolish or craven nature that continues to accept it through repetitions of the offense. Let us not lose sight of the practical side of the problem as presented to Austria. The spirit behind these attacks on Austria-Hungary was not the spirit of the Servian Government only but the

spirit of the Servian people also. A government may be reached sometimes by protest. But there are cases in which a people can only be reached by some tangible military demonstration. History is replete with demonstrations of that kind; so that the problem of Austria, now that the government's word could no longer be taken, was to impress the people of Servia with Austria-Hungary's purpose not to be silent longer under these flying firebands. We went to war with Spain for less than Austria was suffering at the hands of Servia. England declared war on the republic of Paul Kruger for less. And Italy declared war on Turkey for less. And in each case the war closed with territory detached from the vanquished and taken by the victor. Were we wrong? More than that: Did any great outside Power even say Nay? On the contrary we were left to deal with the problem as we thought right. Why, then, should any outside Power say Nay to Austria, especially if no territory was to be taken? Morally right in her demand on Servia, to sit in at the investigation, why was not Austria left alone to enforce that right, as England, the United States, and Italy had been left to enforce their rights?

The answer is—Russia. And that, too, not because Austria was without just cause for what she proposed, but because any movement against the Slavs of Servia would not be tolerated by "home opinion" in Russia. That is the fourth salient fact contained in the White Paper. Had Russia stood aside as England was willing to stand aside, except to see that the demonstration against Servia was not carried too far, the flame would

not have spread to Europe. England had no interest in it, as an "Austro-Servian question;" so Sir Edward Grey expressly declared. France's interest was merely that of ally of Russia—it was put on that ground at the time by the French Foreign Office; so it was Russia's interference, and Russia's interference alone, that blew the flame from a matter concerning Austria and Servia only, to a matter involving Europe. And upon the sole reason (at least such is the purport of the White Paper) that there was a condition of opinion "at home" that would not permit her to be tolerant, or even just, in such a dispute as this abroad. Group together, in your mind, these three facts—the presence of the Slav in large numbers in Austro-Hungarian population; the systematic stirring of these Slavs by Servia against Austria-Hungary, and the persistence of Servia in that, even after solemn promises to stop it, both to Austria and the Great Powers—and you have staked out the cause of the war as an immediate matter between Austria and Servia. Add the fourth fact—the determination of Russia, for reasons of her own, that no military demonstration should be made to stop Servia—and you will have the lever that lifted it from an Austro-Servian question to a European question. Russia is the great Slav country of the world. It is not impossible that that great race demanded of its government that no Slav anywhere should be punished, even if he were stirring up the Slavs of a neighboring nation. It is not impossible that Russia, pressed at home by her own Slavs for a greater measure of civil liberty, saw in the Servian situation a vent for that feeling, by becoming

the champion of her race abroad. It is not impossible that Russia has designs of her own on the Balkan peninsula, and feared that a demonstration by Austria might take the form of acquiring territory. Whatever the reason, the spark that has ignited Europe was this alleged public opinion in Russia. What subsequently transpired was simply the development of that spark. Germany tried to drown it out, even in Russia; the White Paper shows that on a sharp note from her to Austria, Austria stipulated not to take any of Servia's territory. Germany tried to prevent its spreading to France; did not want war with France; the White Paper shows, as already stated, that she said she would not mobilize against France if England would stipulate for France's neutrality. And it is certain Germany did not want war with England. Even after England announced she would not permit Germany to attack from sea the northern coast of France, and asked about the purposes of Germany respecting Belgium, Germany suggested that if England would remain neutral she would stay out of Belgium. But Russia was immovable; she would not accept the offered stipulation of Austria that territory would not be taken from Servia. England would make no assurances for France; and with respect to Belgium, professed to look upon the suggestion as the offer of a bribe.

War is hideous. The Kaiser and his father always ready, as their situation made it essential they should be ready, had for forty-three years averted it. But if put in his place, the head of a nation, what could you have done? What could Austria and Germany do?

Let the Servian Government and the Servian people go free, on her own word again? That would be to invite continued attacks. Serbia would have ascribed this indulgence to fear of stirring up trouble in Europe. Let Russia's interference change this? Serbia would have known then that their indulgence was due to fear—the fear of Russia. Besides there is a national self-respect that must be maintained. Germany and Austria bowing to the yoke of Russia, on a matter in which Germany and Austria were right and Russia wrong, would have been Germany and Austria already morally vanquished. Even though France and England had come at once, and openly, to the side of Russia, could Germany and Austria have let the matter go on Serbia's word? Not unless they were willing to bow their necks to the yoke of Europe. The fact that England and France joined Russia in putting on the yoke would not have alleviated the servility of bearing it.

But was there no way to escape that yoke without war? That is the question history will ask. Without war with Russia, no—unless Austria accepted the Russian veto on any demonstration against Serbia. Russia's mind was made up. Austria stipulated not to annex Servian territory; that was not enough; Russia remained immovable. England suggested a conference, and pending such conference that Austria be allowed to occupy Belgrade. Russia refused. Russia was willing that England, Italy, France, and Germany should go into conference, but made it clear that pending the outcome of such a conference Austria's hands must be tied even from making a military demonstration of

her determination that the incendiarism should cease. Russia's will in the matter must be accepted by Europe as well as by Germany and Austria. That was Russia's attitude. And it meant to Austria and Germany either to bow to that will, or war—with Russia at least.

Russia undoubtedly believed she had the backing of France in this, and possibly of England also. The White Paper contains a dispatch showing that the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg was urging the "solidarity" of Russia, France and England, on the English Ambassador there. Now why did France back Russia? Why has England come finally to back her, for the Belgian matter is only an excuse? On this matter between Austria and Russia, Austria was right and Russia was wrong. For Austria to have surrendered to the veto of Russia would have meant the surrender of her independence as a great power. Why did France (and England finally) virtually insist on that surrender? Because of the Triple Entente? No ally is bound to support another ally in a wrong. It is on that ground that American public opinion is excusing Italy from her obligation to Germany. Why then did not England and France let Germany, right, have it out alone with Russia, wrong?

There was something else than the Triple Entente. Europe the chief seat of civilization is the chief seat of the world-old struggle of the races also, especially eastern and southeastern Europe; the drawing of the races together by the concentric chords of modern life has only intensified that struggle. Europe also is the seat of the modern struggle of

economic ambitions; industry in our day has become the affair not of individuals but of nations. But as colors released from their anchorage run together, the races drawn out of their isolations are merging, and industry no longer a matter of small spheres is concentrating into larger and larger spheres; neither races nor economic spheres can be kept separate longer by national boundaries. Within the thirty years between my first and last visits to Europe this process of things becoming alike (including people) has transformed Europe from a land of picturesque differences to a land resembling America in identity of dress, of mental attitudes, and of the internal spirit as well as external appearances of live affairs. That means that the day of a larger political concentration is at hand also. What led France and England to back Russia, wrong, in this Austria-Hungary matter against Germany, right, was, undoubtedly, their apprehension that Germany successful over Russia would be Germany not simply pre-eminent, but preponderant, both politically and economically, among the nations of the continent.

That apprehension may have been justified by the probable fact. The spread of the war to the whole of Europe, in consequence, history may justify; I am only stating what I believe to be the basic cause. But this thing every honest mind must admit: If this was the Big Cause, underneath the smaller causes, that brought France and England into the struggle, Germany, by every law that entitles a nation to honestly grow, was entitled to resist them. And if war on one side of this

apprehension was something not to be denominated as monstrous, war on the other side is equally above that common epithet. It is not impossible of course that Germany made a mistake in believing war with Russia, or surrender to Russia, was unavoidable, through conference. Only Omniscience and the Russian Cabinet knew. It is not impossible that Germany made a tactical mistake—that the participation of England on the side of Russia might have been avoided by that conference. Only Omniscience and the English Cabinet knew. And it is not impossible that Germany made a mistake as to her own strength, even when ready, against her enemies' unreadiness. The event will prove. But the duty and the responsibility of balancing these, as to whether he would wait for such conference or not, was with the Kaiser and his councillors. He knew that Germany was ready. And who has the right to say, that if war either now or a little later was inevitable—if the attitude of France and England supporting Russia, wrong, against Germany, right, in the Austro-Servian matter, revealed their true attitude toward the natural growth of Germany in the family of nations—who has the right to say in that event that William was bound to wait until his own preparations had been matched by theirs. I am not unreservedly for Germany, nor for France or England in this war. There is much I do not know that might turn the scale either way. But I am for an open mind. The question is not: Who struck the first blow? The question is: Why was any blow made necessary?

Peter S. Grosscup.

I cannot refrain from the observation that Judge Grosscup has not only struck, in the article concluded above the true note of that higher neutrality enunciated by President Wilson, but that he has also given a sound, logical and workable interpretation of it. If in the beginning all Americans and all American organs of publicity had approached the situation in Europe with "an open mind" we might have been spared the war of words which it has brought down about our ears. Attack inspires defense, and as in Europe, Germany and Austria were not the aggressors, so in the American press, it was not those who sympathized with Germany and Austria who opened hostilities but those who insisted upon vilifying them. It is high time that "cease firing" were sounded.

EUROPE'S WAR.

The war in Europe was of Europe's making. The United States was not approached before the declaration of hostilities on the question of its attitude in the circumstances. In one way, therefore, the conflict is none of our business. If its effects could have been confined to Europe solely it would in no sense have been any business of ours. But they could not be, or, rather, have not been, and as a consequence we are brought to a situation vis-a-vis the belligerent powers which demands that we no longer delay a definite statement of our position on certain points of policy. It is not necessary to go into those eternal details which serve only to confuse and to confound. The facts are

that our Atlantic coast has been subjected to a blockade by British cruisers inconsistent alike with our rightful interests as a neutral trading nation and with our claims to the privileges of an independent power, and that our ships have been seized and carried into foreign ports, our right to peaceful trade disputed, our mails interfered with, and our citizens detained, in violation of the written laws of war and the unwritten principles which underlie the comity of nations.

The action of Great Britain in these matters is historically not without precedent. We suffered from the same treatment between 1783 and 1814, but were of the opinion that the claim of England to the rights of search and impressment was definitely settled by the War of 1812. Apparently, we were wrong. The same claim to absolute and unquestionable dominion over the waters of the South was asserted by England during the War of the States. And again we thought that in the Geneva Award we had secured some controversion of England's pretensions. But to-day our eyes are once more opened to the fact that we have not advanced one step in over a century in the fight for the freedom of the seas. We are still face to face with the cry and claim that "Britannia rules the waves" and that whatever transpires thereon is solely a matter for the adjudication of British courts.

The United States fought for years for the rights of private property at sea. She fought the battle of not only her own people but of the peoples of the world. And England alone opposed her. And why? Solely because as the dominant naval power of the

world it was her interest to do so. Willing enough to write into international law all the possible ameliorating conditions under which land war was to be waged, England has stood out consistently for 18th Century principles in the conduct of belligerents on the seas. She has reserved to herself, in other words, every "right" which could be availed of to maintain her unquestioned command of the water-ways of international trade. From the Declaration of Paris to the Declaration of London the policy which she has stood for has uncovered her hand.

The time has come to call a halt. We have come so far under the charm of England's campaign for our "moral support" that perhaps it is difficult to see things clearly as they are. A blind man could discern, however, between England's desires and her deserts. There is no reason why we should allot our friendship where we receive no return in kind. We are asked to support England in her present distress of war and terror, morally, and recently we have been called upon for support of a more material character: but what have we had from her? Injury and insult and nothing else!

I know that there is a certain element in Boston and in Washington, bottle-fed and nipple-nursed by England, that would like to see the Stars and Stripes hauled down and the Union Jack floating once more from Hudson Bay to Houston, Texas, but does that element represent the American people as a whole? We have had Americans in the past who realized that we are no longer a colonial appanage of Europe. Have we not one to-day? We have had statesmen who lived

and died and fought as Americans, supported by a firm faith in our independent sovereignty, and the fact that we were big enough and strong enough to assert our right to a first place in the family of nations. Have we not one now? We have told the powers of Europe on more occasions than one that we should regard as an unfriendly act precisely what England has done and is continuing to do off our coast in the present war. Why do we submit to it to-day?

The answer is at hand. We have passed from the school of Clay and Webster, Seward, Fish, Blaine and Olney, to a school of psychologists, who see in every protest against our re-union with the apron strings of England nothing but "mental exercise." We are represented no longer by men, but by invertebrates. We have no longer as our spokesmen officials who speak "American," but only such as speak "English." The one redeeming excuse of our present Administration is that knowing nothing of the merits of the case and utterly incapable of sane expression on the subject, it has done nothing. Why, however, was the one man in all America who could have handled the situation, John Bassett Moore, driven from the Service?

I am not interested in the fact that it is England that is attempting to destroy our trade and our prestige before the world. I should speak just as plainly if it were Germany or Austria, Japan, China or Chile. The point to be made is that no nation on God's earth has a right to interfere with American trade as it is being interfered with; and that no administration in Washington, whether Whig or Tory, Republican, Democratic

or Progressive, has a right to surrender our dignity to any such nation.

We are face to face to-day with facts, not theories. We are face to face with conditions which spell defeat in the fight for a further share in the world's trade. We are face to face with a problem that demands that we either assert our rights, or withdraw our claim to be more than a colony of the British crown. The question is: Shall we assert those rights, not insultingly, but clearly and in no unmeaning periphrasis, or shall we admit the claim of other powers to dictate to us on what conditions we shall continue to exist and to have intercourse with the people of the world? A century ago the answer would have been clear; a half century ago, a decade ago, it would have been so. But to-day we seem to wallow in the sloth of a psycho-pacifism which is incapable of either right thinking or manly protest.

It is time that the American people registered their interpretation of the Presidency—that they asserted the duty of its incumbent to be the fulfillment of the national desire and not the proclamation of personal theories, however gilded their frames, that are inconsistent therewith. We want only the rights of a neutral nation at peace with all the world, and these are being denied to us. It is a telling disgrace that our representatives have not the bowels to maintain the dignity of their country.

BLOCKADING AMERICA.

If, during the Spanish-American war, the United

States Government had ordered its warships to patrol the port of London with instructions to search English ships bound for neutral ports, as for example Italy, can there be any question as to the vigorous steps England would have taken to have prevented the carrying out of such a blockade?

This question of blockading is not a new one in American history. In the period ending 1812 England had so trampled upon the rights of a little nation, the United States of America, that we were obliged to fight the British Empire to maintain our sovereign rights. To-day we are a great nation, entirely able to maintain our dignity and our neutrality; yet strangely enough there seems to be a difference between the strong Americanism of that time and the psychological un-Americanism of to-day. In 1870 President Grant instructed Hamilton Fish to send the following words to France: "This Government would regard as an unfriendly act the hovering of such vessels upon the coast of the United States, near to its shores, in the neighborhood of its ports and in the track of the ordinary commerce of these ports, that intend to intercept the vessels of trade of its enemy." If I may be so bold as to ask, in what way does the attempt of France in Oct., 1870, to blockade our ports differ from the present policy of Great Britain in blockading the port of New York? Had the French navy been bold enough to seize American ships bound for neutral ports, I leave it to the judgment of any American acquainted with the temper of General Grant, whether or no France or Germany or any other nation would have been able to

maintain such a course without the active protest of the United States, backed up by whatever physical force may have been necessary.

Because England is suffering from hysterical fear of a Zeppelin raid, and imagines that oil consigned to Denmark and Norway is to be used against her, is no reason whatsoever for holding us responsible for the failure on the part of Norway or Denmark or Holland to maintain their own neutrality. Great Britain finds it easier to outrage the American flag than to dictate to Denmark, Norway or Holland. We are forced to the conclusion that it is necessary to appease the fears of England at whatever cost to the dignity of the United States. If our government were conducted with the backbone of little Denmark, for instance, England would be obliged to rely on Denmark's neutrality and not on us, and would not attempt to ride roughshod over the American flag.

Britain finds it difficult to rid herself of the idea that we are more than a colonial dependency. Could anything be more stupid than the British censorship during the last three months? The deliberate falsification of official German dispatches proves the extent to which England seems to be ready to go in order to have the world decide the questions of fact through British eyes. It is, of course, too utterly stupid because within a few days or weeks at most, the facts come through. No fair-minded man reads the British dispatches without realizing that they represent what Britain wants and not what has actually taken place. The "Evening Post" of yesterday, in an editorial on this subject, stated :

"That the British censorship of the war news has reflected credit neither upon the intelligence of the officials nor upon their reputation for fair play is daily becoming more and more evident. It has plainly been controlled chiefly by a desire to conceal from the rest of the world the extent of any German successes, to blacken the enemy's character as much as possible, and generally to win the aid of public opinion in the United States by any means available."

Public opinion in America cannot be won over by falsification and suppression of facts. Neither can it be won over by a nation which tramples so ruthlessly upon our international rights. The campaign conducted in this country so vigorously by England during the first sixty days of the war, can no longer cloak her real motives in misusing the friendship she seems so anxious to win. A. Maurice Low, the correspondent of the London Morning Post, wired his newspaper yesterday that England need not be alarmed about the American attitude in the matter of the seizure of ships, that President Wilson's course from the beginning of hostilities has been admirable and absolutely correct, that America will not allow herself to fall into any German trap and that American public opinion is quite firmly fixed on the side of England. I venture to predict that before another 30 days have gone by public opinion here will learn on how substantial a basis English friendship rests. It is too much to expect that England and her Japanese ally have any real interest in our affairs, or would make any sacrifice for us. Whatever their expressions of friendship may be they are bankrupted by the facts.

A FAIR JUDGMENT.

(*Continued.*)

I published in this column some days ago Judge Grosscup's article on the war. A certain phase of his argument was taken exception to by The Times. I now have pleasure in printing Judge Grosscup's counter-reply thereto.

An editorial just seen by me in the N. Y. Times comments on some views of Belgian neutrality expressed by me in the Staats-Zeitung. This comment was no doubt meant to be fair and was without temper—something rather unusual these days in European war talk. But it left an incorrect impression of what I had written. Will you let me briefly state what my view is?

The Congress of Vienna of 1815, sitting after the fall of Napoleon, took Holland and Belgium away from Austria and made of them a single kingdom, guaranteeing its neutrality. The parties to that stipulation included England and Prussia, the party feared being France. In 1831 Belgium obtained her independence and again had her neutrality guaranteed by the great powers, including England and Prussia. The effect of this stipulation was that of international "contract" between the powers signing, that in case of war between them, and especially in case of war between other powers, the neutrality of Belgium, a small state comparatively, should be observed and protected by

the larger states. Unquestionably the decision of Germany to cross Belgium was in contravention of that contract, and, in consequence, an international wrong, unless countervailing circumstances had arisen that made compliance with that contract a greater wrong. The point I wish to bring out is that the relation of Germany and England with respect to the Belgian matter, so far as England was concerned, was a matter of contract only.

On the other hand Belgium as an independent neutral state was entitled, not by this contract, mainly, but by the law of nations, to possess her territory inviolate from the trespass of other nations. Until early in the 19th century this right included the right to grant leave to belligerents to cross her territory on the way to the enemy. This, says the German authority quoted in your editorial—the nations of the continent being small and largely separated from each other by the territory of other nations—was a matter of “necessity.” Since the early part of the century, however, the opinion has become pretty near unanimous that a neutral nation may not grant such leave, but on the contrary must “prohibit” the use of its territory for the transit of troops. “It is nevertheless conceivable,” says Sir Thomas Barclay, an English authority writing since 1907 for the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, “that under pressure of military necessity, or on account of an overwhelming interest, a powerful belligerent state would cross the territory of a weak neutral state and leave the consequences to diplomacy;” as an illustration of which he cites the act of England in crossing

Portuguese territory, on its way to the South African Republics in 1901, over the protest of Portugal. Those who succeed him in writing may also cite as an illustration Japan's crossing China in this war of 1914 on her way to the German Chinese port, and over the protest of China also—Japan, according to her premier's statement, having been called out by England. In a word, neither the law of international trespass, nor treaty, abolishes "necessity" as an element in international warfare.

Now let us look at the facts as a matter of "contract" between England and Germany—assuming, of course, that Germany was morally right in an attack of any kind on France. To march into France by any way other than through Belgium is to go by a southerly bend through Alsace and Lorraine. That would leave the whole of the northern half of France free from attack except from the south. Bismarck could afford to do this in 1870 because England had announced her neutrality. On August 2, 1914, six days before the German armies touched Belgium, and when the question of Belgian neutrality was still under discussion between the English and German Foreign Offices, England not only had not announced her neutrality but gave her engagement to France that she would prevent, with her fleet, the Germans from attacking or blockading, with their fleet, the northern ports of France. England could not do this and remain a neutral. To say she would block with her fleet impending operations of the German fleet in the war that was opening in France was, in itself, an act of war; this too in con-

nection with the fact that, when England asked Germany her intentions respecting Belgium, Germany asked England if she (Germany) remained out of Belgium, would England remain neutral—a question England refused to answer except to say she would not tie her hands. Here then was England already enough at war with Germany to block any attack on the northern ports of France; ready, too, to come through those ports with her armies to the help of the French armies, in case she became a full belligerent which her attitude clearly foreshadowed; and not above coming through Belgium also, in case of stress, upon the flank of Germany, as her conduct in South Africa showed. Now what under such circumstances was Germany to do with that “contract” with England? Keep it, as a sportsman, you say, would keep his side of a stipulation however onerous, and thereby increase by one-half Germany’s chances of defeat, certainly prolong the war, and with equal certainty give up a much larger toll of lives to bring the war to an end? War is not a sport; and defeat in war and its bruises are not the defeated sportsman going home with a sore pride or sores on his arms and legs. Defeat in such a war as this is the loss of everything for which a capable and gallant people have struggled since 1870, and the bruises are the families left at home without husbands, sons and brothers. To say that a “stipulation” thus misused by England—the England that has since palmed it off as the “cause” of war although she had already entered the arena before as a partial belligerent at least—should prevail over these larger circumstances both

military and humane, is not the essence of morality; it is quixotic, contrary to the common sense of one's obligations, inhuman as well as unhuman, and would have marked the German Kaiser as a faithless servant of his people.

But what about the consequences to Belgium? The sympathies of the world naturally go out to her—not less the sympathies of those who believe she was beguiled into unnecessary fighting on her part than of those who think it was her duty to fight. As a neutral nation Belgium could not have granted leave to Germany to cross her territory. I will go as far as the authority quoted and say it was her duty to “prohibit” Germany from crossing her territory. But she was under no obligation to England or the other nations to use herself up and her army in that prohibition. Belgium is to Germany in military strength about what Switzerland would be to Austria. Switzerland is also a country whose neutrality is guaranteed. Now suppose Austria, in a time of peace, had put some great dishonor on France—had seized her President and her ministers when on a visit to Vienna and held them as prisoners—how could France reach Austria by land except through Germany, Italy or Switzerland? Suppose further that Germany refused transit and Italy as a member of the Triple Alliance not only refused transit but with her navy barred the sea as England barred the sea to Germany, would Switzerland be obliged to let France eat up her army? Along with the balance of the world Switzerland's sense of justice and feelings might be all on the side of France—must she in spite

of that on "a point of law" become practically the fighting ally of Austria? It puts a "point of law" above humanity and ordinary common sense. Who thinks that in case Switzerland would not thus immolate her army, Austria or the world would hold her accountable afterwards? Who thinks China will be held accountable by Germany after the war, even if Germany is successful? Who feels that England would hold Belgium accountable? And why not? Because down in his heart every man knows that to hold a power like Belgium or Switzerland to such an accountability would shock the moral sense of the world. In any wide vision of the situation, therefore, Belgium was not required to resist Germany "by force." She had the right to, but was not morally required to. Even as a "point of law" in international jurisprudence, her obligation did not go that far. International law is not unreasonable. It recognizes "necessity" as a force in affairs. It does not demand more blood than is necessary to reach conclusions—demands no fruitless blood of the innocent bystander to fulfill a technicality or keep the record straight. If Germany is morally wrong in this war on France and Russia, my pro-english friend does not need this side issue to justify his sympathies. On the other hand, if Germany is morally right as between her and France and Russia, he is forgetting the duty not to a sacrifice to a "word" the wider and substantial "thing," the increased danger of defeat and increased cost of life involved in shutting one's eyes to what may be the overshadowing military necessity of the situation. And if you reply that such

doctrine is immoral, my answer is that in this case you are making a fetish of something that it would be, in the highest sense of humanity, immoral not to disregard: for it is the letter of the law that killeth, only the spirit that maketh alive. England professing still to be not at war, holding back Germany on the neutral seas—itself a flagrant violation of neutrality—will cut a poor figure in her pretense that what brought her into the conflict was this subsequent violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany.

In a word the position of England toward Germany was this: You shall not use the neutral seas to attack with your navy the northern ports of France or open them up to your armies. I will use my navy to prevent you from the use of such neutral seas. Nor shall you reach northern France with your armies through Belgium. I will use this "contract" of neutrality to block that. My obligation toward neutrality amounts to nothing on the seas; but your obligation of neutrality is everything on the land. And because Germany did not submit to this double cross on her right to attack France from the north, England professes to have gone into the war as the champion of the cause of the inviolability of treaties and of neutrality.

Peter S. Grosscup.

TURKEY.

The breakdown of the Triple Alliance was brought about by the historical hatred and fear of Austria by Italy. The appearance of Turkey in the present Euro-

pean war can be ascribed with equal certainty to the historical fear and hatred entertained by her of Russia and England. There has not been a day since the "will" of Peter the Great was written when Turkey has not stood in terror of Russian aggression. She has tasted of it on more occasions than one. It was England and France who saved her in the Crimea. It was British diplomacy that drew away the Bear of the North in 1878. Balked in two attempts to gain the Dardanelles or an open sea port in the Balkans Russia was about to attempt a third. The Ottoman Government discerned these things as readily as the next government. It has acted, and acted definitely. What interests us is what the result will be.

The alignment of Turkey with Germany and Austria opens a new question in the war in Europe. What will Roumania and Bulgaria do? What will Italy, and there is where the rub comes in, do?

I do not pretend to omniscience, but I should say that Bulgaria will probably follow Turkey into war on Russia. Greece, and possibly Roumania, will oppose Turkey. Their fighting powers are limited, however.

The peace strength of Turkey is in the neighborhood of half a million men. The war strength is quadruple her peace strength. It will be seen, therefore, that she can constitute a formidable diversion on the southern frontier of Russia. If we add to this number a half million of Bulgarians, we have a force which can not only handle Roumania and Greece but can still prove a thorn in the flesh of the Little Father.

Turkey can no more forgive Russia than Italy can

forgive Austria. She will not forgive her, and she will fight to the end. It is the last defence of the "Sick Man of Europe" of his dominions. If he fails Russia will have Dardanelles and the Hellespont and the only consolation will be that she has entered upon competition in the Mediterranean with Great Britain. That, however, is no great consolation to Turkey.

I do not regard the Turkish military strength as the greatest factor, however, in the entrance of Turkey into the war. As leader of the Moslems, the Sultan has an influence which extends far beyond his immediate borders. It will be felt not only in Egypt, where England is attempting to cling to her suzerainty, but in India and elsewhere. There is no love lost between the Porte and England and this advantage may be expected to be pressed to the utmost. There will be no "Holy War" but there may be something else much more serious for Great Britain. The feeling can not but extend from Turkey to Persia where British and Russian superciliousness has created a strong sentiment against these two countries, and where British interests especially will suffer. The British trader will be the first to feel it.

There is another aspect of the matter, however. Were the Suez Canal to be put out of commission the transport of the wild tribes of India to the firing line in France would be vitally affected. And it is in Turkey's power to put the Suez Canal out of Commission. Then those "loyal Indians" which are rushing to the support of Sir Edward Grey would have to be transported by way of Canada or the Cape. The whole stretch of

land from Constantinople to Cairo and beyond is Turkey's, and it requires but a word from the Sultan of Turkey to turn its teeming population into devoted enemies of the great enemy of Turkey—England. Sedition has appeared in Egypt already—sedition against the claims of the British Crown, and with the revolt in South Africa and the disaffection in Ireland, it may be depended upon to give England her handful of trouble.

I regard the decision of Turkey to throw her lot against Russia and England as one of the significant features of the present war. It is one more sign of the rejuvenescence of that powerful country and a token that not all the world is yet ready to bow the knee and say: "Aye," when England claims world dominance. It is a cogent protest against the redivision of the world between two powers. There is only one thing to fear from it: the further extension of the war area. But if we have judged Italy rightly, the motives which determined her action vis-a-vis Germany and Austria, will actuate her to continue in the character of a neutral country. She has nothing to lose by Turkey's entrance into the war. She has everything to lose by entering it herself.

I cannot, therefore, come to any other conclusion than that the acquisition of Turkey as an ally has been a distinct gain to Austria and Germany. Were its prophesied consequences to follow—were Greece and Roumania to cast their lots with the Allies against her—I should say the same thing. The fighting power of Turkey, well led, is so essentially superior to that of all the Balkan states that can be aligned against her

that the gain to the Dual Alliance is still one of no mean significance. With Turkey operating from the Black Sea to Egypt, and with her influence extending wherever a Moslem dwells, she is a factor which cannot be overlooked.

TSINGTAU.

A tragedy that will live as long as heroism is remembered is being staged to-day in a small outpost of western civilization on the coast of China. The spectacle of the 4,000 Germans in Tsingtau defying the Japanese nation is not one to be lightly regarded. There is more to it than the mere fact of a gallant defence—more to it than the fact that since Leonidas tried to hold Thermopylae against the East of his day, no greater example of determined gallantry and patriotism has been given to the world. There is a deeper meaning in the defence of Kiaochow, significant to all the West and peculiarly significant to America. It marks the beginning of the end of the West in the East.

The pretext which Japan advanced to cover her intrusion into the war was as transparent and as easily disposed of as was England's. The excuse advanced for her by her apologists, that she harbors a feeling of enmity toward Germany on account of the latter's protest against the occupation of southern Fengtien by Japan in 1895, is true but not comprehensive. For France and Russia, who are now Japan's allies against Germany, were joined in this protest and Russia, who subsequently inherited the leasehold of Port Arthur,

was its instigator. Japan threw in her lot with the Allies on account of her enmity for Germany, but the roots of that enmity were fed in far deeper soil than that of the Liaotung Peninsula.

A few years ago a great deal more was heard of the "Yellow Peril" than we hear to-day. Our interests in the Pacific have brought us into fighting distance of Japan and the phrase has consequently been forced, in this country at least, into the class of taboo. We scarcely longer dare discuss the internal administration of the Philippines for fear that we may give the jingoes of Tokyo cause for agitation. But not so Germany. The Asiatic "peril" was first enunciated by her thinkers and she has never ceased to realize and discuss its import. With perhaps no greater appreciation of its dangers than we have had, but certainly with a greater degree of fearlessness in discussion, she has never lost an opportunity to point out the significance and meaning of the coming struggle between the Occident and the Orient. Japan could not fail to remark this. And it is just this which underlies the intense and lasting hostility of Japan to Germany.

The aspirations of Japan to the pre-eminent position in Asia and in the Pacific are well known. Her leading men have taken but small pains to conceal them. In times of excitement they are a theme for her demagogues from Tokyo to Nagasaki. One nation, especially, stands in the way of their realization—the United States, whose shores, like those of Japan, are washed by the Pacific; and another nation, Germany, has stood by ever ready to assist the United States in the defence

of its claims. On all the Continent of Europe Germany alone has stood out clearly and irrevocably for the West as against the East. England has long been an ally of Japan and to-day France and Russia are fighting under the same standard. On the other hand, Germany has never once retreated from her position as a champion of the civilization of Europe and America. When it came to a choice between two evils she chose in 1904 the lesser and supported Russia against Japan. For all this Japan cannot and will not forgive her.

But it is not so much the Germany of Europe, which can never hope for predominancy in the Pacific, that rancors Japan, but Germany the silent ally of the United States. Until the advent of the present war the efficacy of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in case of war between ourselves and Japan admitted of a certain amount of doubt. Japan may still think that this condition continues to exist, though England's conduct has removed any such impression from the minds of the American people. In any event, her logic ran, the hour had struck for putting Germany out of the class of dangerous enemies. When she had been disposed of the one and only ally to whom the United States could look would no longer exist. To deal then with the United States would be a much simpler task. When, further, she argued, by warring on Germany she could put herself in possession of points in the Pacific particularly helpful in the coming conflict, the case of Japan was complete.

The possession of Kiaochow can not be regarded as other than a secondary consideration with Japan. With

half of Manchuria to develop in, she does not need it. The great things for which Japan is fighting are the destruction of Germany, the crystalization of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the occupation of territories in the Pacific strategically important in the struggle which she knows is doomed to come with this country. All three of these motives bear directly on that struggle.

It is for this reason that the American people should not forget the significance of the fight that is being put up by the handful of Germans in Tsingtau. It is impossible that this fight can go on much longer. The odds are too frightfully great. It will probably end in slaughter—and when it ends there will be great rejoicing in Japan. The last stronghold of Germany in the East will be in the hands of the enemy and the first and last ally of the United States in the Pacific will have been humbled. The victory itself will not have been great in material things but it will symbolize the racial aspirations of the Japanese.

The twenty four centuries which divide the Spartan defence of Thermopylae against Xerxes and the hordes of Persia, from the battle to hold Tsingtau against the East, reveal nothing so significant in the conflict of races.

“STARVING GERMANY OUT.”

The boast of England that she will “starve Germany out” would seem to have about the same chance of being made good as have the famous words of the First Lord of Admiralty that unless the German ships come out and accept battle in the open they will be

"dug out like rats from holes." Of course, no sane member of the British Government placed faith in either of these flights of patriotic rhetoric. They may have served to draw a few more recruits to the colors, but that is where their value began and ended. The starving out of Germany is no simple task, and as the war goes on the difficulty of accomplishing it is made more and more apparent. The same thoroughness and marvelous efficiency which has recently come to light in military Germany is present in no less a degree in civil Germany. The development of the German people has been a marvel of well balanced symmetry. Their ideal has been the industrial and commercial expansion of the Fatherland—their necessity, to live in arms to defend it. The same people that can hold the world at bay and carry their arms into the enemy's country, as Germany is doing, may be counted upon not to have overlooked the surest foundation of national greatness. Were we to admit that Germany is nothing but a huge fighting machine, war mad and war glorifying, we should still be compelled to assume that she has provided herself as well with corn as with cannon, as well with bread as with bayonets, as well with marks as with men. The problem of starving her out then appears no less serious than that of driving her out.

A great many things testify to the difficulties ahead of England in any attempt to carry out her threat. Among them stands out prominently the fact that while England herself has been compelled to declare a moratorium, Germany's sound financial system and internal strength made this unnecessary for her. The fact, too,

is that while the Allies have been forced to raise foreign loans Germany has been able to finance herself. The unparalleled sum of over 4,460 million marks was subscribed by the German people in the eight days between September 11th and 19th—and yet England talks of crippling Germany financially! “Nothing could prove to better effect,” says a German Chamber of Commerce, “the favorable military and economic situation of Germany than this subscription of 4,460 million marks, coming from all classes of the people, from the small saver to the richest man, and this, also, is the best answer to England’s attempt to conquer Germany by such paltry measures.

“A nation counting some seventy million people and which, along with its remarkable military organization, shows such readiness to sacrifice, and maintains such healthy and unshaken conditions, cannot be suppressed.”

The financial stability of the German Empire cannot be questioned. Its foundation rests securely on the immense German population, the scientific prosecution of agriculture and the mechanical industries, and the tremendous natural resources of its mines, forests and waters. Germany is to-day the richest country in Europe. Compared with Great Britain and France its natural wealth is as 400 is to 320 and to 280, respectively. Financially Germany cannot be “starved out.”

The command of the seas gives England the power to control for the moment the overseas trade of Germany, but this does not by any means infer her ability to bring Germany to her knees economically. The three

things which Germany needs most in the prosecution of the war, which she cannot obtain at home, are oil, cotton and copper; and in her hysteria over submarines and under Zeppelins, England has violated all the rules of the seas to prevent Germany from getting them from abroad. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that Germany is already well stocked with arms and ammunition, and that England's interference with neutral trade is, therefore, more or less in the nature of the unnecessary.

The question of foodstuffs is distinct, but equally unalarming. The rapid increase in German imports, as well as her exports, in recent years might lead the casual observer to the conclusion that Germany is in a large measure dependent upon foreign countries for her foodstuffs, a conclusion, however, not borne out by a careful analysis of her trade reports. The German Empire is less dependent upon the external world for the actual necessities of life than any other country of Europe, Russia alone excepted. By a system of intensive cultivation she has arrived at a larger production per acre than any other country. A few figures will suffice to prove this, as far as it applies to Europe. The production of wheat per hectare (2.4 acres) in 1912 was, for example, in Germany 22.6, in units of 100 kilograms or 220 lbs.; in France, 13.8; and in European Russia, 6.9. The production of rye for the same year was: Germany, 18.5; France, 11.1; and Russia, 9; while the output of potatoes was 150.3, 96.1, and 87.1, respectively. The breeding of live stock has developed apace with the other major industries

in Germany. Between 1873 and 1912 cattle increased from 15,777,000 to 20,159,000 head and swine from 7,124,000 to 21,885,000. The coal supply of Germany is inexhaustible. The iron industry of Germany is second only to our own. The salt mines of the Empire gave up in 1912 no less than \$50,000,000. And yet England claims she can "starve Germany out."

Allow me to conclude with a quotation from a statement of the Potsdamer Handelskammer of recent date:

"As a result of these considerations one can in any case see that the German economic position is more independent than ever, and that its strength lies in the productivity of its soil and in the firmness of its home market. It is not to be forgotten that for the German foreign trade with neutral countries, important connections remain open, the maintaining of which must be valuable also to the neutral states.

"The English politicians who form their opinions from the great increase of German foreign trade and their own commercial conditions, have deceived themselves concerning the limitations on the independence of German economic relations and in reference to their own power. Here lies the principal error in their calculations."

A RAY OF SUNSHINE.

The American people, whom the American press should always serve, but whom it too often attempts to dominate, will welcome the ray of hope discernible in the altered attitude, apparent in the last fortnight, of many of the leading papers of the country toward

the warring parties in Europe. There was never any good reason why such a change of attitude should have been made necessary or even possible. The adoption in the beginning of a policy of strict neutrality of mind and expression would have rendered unnecessary and made impossible at this late date this *volte face*. It is not, however, for this reason any the less welcome.

When war became desirable for England, she declared it; and recognizing the weakness of her pretext, she thought to bolster it among neutral nations and especially in the United States, upon whom she was dependent for many of the sinews of war, by a campaign designed to discredit Germany and her motives. Any one who will go to the trouble of re-reading the output of her own writers and of those Americans who fell for it, will be surprised at the vacuity and ineffectiveness of it all. It is astonishing to find upon re-reading it how very little is said of England and her allies and how consistently the enemy has been pounded at every point. It is apparent that even the press itself is wearying of this process of attempting to tear down with no counterbalancing effort at constructive argument. The American people showed signs of weariness some time ago.

The wonder is not that we have tired of listening to England's tales of German savagery, but that we did not refuse long ago to listen to them. The pretext advanced by England to cover her entrance into the war—the violation of Belgian neutrality, could not be defended in debate. It fell of its own weight and the weight of England's historical policy of the "right and

supreme duty to insure national safety in time of war." The attempt to defame the good name of the German army and people, to-day one and the same thing, was longer lived, but doomed to the same end. The return of the Americans "stranded" in Germany at the time of the mobilization gave the lie to the stories of suffering and outrage which had been poured into our ears from London. Their greatest inconvenience was experienced in England itself or on the English boats which brought them home. When the truth became known Louvain and Rheims disappeared into the same category of falsification. The Dutch, the Swedes and the home-returned Americans have all borne testimony to the excellent behavior of the German troops. Only England, France and Belgium have defamed them. This was all well enough as a war measure in England, France and Belgium, but it had no place in this country. But England, having cut the truth with the German cable, dictated what "news" we should have. A blockade was declared against facts and an attempt made to submerge us with fiction. While the columns of our papers yearned for stories of the war they were loaded with the newly discovered opinions of English novelists, dramatists, and journalists of German "militarism" and German "kultur." Bernhardt, who was never read before the war, not even in Germany, was dragged from obscurity and rammed down our throats, because England could find for the moment nothing worse in Germany than this discarded victim of a hallucination. When Bernhardt failed longer to make good "copy" these same writers turned their grappling hooks

against German "kultur," and by mistranslation, distortion and casuistry attempted to convince us that there was no such thing or if there were, that there should not be.

With such exudations the English squid sought to conceal its own motives and ambitions. Its stock of liquid is apparently diminishing. The waters are clearing again and the American press is once more beginning to see that the true course to steer is closer by the American shore.

I do not pretend to a knowledge of all the motives which have worked to the end of this revulsion against the dominance of our papers by England. I have suggested one: that we have tired of having the truth withheld from us by the British Censor and of being deluged with falsehoods and fabrications which are one by one dissipated when the truth comes to light. There is another, and I should like to regard it as the true reason for this change of sentiment. It cannot fail to have been remarked that in every question of an unpleasant nature which has arisen in connection with the war, whether of the seizure of our mails, our citizens, our ships, or our cargoes, of the blockading of our ports, or of other invasions of our rights as a neutral and independent nation, England has been the aggressor. In not one instance has Germany given offence to us. On the contrary, making due allowance for the rigorous necessities of mobilization, Americans caught in Germany by the war were shown every courtesy and kindness possible. On the seas, where the German navy has wrought such havoc with English ships, surely op-

portunity must have presented itself in the last three months for an insult to the American flag. Yet we have not heard of one. And after all, it is these things that count. We may submit for a time to the ocular operation of wool-pulling, but not beyond the point where our interests are involved.

We may charitably forgive those Americans who placed faith for a space in English promises of friendship and good-will, even though such promises were based on the defamation of Germany; for the progress of the war has taught them how ill advised they were in the premises. The German Government and the German people have continued throughout the trying days of their death-struggle those expressions of good-will for the United States which have characterized the life history of the two nations. They have done more—they have given cogent signs that there is body to these expressions. With equal consistency, on the other hand, England has continued her policy of insult and aggression, until we are less in her eyes than Canada. These are facts which are being substantiated day by day in the columns of our papers. They stand and have stood side by side with England's protestations of friendship and her tales of German savagery. There have been some Americans able all along to choose of fact and protestation the former. It is a wholesome evidence of true Americanism that their number is increasing rapidly. The press, and especially when the press is wrong, cannot long oppose the will of the people. There is no need for it to surrender—only for it to return to the path from which it should never have

departed, and to follow that path in the future. It should cut the lashings which hold it to England and aim only to serve the American people. It should cease, in other words, to be an English press represented in the United States. The signs that it is gradually doing so are encouraging.

The last week has seen the appearance of two editorials in New York papers which might have been written months ago. I allude to *The Evening Post's* comment on the naval fight off the coast of Chile and *The Evening Sun's* leader of November 5th: "The Defence of Kiao-Chau." Both articles are well worth the attention of Americans. They are ably written, reveal a high degree of analytical reasoning and, best of all, they are fair. The publication in book form of *The Evening Sun's* editorials on the war is intended, I believe, and one can only hope that the high standard set in the leader of the 5th instant, will be the standard of the book. It is to be hoped, too, that this standard will soon be that of the American press generally.

GERMAN BARBARITIES.

When Georges Pielot and Leon Lebot stepped from the French liner "Rochambeau" a few days ago, into the waiting arms of a score or more of reporters, they relieved themselves of their experiences in the trenches before Rheims. I quote from *The Evening World*: "Both Pielot and Lebot, who was hit four times by shrapnel fragments in the same fight, agreed that during the fighting around Rheims a French battery was

stationed directly behind the great Cathedral. They gave this information innocently, not realizing that they were verifying the German contention in excuse for firing on the ancient pile." And so another London lie is nailed to the mast.

Perhaps the outcry which came from France and England over the incident has been forgotten. But what hypocrisy it showed, in the light of the facts, which we have had from other sources before and now have from the lips of Frenchmen themselves, that the French were using the Cathedral to shelter their artillery! Strangely enough—I was about to say, but nothing is longer strange in the Anglicized press of this country—the only publicity given to the testimony of these eye-witnesses to the fact was contained in the few words quoted above from an evening paper.

Similar tales are being coined daily with regard to the situation in Belgium. The German Government insists upon the civilian population returning to work. There is a sufficiency of food at hand, if only everybody does his share in starting the wheels of industry revolving again. An idle and hostile population—and idleness breeds hostility—does not aid in the solution of the serious problems facing Germany in her attempt to organize a temporary government for Belgium. And yet a howl goes up from England and America over Germany's demand that the Belgians if they would eat, must work. When all the facts are at hand we shall probably discover that a large element of the people in that distressed country are sheltering themselves behind foreign charity, as the French artillery found shel-

ter behind the Cathedral of Rheims. Want, misery, and all the other horrors which follow in the train of war are unquestionably present in Belgium to-day. So far as possible the well-wishers of the Belgian people in other countries should act in relief of them. But if the Belgians themselves refuse to do their share they absolve others from the need of assisting them and of the propriety of sympathizing with them. I feel as keenly as anyone the plight which has befallen Belgium, but I cannot agree with those who condemn the German Government for taking the first step necessary to bringing the country back to the normal. When the Belgian people have shown themselves as willing to work as they have been to fight, when they have given an earnest proof of their desire to help themselves, those who are willing to help them will have an additional stimulus to charity.

The destruction of the "Emden" brings to a close a chapter of the war which has been followed with thrilling interest from one end of the world to the other. It has long been merely a matter of time when she would run foul of one or more of the seventy odd warships that were scouring the oceans for her. She found her grave in the same waters on which for over three months she had ridden and revelled in the task of doing as much injury as possible to the enemy. She went down with a clean record. The story of the "Emden" cannot be distorted. It opens no opportunity for defamation; and for this reason, apparently, none has been attempted. She sent to the bottom over forty vessels, with a total tonnage of between 70,000 and

80,000 tons, without the loss of a single life. This record will live as long as naval history is written and read. She accomplished it in hostile waters, far from home and from any friendly port where she might coal, repair or provision, living the life of a rover, hounded by those who sought her, knowing not when she might be caught but only that the day would come, moved by the sole idea of doing as much damage as she could to the commerce and navies of the enemies of the Fatherland. The British had but scant praise for her achievements while she still rode the waves of the Indian Ocean. When she settled, hardly more than a cinder, beneath them the tap of eulogy is turned on. Says *The Daily Telegraph*: "It is almost in our heart to regret that the *Emden* has been captured and destroyed. We certainly hope that Commander Karl von Müller, her commander, has not been killed, for, as the phrase goes, he has shown himself an officer and a gentleman. He has been enterprising, cool, and daring in making war on our shipping, and has revealed a nice sense of humor. He has, moreover, shown every possible consideration to the crews of his prizes. So far as is known, he destroyed over 74,000 tons of shipping without the loss of a single life. There is not a survivor who does not speak well of this young German, the officers under him, and the crew obedient to his orders. The war on the sea will lose something of its piquancy, its humor, and its interest now that the *Emden* has gone, but she had to go because she was so expensive."

The English are always generous winners; but win-

ning or losing, the praise of an enemy is always that cherished most by the warrior. If Commander von Müller has survived to read the comments of the London press on the exploits of the "Emden," now that she is no more, they may serve to soften the sorrow which he must feel at the cutting short of the career of his gallant little boat.

The moral of this comment is not so much, however, that the praise expressed for the heroism and chivalry of the Commander and crew of the "Emden" is only what is justly due to them, but that it was expressed only when their work was ended. The question may justly and appropriately be asked: Will not the same praise be bestowed on the German commanders and troops fighting on land to-day, when there is no more left of Germany than there is of the "Emden," if that day should follow this war? It would be asking more than can be expected of human nature to suggest that such praise be accorded now, by those who have set out to destroy Germany. But can it not be suggested that it would be much more fair, much more manly and honorable, for the enemies of Germany to desist from setting on foot stories which have no basis in fact and which are so easily exploded as that regarding the wanton destruction of the Cathedral of Rheims? I have not the slightest doubt that when the war is over, if England regards herself as a victor, the press of Great Britain and this country will be as loud in their praise of the chivalry of the German troops in Belgium and France as is the press of London to-day of the chivalry of Commander von Müller and his offi-

cers and men. The German Army and the Imperial Navy are recruited from the same nation. One brother joins the land service and the other takes to the sea. By what system of logic can we arrive at the conclusion that this simple choice of service, often-times, perhaps, no more than an accident, makes of the one a chivalrous sailor and a gentleman and of the other the brute which German soldiers are reported to be? There is not sufficient difference in either the discipline or the training of the duties of the soldier and the sailor to account for it. Born from the same womb, taught at the same knee, bred up under the same skies and breathing inspiration from the same institutions which surround both, war leaves one a man still, while it turns the other into a beast. So palpably illogical is the reasoning which underlies all attempts to convince the world of this and of the truth of the stories of German "barbarism" and "savagery," that it bares the motives which prompt them and reveals them in their true light.

When peace comes again to Europe we shall have the truth. We shall have columns and volumes and libraries extolling the heroism of the Germans on land, as we are now having paragraphs on the same quality of Germans afloat. If Germany is crushed we shall have them from her enemies: if victorious, she will write them herself, as all people do. But the memory of what we read to-day will never be quite wiped out by all that we read years hence. The time to tell the truth is now. A manly man does not wait until his opponent is in his grave before admitting the good quali-

ties which he may possess. Should a nation be less manly than the individual?

MACHIAVELLI UP-TO-DATE.

I have repeatedly emphasized my strong wish to support, in the finest sense of loyalty, our government's policy of strict neutrality. It has always been very clear that only such a policy would leave this country in the enviable position of finally being able to act as the composing factor of the present world struggle. In the pursuance of such a policy the status of international law has inevitably brought about many situations, apparently giving either the English or the German sympathizers reason for feeling displeased with actions or mostly with non-actions, by the State Department. I have been tempted to take exception to the one or the other attitude of the State Department. For instance, I have been and still am in serious doubts about the economic advisability of taking advantage of the license given under the Hague Convention, of allowing the export to either belligerent of munitions of war. Does it not seem that this method of furthering the war, though temporarily profitable to a small number of industries, is bound to make the losses for the other industries all the more severe in the long run? To be sure, Art. 7 of the Convention says: "A neutral power is not bound to prevent the export of arms." The ethics of a policy of peace-prayers on Sundays and the export of munitions of war on week-days each one will have to settle for himself.

It is therefore only after the most mature deliberation and after having consulted with men deeply versed in the history of international law, that I feel called upon to voice the strongest protest against the apparent attitude of the State Department in regard to England's recent contentions about contraband and the right of search. The State Department seems hypnotized by British methods, often truly Machiavellian. We have repeatedly heard of an extreme and radical action by Great Britain, followed by concessions, apparently due to representations of the State Department.

"From whence it is to be observed, that he who usurps the government of any State is to execute and put in practice all the harshnesses, which he thinks material, at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often, but that, by his discontinuance, he may mollify the people, and by his benefits bring them over to his side, and that to see and to hear him he appears all goodness, integrity, humanity, and religion, and has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace."

(Machiavelli, "The Prince," ch. VIII—ch. XVIII.)

When, in 1904, Russia declared certain articles absolute contraband, Lord Lansdowne, in the House of Lords, made a sharp protest characterizing such action as one "regardless of the well-defined rights of neutrals." To-day, the same England proceeds in the same arbitrary manner in declaring various articles "absolute contraband." Fine phrases are made to cover the insatiable lust expressed in "rule Britannia."

But why is it, that we appear to be in such an un-

enviable position of dependency? The double standard of the British Navy and the traditional policy of England on the seas is the cause of our present, as it has been the cause of our past incongruous and unenviable position in regard to our international trade during war time. But how much clearer has been the vision of our forefathers, how much more self-reliant, with how much more Americanism have such issues formerly been met! Great Britain has for centuries claimed the absolute rule over the seven seas, not in words but in acts. Every concession from this claim we had to gain by most resolute actions or, as in 1812, by war.

How consistently this British policy of "claim everything and concede nothing" has been followed, is most easily realized by taking up the text-books on international law used in the British navy. In one, just recently published, we find under the "rule of war of 1756," relating to coastwise and colonial shipping, the comment by the author, probably the best known English authority on international law, that this "question, raised by England in 1756 and again in 1793, will crop up" again. To keep things in an uncertain state has been England's policy, for then she can claim everything and she need not concede anything.

The same text-book, commenting on the Declaration of London of 1909, contains in its closing paragraph this remark by the author: "All looked forward to its (Declaration of London) early ratification. But a strong agitation against the declaration, and especially that part of it which refers to contraband of war, arose

in England. The House of Lords threw out the bill. Without the bill an international prize court was impossible." Of course, such an international court is the very thing which would militate against "rule Britannia."

How little England is disposed to relinquish her claim to be the "Mistress of the Seven Seas" and how hypocritical her protests against "militarism" are, Lord Roberts proves in his recent article in the Theologian "Hibbert Journal," when he says "It would be folly (after the war) seriously to reduce the strength of our navy and of our army, simply because they have nobly fulfilled their dangerous tasks. Do not let us pay any attention to the foolish prattle of those who talk of this war as the doom of conscription."

The London Times gives away the real English theory by saying: "It is our present job to work all day and all night for some years in order to prevent all states with a passion for hegemony from challenging us in the future."

Has our State Department agreed to second the British passion for hegemony? Shall we, free Americans, again be forced to obey the orders of "John Bull"? Is our dream about the revival, about the coming supremacy of American shipping to be rudely shattered by having our State Department docilely, even meekly concede British pretences to the dominion of the sea?

Many, imposed upon by the Machiavellian methods of the British foreign publicity office, speak thoughtlessly of the danger to this country from a German

victory. The holy fear of a mythical militarism has been thrown into their minds. Germany is accused of striving for world conquest, threatening all of us with an unwelcome dependency. I do not want to argue about the rights and wrongs of this theory. I only want to point out, that it is a theory and I want to impress upon my readers the fact that our dependency upon Great Britain, measured with the ordinary methods available to us for determining something of this nature, confronts us, to speak with Grover Cleveland, as a condition, the very moment we permit her presumptions to stand unchallenged. Our ports are practically being blockaded by England, as not only in accordance with the intention of international law trade with belligerent countries is closely inspected by England, but trade with neutral countries is equally hampered and interfered with. Soft-spoken English diplomacy tries to justify this interference with neutral trade by referring to the Springbok case, commented upon by our Supreme Court in the memorial decision as follows:

“The vessel was captured because the bills of lading disclosed the contents of 619, but concealed the contents of 1388 of the 2007 packages, which made up the cargo.

“Why were the contents of the packages concealed? The owners knew that they were going to a port in the trade with which the utmost candor of statement might be reasonably required.

“The adventure was undertaken several months after the answer of Earl Russell, Foreign Secretary in the

British Ministry, to the Liverpool ship-owners in which he distinctly stated the fact that he was unable to deny that Nassau was a port notoriously used by persons engaged in systematic violation of blockade."

Of course, in addition it must be remembered that, at the time, the policy of the British government clearly favored one belligerent at the expense of the other, something that in the present crisis could certainly not be said of the expressed policy of our own government.

THE "KAISER'S WAR."

The assertion that the present war was the creation of the German Emperor, aided and abetted by a "military clique" in Germany, has stared so often at me out of the columns of our dailies, weeklies and monthlies that only an intimate knowledge of the German people has preserved my faith in the opinion that it is a war of defence, waged on the defensive by the German nation as a whole. The "Kaiser's war," as a slogan, has undoubtedly done good service in England, where just now they need good service done. Almost anything will rouse the British people to "cut a throat or sink a ship." As a war measure, therefore, one can readily understand why it has been worked to the utmost by the British Government, and why such writers as Doyle, Wells and Arnold Bennett have done their best to carry it into those neutral countries the moral support of which the British are so solicitous for. I have always had a suspicion, however, that the doctrine of the "Kaiser's war" has not had the unanimous acceptance

of the British people. The censorship, which still blockades us as far as the truth is concerned, has made impossible of success any attempt to get at the real facts of British feeling in regard to the war. Occasionally a blockade of even this sort may be "run," however, and it is apparent that something of this nature took place on the 11th instant. I was startled, in glancing down a column of *The Evening Sun* of that date to meet this admission of Mr. Andrew Bonar Law, Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons and one of England's few "democrats:" "I have never cherished the delusion that this is a war of the German ruler's only. It is a war of the German nation."

I was startled not that such an admission had been made, especially when it was credited to a man of Mr. Law's well known proclivity for speaking his mind regardless of consequences, but rather that it escaped the eagle eye of the British censor and was permitted to come to this country. So very careful has this official been in his education of the American people that I sought in the papers of the following morning a confirmation of *The Evening Sun's* report. A paragraph or two were given by all the morning papers to Mr. Law's remarks, but from everyone of them this admission damning to Great Britain's claim that the war is a "Kaiser's war" was deleted. Whether the deletion was accomplished on this side of the Atlantic or on the other, I am at a loss to say. The more probable explanation of the matter is that the censor, with true British tardiness, eventually "got next to himself" and erased from the later wires the most interesting portion

of Mr. Bonar Law's caustic criticism of the English slogan. I have no reason for assuming that The Evening Sun's report was inaccurate. The reports given to the other dailies were merely incomplete. The harm has been done, however, and we may expect in the early future to hear of another British censor being sent to the firing line, with a sword by his side and a cigar in his teeth.

This little error on the part of the official entrusted with the preservation of England's press consistency leads to a great many other thoughts. Among them the inconsistency of some of the American papers now loud in their outcry against Germany and the German Emperor. Among them, also, the insecurity of reputation. Almost any of the great New York dailies might be quoted as an example. The most convenient for the moment is The New York Times, whose Magazine Section of Sunday, June 8, 1913, I have before me. Allow me to quote a few letters which appeared on the first page of this Section, as evidence of the feelings entertained at the time for the German Emperor by the distinguished gentlemen whose names are subscribed to them. "To assert that the Kaiser has been a hypocrite for over a quarter of a century," wrote Bishop Nuelsen recently, "or that he has radically changed over night would be expressing a rather rash judgment." The German Emperor of July 1914 was the same German Emperor of whom the following words were written in June 1913.

"The one man outside this country from whom I obtained help in bringing about the Peace of Ports-

mouth was His Majesty William II. From no other nation did I receive any assistance, but the Emperor personally, and through his Ambassador in St. Petersburg, was of real aid in helping induce Russia to face the accomplished fact and come to an agreement with Japan—an agreement the justice of which to both sides was conclusively shown by the fact that neither side was satisfied with it.

“This was a real help to the cause of international peace, a contribution that far outweighed any amount of mere talk about it in the abstract, for in this as in all other matters an ounce of performance is worth a ton of promise.”

Theodore Roosevelt.

“The proof of the pudding is in the eating. When the German Emperor went upon the throne and developed his independence of Bismarck, and his intention to exercise his own will in the discharge of his functions, there were many prophecies that this meant a disturbance of the peace of Europe. Instead of that, the truth of history requires the verdict that, considering the critically important part which has been his among the nations, he has been, for the last quarter of a century, the greatest single individual force in the practical maintenance of peace in the world.”

Wm. H. Taft.

“The German Emperor’s life has been worthy of his father and of his mother, and no higher praise can be rendered in grateful acknowledgment of a great

career—great with the abounding blessings of peace through steadfast striving for strength, and duty done for his people and his justice to his neighbors.

“His mother’s nation was enthusiastic, loyal to his ideals, and ever able to make honesty of purpose unite with poetic and artistic temperament. Her clever mind and wide discernment enabled her to place all matters in their true perspective. Her son inherited her gifts, with his father’s truth and gallant steadfastness.

“This generation of Germans have good reason to be proud and to love their patriotic Emperor.

Argyle.

“The highest praise that I can offer concerning the Emperor William II is that he would have made as good a King of England as our history has provided, and as good a President of the United States as any since George Washington.

“It was said of the Emperor William that he was medieval in his war spirit, but he has proved himself to be a modern keeper of the peace. He was declared to be reckless, and the worst that can be said of him after twenty-five years is that he is impulsive. The world has never been hard upon men of impulse who are not at the same time reckless and selfish, and the Emperor William is neither of these.

“When he became Emperor Germany—and Prussia particularly—was rigid, narrow, and pedantic in all too many respects. Under his enlightened, tolerant, and broad-minded guidance she has become—even Prussia has become—resilient, absorptive, and almost impulsively adaptable.

"The world owes the Emperor William a debt of gratitude. He might have found cause to reap advantage from European embroilment of his own making, but he has proved himself among the most civilized internationally patriotic of rulers."

Gilbert Parker.

These letters speak for themselves. I shall, therefore, make no comment on them. I might go on and quote a great many other things which appeared in this section of a New York Sunday paper and from other contemporaries. I might call attention, for example, to Mr. Carnegie's "Kaiser Wilhelm II., Peacemaker," to Lord Blyth's "Kaiser Central Factor of Germany's Peaceful Policy" or to Alfred H. Fried's "Kaiser Has Kept all Europe From War." The list of eulogistic articles written last year might be extended ad infinitum. But what's the use? The high regard in which William the Second of Germany was held in this country and in Europe up to the time of this war is well known. It is sufficient earnest, too, that he is not the blood-mad "war-lord" which it has pleased England since the inception of the war to picture him. A leopard cannot change his spots—neither can a ruler of the German Emperor's recognized tendencies change his nature over night. I am glad to see that in England there is at least one man who is prepared to admit this fact. I should welcome evidence that in this country there are more who are willing to see that the war now being waged in Europe was not of the German Emperor's seeking nor of his creation but one that was accepted by the German nation as a whole.

"G. B. S." ON THE WAR.

After a hundred days of English explanations, distortions and hypocrisies and all the other instruments of casuistry which can be employed by a Government to justify its conduct in a most ambiguous position, it remained for an Irishman to permit himself the luxury of telling the truth. I admit that under the circumstances of England's position as a party in the present war it is no easy matter for an Englishman either to face the truth or to tell it. It requires a degree of historical analysis, a certain amount of self-inspection, and to some extent a possible admission that the enemy has a moiety of right on his side of the barbed wire entanglements. It was not to be expected that those directly responsible for England's present predicament would be the first to frankly state the facts of the case. They have been too busy recently with other things. It was rather to be expected that the truth would come from some other corner of the British Empire. And it came last Sunday from George Bernard Shaw. I do not maintain that Germany has told all the truth, that she has any claim to all the right in the present conflict or that all the justice is on her side. I have simply given expression to a suspicion all along entertained that England has not had a monopoly of the truth, right and justice. I find this suspicion ably sustained in Mr. Shaw's article in *The Times*.

Writing a little common sense about the war, Mr. Shaw sweeps aside the restrictions imposed by nationality upon so many British authors and assumes an

international point of view. As an Irishman, this was possible for him to do. Standing to a certain extent apart from the class which furnishes the recruits for Downing Street he found it more easy still. He speaks of the militarists of England precisely as he speaks of those of Germany and Russia and France. Since Cramb, no other denizen of the British Isles has been able to see things just as they are or to represent them as being other than exactly what they are not. The position adopted by Mr. Shaw is a distinct step forward. It offers a real neutral ground on which we all may meet and discuss the true character of the struggle going on before our eyes. That the American people, through their many editors, did not hit upon this idea is strange, to say the least. It is one which should have appealed to all true democrats from the outset. I cannot picture any liberty and equality loving American sympathizing more with the sweep of Sir Edward Grey's pen which plunged England into a desperate war which her people as a people neither sought nor desired, than with the activities of that war party in Germany of which so much has been written. There is here no ground for argument. We condemn both, and equally.

Of course, Mr. Shaw will not be taken seriously in England. He never has been. Very few Irishmen, in fact, are taken seriously in England until there is room for them at the front. And no man who talks common sense in England, or in Germany for that matter, will be listened to while the war is on. Common sense may follow peace, but it will not precede

it. But while he will not be accepted in England, Mr. Shaw will be read, and it amuses me to picture the "upholders of little nations" and the "defenders of the democracy and civilization of Europe" choking with impotent rage at the playwright who has dared to speak what they have striven so hard to forget. I am inclined to believe, however, that the conscience of England will be awakened by the thunder-clap of Shaw rather than by the wee, small voice of its professional apologist, Mr. Asquith. But while Mr. Shaw will not be taken seriously in England there is no good reason why he should not be so taken in this country. The daily press of New York, however, and notably *The Times* and *The World*, acting apparently on the assumption that while there is much which it does not understand there is nothing which it cannot editorially explain, is inclined to dismiss Mr. Shaw with considerably less than a few words. Incidentally, by doing so, it appears to prove his argument unanswerable and, as such, worthy of consideration. Personally, I prefer the intellectual neutrality of Mr. Shaw to the wholly partisan and belligerent attitude of *The Times* and *The World*, for example.

The "meat" of Mr. Shaw's article which appeared in last Sunday's *Times* is simply this and nothing else: Germany has her militarists and her Junkers, and so has England and of the latter the simon-pure article is represented by Sir Edward Grey. The militarists of Germany, who can not count the Emperor a member of their party, found their voice in Bernhardt and Treitschke. Winston Churchill, a perfect example of

militarist, and Sir Edward Grey spoke for those of England; in Russia it was Sasonow; and in France it was those fire-eating Boulevardiers, Clemenceau and Delcassé. There is not much to choose between any two of them. They all represent or have represented the same spirit of oligarchic dominance, based upon force, so incompatible with and repugnant to our own ideals. They are internationally interchangeable, for they speak the same language, stand for the same things and live for the same ends. I have not the slightest doubt that had Mr. Churchill worn the uniform of the German Navy he would have toasted "The Day" quite as enthusiastically as it has ever been drunk to. I can hear Sir Edward Grey alluding to a treaty as "a scrap of paper," though in somewhat more diplomatic words. I can imagine anything and everything that has been charged to the German militarists as transpiring with only a negligible difference in setting in Russia or France or England. Mr. Shaw alone has succeeded so far in getting this idea past the English censor.

While admitting the existence of a military party in Germany, which no one will deny, I am not one of those who hold the present war and England's part in it as necessary to the salvation of Germany. She has other parties, and I am quite confident that she is able to handle her internal affairs without the assistance of either Mr. Churchill's braggadocio or Sir Edward Grey's diplomatic chicanery. I am equally confident that when the war is over Germany will straighten out not only the question of militarism but the many other problems which confront her. It is to be hoped that

the other belligerent nations will be able to do the same. Only in this way will this war be "The War that Will End War."

The great difference between the militarists of Germany and those of the other countries now at war is that the former have made less bones about what they had to say. The German temperament is antagonistic to duplicity. Some of her enemies, on the other hand, seem to revel in it. A pertinent exemplification is seen in the fact that diplomatically Germany has not had the best of it during the past decade. She has not had a great "diplomatist" since Bismarck. The Germans, in their militarism as in their diplomacy, have been brutally frank, and hating dissimulation have suffered by their hatred. There are at least two ways of saying almost everything, and Bernhardt chose apparently the wrong way. All that he ever said or wrote finds its counterpart in the teachings of the militarists of all the European nations. With greater or less disingenuousness all but Germany dissembled. She suffers to-day for her frankness. When the German Chancellor alluded to the Treaty of 1839 as "a scrap of paper" he was but quoting the expression of a British statesman of an earlier day—a fact which shows not only how very little reason those who live in English glass houses have to throw stones at those who occupy similar edifices across the North Sea but also how far removed in candor is present day British diplomacy from that of a generation or two ago.

After all, however, one should not be too hard on poor old England. She has a Government that is at-

tending to the thumb-screws with a conscientiousness sufficiently religious to satisfy her most ardent adversary. And her "national attitude" and those of her enemies, in the last analysis, do not differ so widely. She is looking out for herself. She has made the earth her foot stool and is now attempting to deny Germany a place in the sun. We may disagree as to her rights in the premises, but we can not refuse to applaud her nerve. The principal objection which can be raised to her conduct is that she is not willing to tell us, as Germany has done, just what she is about. It's "England's way," however, and that covers a multitude of omissions and reservations. The cocktail which the First Lord of the Admiralty mixes to "The Day" is made up of one part of conscience, seven of dissimulation, and the rest of boasting, with just a dash of justice (or, if that is not at hand, of hypocrisy.)

THANKSGIVING THOUGHTS.

We leave our labors to-day to offer up to the Great Provider of life and all its blessings a nation's thanks for what He has vouchsafed to us during the year now closing and to ask His grace and guidance through the year before us. There is much to be thankful for—and much to be asked.

As we pause in our busy lives for these few hours of reflection and praise-offering the sound of Europe rolls in upon us "clearer, nearer, deadlier than before." It is the sound of thousands of guns—of millions of small arms—"the shout of the conquered—the con-

queror's yell"—the wail of the widow and the sobs of her child. While we gather at our happy family boards, ten million men are wallowing in the trenches of Europe, slaughtering or to be slaughtered: and for everyone of them some heart at home is breaking.

It is not for us to ask the reason why. The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. But let us not thank the Father of All that we are better than the other man. It is but fifty years since our own hearts were breaking—or broken—on this same Thanksgiving Day. We should be thankful only that we have been spared and that out of the bounty that is ours we have been permitted to render a mite for the alleviation of the suffering inflicted upon the homeless and hungry.

The custom of this day is older than our independence. It was laid by that stalwart band of Anglo-Saxons who forsook Europe for "the freedom to worship God." It has been perpetuated through the years, and each season has added to its sacredness and significance. We have grown from a cluster of families to a nation of 90,000,000 people, drawn from every continent and from the islands of the seas. Wherever the hand of the oppressor has fallen too heavily escape has been found on our shores. Wherever genius and ambition have sought a wider sphere they have found it with us. We are a people mixed in blood but in mind one; and I know of no better day on which to remind ourselves of this than that which calls the Gentile and the Jew within our gates—the Saxon, Teuton, Latin, Slav—to his peculiar altar, but for the common purpose of thanking God for His protection and in-

crease of the United States of America. Then, if ever, are we all Americans, in the highest, noblest and most sacred sense of the word.

The ties of blood and language and tradition which bind us to the homes from which we have come loosen with the years. They can not be snapped at once. When the world is at peace the youngest immigrant soon ceases to think of the happy little village, with all that it held dear to him, on the Rhone or the Rhine or the Shannon. A catastrophe in the "old country"—and such memories are fanned into life in the hearts of the third and fourth generations. We are not the less American for this. I think rather we are the better Americans for it: for out of this spirit millions in charity have flowed back to our parent countries in times of war and flood and famine. It is the surest foundation of international charity and good-will.

The tragedy of the present year has revived these sympathies in many an American heart where they seemed dead. I do not think, however, that they have over-flowed their legitimate bounds. A harsh word has been given here and there—and taken, but in no case has anyone ceased to be an American for even the harshest of them. Were a foreign enemy, of whatever race, creed or color, to precipitate himself upon us tomorrow, these varied sympathies, reborn in the European conflict, would die at the first call to arms. Are we not to be grateful for this?

We have been spared through four months of war from war's death and devastation. Our prayer should be that we may be so led to see our duty and so

strengthened to the fulfillment of it, that the horrors of war may never visit our shores. We should seek the light of justice, that we may not offend: for in offence lies retribution. With the widow and the orphan and the homeless, helpless and stricken there can be no offence, and our duty lies with them. As we give so shall it be given to us.

And finally, can not we who have been so mercifully spared through this year of Our Lord Nineteen Hundred and Fourteen offer to the Prince of Peace, in return for what we have received at His hands, a nation's vow that we will wash our lives clean of war—that we will neither arm nor clothe nor feed it—and that when peace reigns again on earth we will strive with the strength that is in us to make it universal and eternal?

GERMAN ATROCITIES ABROAD.

It is seldom at this late date that I look twice at the traductions of Germany and the Germans which continue to find a prominent place in the columns of our daily English papers. I had thought that all that could be said had been said. But occasionally, even now, something crosses the border line of the ordinary and holds me, by an excess of either absurdity, venom or maliciously intentional inaccuracy.

The letter of Charles Francis Adams, which a few days ago was cabled from England, where it had appeared in *The Spectator* and had been exploited as evidence that the sentiment of the American people is solidly for England in this war, and which had a large

run in the American papers, is such a traduction. Certain allegations contained in this letter, I confess, shocked and startled me, accustomed even as I have become to reading defamations of Germany.

"My friend Gen. James H. Wilson, who commanded the American contingent in China, assures me that the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans there, especially as respects women, were something too atrocious for record; and, moreover, were unblushingly acknowledged as a regular feature of warfare. Wilson on this point is an authority."

These are the words of Mr. Adams. So incredible were they to me in the light of what I know of the German people and the German army, that I sought confirmation of them before accepting their inferences as final. General Wilson was kind enough to reply to my inquiry with the following telegram from his home in Wilmington, Del., under date of the 26th instant.

"N. Y. Staats Zeitung, New York.

"Absence prevented earlier reply. For what I actually did say to General Adams, refer to pages five twenty two, five twenty three of 'Under the Old Flag' (Appletons) to Field Marshal von Waldersee.

P. H. Wilson."

The passage referred to by General Wilson as appearing on pages 522 and 523 of his book "Under the Old Flag" is as follows:

"A few weeks later in conversation with the grave and dignified Field Marshal von Waldersee, who had been chosen generalissimo of the allied forces on account of seniority, in regard to the relative practice

of Europeans, Asiatics, and Americans in conducting warfare, I took occasion to condemn as a recrudescence of barbarism the wholesale practice of violence, outrage and robbery which had evidently characterized the campaign on the part of the Europeans and Asiatics. In doing so I expressed the thought that, while our for-bears appeared to have left the customs of the Middle Ages behind when they came to America, their racial kinsmen from European countries, greatly to my surprise, seemed to return naturally to the cruelties of primitive man. I frankly confessed that I could not understand it. To this remark the humane and courtly Field Marshal replied with a sigh: 'Ah, General, I regret to say that Europeans, no matter whence they come, have never abandoned the cruel and outrageous practices which you so justly condemn'."

I ask the reader to compare the words of General Adams with those of General Wilson, and to say if in the latter he can find any justification for the former. I think he will reply negatively. For not only is there nothing in General Wilson's statement to lead one to segregate the German soldier in the Boxer campaign, on the point of the atrocious, from his colleagues in arms of the other European nations and of Japan, but rather do General Wilson's words give the benefit of the doubt to the Germans. The relief expedition of 1900 was made up principally of Japanese, Russian, German, British, French, Italian and American troops. The Japanese and Americans are dealt with by General Wilson himself. The European troops—"no matter whence they come"—are one and all condemned by

"the humane and courtly" German Field Marshal for the practices so inconsistent with our own ideas—and condemned "with a sigh."

A second statement in Mr. Adams' letter also challenges attention. It is this: "When the first contingent of the German army was sent out on the China expedition in 1900 the Emperor personally addressed them in these words: 'When you meet the foe you will defeat them. No quarter will be given; no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German'."

An extensive report of this speech was cabled to the press of this country at the time. I have gone through it carefully, and fail to find anything which even suggests the words which Mr. Adams quotes. I have gone to great pains in the matter and I know of but one source from which they could have been drawn: a pamphlet of William Le Queux, now being circulated in England as an assistance to the recruiting campaign, which bears in large and blood-red letters the title "German Atrocities" and which it should be above the clean hands of any man of Mr. Adams' standing to touch. Perhaps Mr. Adams has other authority for the statement, but if he has he should have stated it when he set out to vilify the German Emperor. He still has an opportunity to do so.

I find in the "Europäischer Geschichts-Kalender" of 1900, page 114, the speech of the Emperor as printed in the "Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger". It contains neither the words nor the sentiments expressed by Mr. Adams. After discussing conditions in China and the death of the German Minister the Emperor said: "Do not rest until the enemy is completely crushed, begs for mercy." There is no further reference to the policy to be pursued by the German troops in dealing with the Chinese.

It should be remembered that when the German contingent alluded to left to join the international corps intended for the relief of the Foreign Legations in Peking, public feeling was running particularly high in Germany. The dastardly murder of the German Minister in the streets of Peking, while on his way to the Tsung-li-yamen with a message from the Diplomatic Body, had already been reported to the German people. All Germany was crying out for the revenge of not only the insult to the German nation but of the murder itself, and whatever relief might be afforded to Baron von Ketteler's devoted American wife. It was a time for men to lose their heads. The words placed by Mr. Adams in the mouth of the Emperor were justified then if ever. And yet, from all I can discover, the Emperor, far from losing his head and employing the words imputed to him, was calmly logical in his address to the troops.

The vicious and unfounded allegations of Mr. Adams might have been passed without comment if they had remained in England where they belong. But when

they are circulated broadcast through our own country, where neutrality of sentiment should be nourished rather than undermined, they demand the same examination and condemnation which belongs to all that pro-British and anti-American literature that has been foisted upon us recently by the intolerant and intolerably supercilious Boston School. The name which Mr. Adams bears is one which has been worn with honor in this country. He is descended—apparently very far descended—from a sturdy stock which made the revolution a possibility and a success. It was at the feet of an Adams that Alexander Hamilton sat, and then returned to New York to spread the fight against England and English oppression. But blood and sentiment thin with the years. And the Adams of today, like the Eliot, and the list could be filled to the bottom from the social register of Boston and Cambridge, seems intent upon undoing what their ancestors did so well one hundred and thirty odd years ago. Then Boston was the hot-bed of Americanism. The elm under which Washington took command of the Continental Army in 1775 has withered to a cement-supported stump, and with its life has departed from New England all that Washington stood for. While the South and the West are clamoring for the truth about Germany, New England clings to the fetich of the coat-of-arms and the English tradition. It is time that Maine wiped the word “Dirigo” from her Great Seal and that Massachusetts awoke to the fact that there is no longer place in this country for her A I, rock-ribbed, copper-bottomed narrowness, sycophancy and English heel-licking.

I called attention to the early illogical putterings of Harvard's President Emeritus and to his frank admission—from his point of view—that the United States must go to the rescue of the Allies should they become exhausted in the struggle against Germany. All this, however, was of comparatively small importance to the American people, compared with Mr. Adams' letter to Lord Newton. Mr. Eliot, of course, has long been "quite exceptionally hopeless," and what he said was dignified, even if it was silly and misleading. But when a leading citizen of the Hub of America and of the Universe so far forgets himself as to indulge the English people with misquotations which are not only undignified but untrue, what are we to infer? When the earth shall have lost its salt, where shall it find it again? Can it be that the commandment "thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor" was not meant to include Charles Francis Adams?

A WAR-PROOF NATION.

The man who sits on his own roof, while the property of his neighbors is going up in flames and the burning timbers are falling all about him, crying ever and anon: "Oh, the horror of it all!", is a subject for pity rather than admiration. When the roof on which he sits is, however, not his own but that entrusted to his keeping by an employer all the condemnation attaching to criminal negligence is showered upon him. It is not enough for him to say: "My

house, or my employer's house, is fire-proof." No house is fire-proof.

And no nation is war-proof. We have not even sanely striven to make ourselves so—and we may be sure that for a long time to come none of our neighbors will place themselves in that condititon. Yet every attempt to provide against the ravages of war when it is brought, as any day it may be, to our shores is howled down by those in whose hands we have placed the keeping of the nation—and the loudest by those highest in office. The conflagration in Europe, instead of affording our Government a helpful lesson in what we may expect when a brand is dropped in our midst or we drop one carelessly in the midst of another and warlike people, seems to have been called forth only that the select one may pluck a Nobel Prize out of the ashes of nine nations. Europe is not burning for this; but Europe will have been consumed in vain, as far as we are concerned, if we do not realize from what we are looking upon that only by being prepared to defend ourselves and hoping always that we may never need to employ our defences, can we ever aspire to lasting independence and security.

We do not require the huge armaments of Europe. We have in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans allies which outweigh thousands of guns and hundreds of thousands of men. We do need, however, to supplement these natural defences by a military and naval establishment that will guarantee our shores from invasion. Compared with the needs of European nations, it is infinitesimal, but it is just as vitally necessary, and will

remain so until the peoples of the world attain to such a perception of their own intrinsic worth, to paraphrase a sentence of Emerson, that they do not think property or their own bodies a sufficient good to be saved by such dereliction of principle as treating others like a herd of sheep. We want peace—for peace's sake itself, and for the freedom from the murder and the blood and stench of war and from the harrowing miseries of those who live to weep for the dead. We need peace for the proper development of our own social institutions and organization. A people living always under the shadow of invasion or the hope of invading, is not a free people; but the slave to fear or ambition—in either case to an element extraneous to itself and having no place in its social or political philosophy. But the hour of universal peace has not yet struck. The lesson of these months is not less that war lurks in the dark corners of the world still, than that world peace is an ultimate ideal which all the nations should strive to render concrete. But mark the word "ultimate". Two generations and more have passed since Victor Hugo presented to the International Peace Congress of 1849 his conception of a United States of Europe and prophesied its early consummation—yet what a caricature has history made of these prophecies! While our voice should never be raised but in the cause of peace we cannot, until those who surround us have struck the same note, afford to ground our arms or turn one cannon into plowshares.

We are not free from danger. While there is little to be feared from Europe and while we have outgrown

Canada until it has become a hostage rather than a menace and South America is becoming increasingly American, we must not forget that we have still to account for Asia. "Why," said Representative Gardner on the floor of Congress recently, "we have turned around and said to the most military nation Asia ever knew: 'We will have none of you within our borders'." And he pointed to Japan and our nearest danger. "Do you suppose," he continued, "a proud nation like Japan is going to listen with equanimity to a doctrine like that, unless behind that doctrine is a force, a strength to put that doctrine into effect?" I do not think that it is—for very much longer, or that it would have listened as long as it has but for a depleted exchequer. The erasure of the indemnity clause from the Treaty of Portsmouth served more effectively than any treaty of arbitration engrossed in the most innocent juice ever expressed from the grapes of sun-kissed California could have done, to preserve peace thus far between Japan and the United States. But the most depleted of exchequers are refilled in time—a fact which we seem to overlook when we regard with complacency the seizure of the Ladrones and the Marshall and Caroline Islands, the cutting of our communications with the Philippines and the creation of a series of bases from which Japan can operate against Hawaii and Guam. I am told that Great Britain will hold them—but even if England did not herself take a hand in the war, what is a little matter like neutrality between allies?

We do not want war with Japan, but there is a large

element of the Japanese people who want war with us. We have not insulted them, but they feel that we have. The decision of the people of California and other States to determine for themselves under the Constitution who shall and who shall not come to live among them has been interpreted as an infringement of the assumed inalienable right of the Japanese to go wherever they like and there erect their standard of wages and living. Without offering the white man in Japan equality of treatment with the yellow, Japan demands such equality for the yellow man in the United States—and eventually we shall have to grant the demand or fight. I think we shall fight. Our wishes as to peace will not be consulted. Were treaties of peace and amity and arbitration to be signed with Japan until the crack of doom, they would not make the Japanese white; and until he has been made white he cannot come to live amongst us on terms of equality with white men. That means war, and we should be ready for it.

Whether we are prepared to meet Japan or any one of the major powers of Europe in armed conflict is not the most important question of the moment. The important question is whether or not the American people have a right to know if they are prepared or unprepared. The other question can be answered later.

The argument that has been used by high administration officials against any investigation of our defences at present with the greatest apparent success is that this is an inopportune moment for any such action. That, in other words, our intentions might be interpret-

ed erroneously by the belligerent nations. The answer to this argument may be put in the form of another question: When will our intentions not be misinterpreted, if they stand in danger of misinterpretation to-day? Preparation for war with us means preparation for defence against insult or injury or both. And nothing else. We are known as a people of peace. Will our intentions, then, if we prepare for our proper defence when we still have the picture of war-torn Europe before our eyes, stand more likely to be misunderstood than if we suddenly increase our army and navy in an hour of general peace? I think not. The moment is not only not inopportune; it is both opportune and psychological. We know to-day what war is. To-morrow, when it shall have ceased, we shall have forgotten. We should strike while the iron is hot in our minds. We have been invited by an eminent Japanese statesman to "clarify" our policy in the Orient. That may better wait, however, until we have clarified our policy at home; determined whether or not we are in a position to support our "clarification"; and seen to it that what we lack, if anything, is supplied. The American people have a right to know these things. There is no better time than the present to present these facts to them.

CONGRESS, ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

The bill introduced by Senator Hitchcock forbidding¹ the exportation from the United States to nations now in a state of war in Europe of arms and ammunition

is the first sane expression in a concrete form that I have seen of the principles for which this country supposedly stands. We have talked of peace and have advocated peace. We have signed treaties of arbitration designed to lessen the chances of war. We have done nothing, however, to date, in a practical way to make war impossible or even undesirable. The Hitchcock resolution offers us an opportunity to make good our protestations—or to throw them overboard.

It was not to be expected that London would take kindly to the suggestion involved in the resolution. As a matter of fact, London has not taken kindly to it. On the other hand, she attempts to tell us that the resolution should not be passed because at some future date we may find ourselves at war with a European power—presumably England—and that we should then have to fall back upon the armories of Europe for our military supplies. Were we now to declare an embargo upon the exportation of the materials of war to assist the Allies in their war upon Germany, in the contingency suggested by London, Europe might refuse to supply us with what we might then stand in need of. That, however, is no argument. When the day intimated by the British Government comes to pass we will take care of ourselves. We plan no aggressive war, and we can very well manufacture in this country all we need for our own defence. We are not only doing that now but are supplying Great Britain with much that she needs.

As I have said, it was not to be expected that London would look with favor upon the establishment by

the American Government of an embargo upon arms and ammunition. The London Times has already expressed its opinion upon the subject, and its namesake in New York has taken up the argument. This we did not expect. The New York Times, in its leading article of the 10th instant, arraigns the Hitchcock resolution as an "unneutral embargo". The Times goes back a century and quotes Thomas Jefferson on our right to export arms and ammunition to whomsoever we please, whether belligerent or not, and continues a list of authorities down almost to the present time. I do not challenge the Times on this point. I admit it. We have a perfect right to sell arms and ammunition and all that goes to aid, abet and assist war, under the terms of what is known as international law. The point which I wish to make, however, has nothing to do with our right to engage in a trade of this sort—which is generally admitted; but has to do rather with our duty to refrain from engaging in this sort of trade if we are to be held consistent in our professions of faith in the possibilities of universal peace and our desire for its accomplishment. We can't talk peace and sell arms and ammunition in, to strain a phrase, the same breath.

The argument of unneutrality advanced by the Times is plausible but fictitious. Admitting that Great Britain holds command of the seas—admitting that under these circumstances she can draw upon the United States, while Germany cannot, for the sinews of war—can we be regarded as having committed an act of an unneutral nature if we determine that it is

most consistent with our professions and to our best interest not to supply any of the warring nations with the means of continuing a war which we nationally deplore? The Times is pleading the case of England. I am pleading that of the United States. When England suggested not so long ago that we take action to require the German vessels of war to leave American waters, the Times was sympathetic. When we remember that England has naval bases in the West Indies and Canada from which we could not reasonably require the British navy to retire, the unneutral element in the suggestion is apparent. When, too, Great Britain asked us to see that no contraband of war left our ports for a possible ultimate destination in Germany, the Times was equally sympathetic; although the just execution of the duties imposed upon us by the suggestion would have involved also the inspection and detention of contraband cargoes destined for Great Britain and the Allies.

The Hitchcock resolution has not to do with Germany or Great Britain so much as it has to do with the United States. Our right to sell arms and ammunition to belligerents is established: our right to refuse to do so is equally clear. I do not attribute to Senator Hitchcock, in connection with the resolution which he introduced in the Senate, a desire to help one party in Europe against another. "Mr. Hitchcock," says the Times, "proposes that by a law passed in Congress and signed by the President we shall rob Great Britain, France and Russia of the advantage they have gained." He proposed nothing of the sort. Involved in his reso-

lution, however, is the question whether or not the United States wishes to enhance this advantage to the injury of a nation with which we are all—with the obvious exception of the Times — at peace. The fundamental sense of Senator Hitchcock's resolution is not what the Times would make it out to be. We do not want to help Germany and we do not want to help the Allies to carry on a war which we deplore and abhor. That is, I take it that we do not want to do anything of this sort. If nationally we do want to do so, let us come out frankly and say so. If we want to help England to crush Germany, let us not talk about peace but let us go at once to the open assistance of England—for she sorely needs assistance. If, on the other hand, we wish to see Germany triumph in her unequal struggle, let us go openly to her assistance. What we cannot consistently do is to talk peace, peace, peace, and while we are talking with our right hand, allow our left hand to be fashioning arms for the destruction of men as human and as perfect as ourselves.

When London tells us not to pass the Hitchcock resolution London is speaking for herself and for all Great Britain and the Allies. She is not speaking for the American people; nor is she speaking in the interests of universal peace. She wants something just now and if Senator Hitchcock's bill is passed she will be stopped from receiving it. We all understand London—and England. Why cannot we feel that we can equally understand our own Administration? We did not want to see England enter the war—for she had no logical place in it. But, as I have often said be-

fore, that is no good reason why we should go to her assistance. The continuation of the exportation to the Allies of means and materials for continuing the war is but adding to a holocaust already great enough.

We have been told by British writers that we shall have a seat in the Council of Nations that is to write the peace. An exalted seat has been promised us, as a matter of fact, as that which properly belongs to a great nation which has kept itself aloof while all the rest of the world was at war. But can we claim such a seat when we reflect that we have been as largely instrumental in perpetuating the strife as any of the combatants themselves? It is rifles and bullets that destroy, blankets and uniforms that clothe and horses that mount for destruction. We have supplied all these; and remembering these things, can we appear in a Council of Peace and, raising up our hands for the relegation of war to the limbo of the past, say that our hands are clean? I do not think that we can.

Without regard for the interests of this combatant nation or that, we have the right to stop the shipment abroad of articles necessary to the carrying on of the war, and the duty is ours to see to it that such shipments cease. We were not asked if there should be war or not. We are suffering from the war in more ways than one. We have a right to look to our own interests, as others are looking to theirs. And in considering these interests we must weigh a few million dollars against our nationally professed principles. The question which Senator Hitchcock has raised is: Shall we be Americans or shall we be colonial subjects of a European crown?

THE BURDEN OF HUMANITY.

We can but watch the great bleeding heart of humanity throb to the accumulation of the endless sorrows which sadden it day by day—and wait—and hope. All that we had prayed for during the last few encouraging years in the way of the brotherhood of man and a lasting and assured peace has seemingly perished in the shambles on the plains of Flanders and Poland.

We cannot look forward to the spring and the flowers and to the re-birth of life when it is to be accomplished by so terrible a toll of death. War knows no seasons. It is a perpetual harvest of sorrow and destruction. It is indeed an optimist who can find a shred of hope in all this gloom.

Each one of us has been apportioned his share of the sacred load of humanity. Our responsibility is in direct proportion to our ability in carrying forward the work of humanity towards its destined goal. Previous to the war, millions of human beings in Europe were marching shoulder to shoulder, steadily and surely, along the road to a better and nobler day. Happiness, like a cloth of gold, was being spun to stretch from the North Sea to the Mediterranean and from the Atlantic to the crests of the Ural Mountains. The cause of freedom and of social betterment was progressing, if not fast enough to satisfy the most impatient socialists, at least advancing within the steady bounds of liberalism. Some of us had even perceived broad rifts in the clouds of militarism and autocratic feudalism that has blanketed the international development of peace and good-will among men.

How doomed to disappointment have we been. The majority praying for peace have been powerless in the hands of the minority cursing us with war. We dreamed the dream of a sweeter day to come, and awoke to the realization of a brutal dawn. The women of Europe are crucified with the sorrows of Mary. We, who hoped to find our sons sharing the benefits of universal peace—we see them dying with the stamp of hatred and the lust of blood upon their swollen, distorted faces. No matter how we, in paradoxical manner, attempt to clothe the victims of war with a halo of patriotism and heroism—we know that in hurrying millions of young lives before the judgment seat of the Almighty we cannot deceive Him with this frail delusion. One cannot storm the citadel of heaven with the blood of one's fellow man still warm and red upon his hands. One cannot look upon an eternal vision of serenity with the lust of killing still seamed upon his face.

It is not a lovely thing to view the great eternity of humanity with one's soul blackened and shrunken with the indelible stamp of war.

We have cast aside the burden of mankind. For each step we have been stumbling forward, each step won with such infinite pains and sacrifice, we are now hurrying backwards at a pace that numbs the heart. How we shall have to fight to regain this lost ground! Our sons and our sons' sons will be forced to stagger under the burden that a few in an insane moment have placed upon them all.

Christmas is approaching, but the carols of that sac-

red day will be muffled with the ache of a million broken hearts. The terror of it is with us all the day and all the night. There is a day of reckoning to come, when the books will be balanced and then God pity those whom humanity shall hold responsible for this sacrifice.

Allow me to conclude with Miss Gertrude C. Hopkins' excellent lines taken from the *Cranford* (N. J.) Chronicle.

Death Masks.

You say that the white of his face in the darkness
gleamed strangely,

As touched by a light

That is given alone to those who die greatly, whose
honor

Gave all for the right;

You bring me his sword and his sash and the message
of comrades.

All that they knew

Of the last of the hours that he spent on this earth,
me, his mother—

You comfort me so— — —.

And I tell you you lie!

I tell you the last that he knew of this earth was its
hatred and anger;

Blood blinded his eyes;

What gleamed white in the dark was the tightly-
clenched teeth of his raging;

Cursing the skies.

For his face was as blackened, awry, as the soul they
tore from him,

Hurled to God's feet.

A devil, the horrible madness of murder upon him—
My son who was so sweet!

ORANGE PEEL.

When George Bernard Shaw peeled the yellow off the French diplomatic correspondence and laid bare its inner fallacies, he did an act of kindness to the world and to France. A country cannot thrive on misconceptions or misstatements. But one can readily see the opening to which he exposed himself in so doing, to the attacks of those interested in the perpetuation of untruths.

A great deal of "fool-pidgin" has been written around the white, blue, gray, yellow and neutral-hued "papers" that have been given to the world on this war, its causes and the reasons for it. The republication of these documents in this country has been of value from the point of view of amusement—but historically they are interesting only in that they show how well those who rule us feel "what fools these mortals be." I cannot see why the Allies should not have pooled their cases and sent them forth on one and the same day. As it is, they have been served out to us with the intervallic regularity of speeches in a debate. Only, there has been but one affirmative. The British, Russian, Belgian and, now, the French papers, have appeared,—each taking up the futile attempt at rebut-

ting the flaws discovered in its immediate predecessor. We may hope, perhaps, that the French "yellow book" will close this silly contest to convince us of what we very well know or should not be convinced. I do not suppose that all diplomatic history contains a parallel blow at the good sense of the world at large. It is probable that the future will not repeat it; for this war should relegate the thing we know as "secret diplomacy"—and it is secret diplomacy that breeds white and gray and yellow books—to the same limbo as war itself.

The French "yellow book" falls quite within the category of the other collections of diplomatic correspondence that have been given us. They all seek to hide the truth beneath a mantle of prevarication. And when one who cares not for the mantle but for what it hides, tears the mantle aside and exposes what we know is the truth, the weavers of fiction fall upon, rend and malign him. I have read Shaw the Dramatist and Shaw the Socialist, and I confess to a liking for both. Both men write the truth as they see it and both look toward the future. I do not discern in Mr. Shaw's strictures on England the justifiable blasphemy of an Irishman suffering from his country's wrongs. I can discover in them only an attempt to open the eyes of not only England and the United Kingdom but of the world to the fact that unless this war remedies the defects in the British system—wipes out England's hypocritical attitude to her own and to the own of other countries—it will have been waged in vain for the world and for England.

It is fashionable these days to speak of Mr. Shaw as a mountebank or as a characterless master of a masterful pen. The New York Times, for instance, remarks: "It would be a pity if the picture he has so vigorously drawn should be accepted." It would be a thousand pities if it should not be. Mr. Shaw is neither a mountebank nor a characterless wielder of the quill. He is a well equipped and profound thinker, and one who loves his fellow men. He is less a subject of Great Britain than a citizen of the world; and as such can place man above money or minorities. And doing so, he cannot overlook the shortcomings of government which, in England no less than on the Continent, make for the repression of the movement toward that newer freedom of man which he sees with prophetic eye.

A plebescite would never have thrown England and the British Empire into the present war. An oligarchy has. This is what Mr. Shaw sees—what we might all see if many of us had not closed our eyes when the war opened. He saw the British lion crouching, as Perris saw it when he wrote: "Thus, from the foundation of British diplomacy by Henry VII, England was engaged for centuries in a shrewd game of beggar-my-neighbour with the three great Powers of the Continent, France, Spain and the Empire, taking a partner now on one side, then on the other, and always for a prize." He saw it under Edward VII preparing for the spring. With the vision of a Liberalist, the alliance of the oligarchy of England with the oligarchy of Russia could have meant nothing else to him. He now sees that the lion has sprung—and he says so. That is all there is to Mr. Shaw's philosophy.

Six years ago—nay six months ago—he was preaching the gospel of man vs. minority. Then he was a “socialist.” When six weeks ago he preached the same cause he was denounced, as he is to-day, as a traitor in England and by the New York Times as the incarnation of the “dramatic faculty.” What Mr. Shaw seeks to accomplish, if I have read him rightly, is to have the power of war creation removed from the hands of the few and rendered into those of the many. Is there any sane man on this side of the Atlantic or on the other, for that matter, who does not desire the same thing? I do not think there can be. It is only when war is made by those—and by those alone—who bear its burden, will it cease to be made at all. It does not matter whether the few is King or Kaiser, Czar or President, an oligarchy based on wealth alone or on wealth and birth combined—no man or no few men can safely be entrusted with the power of involving millions in war. They have done so, however, within six months.

The war which we are now witnessing is a stand of oligarchy against democracy—and Mr. Shaw wishes to make it the last. Are we, who more than all others want peace, to scoff at him for this? Are we to stickle at his style—when he gives us the truth? Brilliancy is usually a virtue—but the Times attempts to make it a vice. England has not yet gotten through the style of Carlyle to an appreciation of his worth. But this is not unnatural. It is said to take an idea thirty years—or is it twenty?—to cross the North Sea going westward. Let us hope it will not take anything like that

long for Mr. Shaw's ideas to cross the Atlantic. They come from the sanest man writing in Great Britain to-day with the conviction that truth is not for an hour but for all time—to be given to the world at the sun-down of war as well as at the sunrise of peace.

COUNSELLING GERMANY.

When President Wilson, following the outbreak of the present war, issued a formal proclamation of neutrality and added to it the informal suggestion which has since come to be referred to as "higher neutrality," the American press was loud in its praises of both the formally official and the personally informal acts of the President. A certain portion of this press has found it to its interest, apparently, to withdraw from this position and to ally itself openly and belligerently with the press of Great Britain. The last word in the process of translation from neutrality to unneutrality was spoken by the New York Times on the 15th instant, in its leader: "For the German People, Peace with Freedom."

This strangely reasoned and strainedly argued appeal of England to the German-American to counsel the German nation in the ways in which it should go would be innocuous if it could be confined to the American reading public. But it cannot be—and has not been. It is already in Germany and carrying with it, perhaps, the impression which London desires it to carry. The insinuation which goes with the editorial that the Germans in this country wish in any way to

influence the German people in Germany or to criticise their institutions, their ideals or their acceptance and conduct of the war is one which requires the immediate repudiation of the American people. Americans one and all, whether of German or other extraction, have no interest in these things which lead to condemnation. The British people have. I can readily understand why England wishes to make it appear to Germany that the American nation, and especially that portion of it which has sprung from German flesh and bone, is not in sympathy with the German cause. The establishment of this opinion in Germany would be worth more than "two army corps to Kitchener." And England does not care what it would mean to us. The "Cologne Gazette" intimated some days ago the extent of the injury which the British propaganda in the American press has already done us among a friendly people. The enthusiasm with which the press of England has taken up the London-inspired leader under reference will serve only to enhance this injury. It is cabled to Italy and to Scandinavia and to the other neutral peoples of the world. Added to and misrepresented as an expression of American opinion, it will carry a weight with certain elements among these peoples which could not attach to a leader from any English journal. The insidiousness of England's methods is apparent.

I know enough of the temper of the German people to know that whatever advice the New York Times offers it in the sense of its editorial of December 15th will fall upon sterile ears. It will do Germany no

harm—but it will and does harm us. And that is why we should let it be known to Germany and to her enemies, once and for all, that there is no such thing as “an American opinion” on the merits of this war and that there cannot be, and that, for this reason, any representation to this effect is a misrepresentation of the facts. I think it one of the safest signs of our perpetual abstention from the political affairs of Europe that our opinion is and must ever be divided on the questions involved in them. We wish to remain on terms of friendship with all. The political theories of Europe differ from our own, in some countries more than in others. But they have all served their purpose and it is not for us to judge them. Judging them, however, or not judging them, there is one thing we cannot tolerate and that is the misrepresentation of our opinions by any country to the injury of ourselves.

The German people have always given us their friendship. They have had and have ours. The attempt, therefore, to make it appear that they have not is a gratuitous assumption by Great Britain of a privilege unwritten in the laws of war and the exercise of which can only redound to our own loss. With the characteristic indifference to the rights of any and all but England which has ever figured in the policies of her Government she is now attempting to undermine a friendship quite the most valuable which we have. A paper printed in New York and purporting to be a representative spokesman for the American people aids and abets England in this nefarious design.

There can come no good out of allowing that infin-

itesimal portion of the American press which is controlled by London to misrepresent American opinion abroad. I do not deny that there are blocks of sentiment in New York and in New England solidly for the Allies. West of the Alleghanies there are not. The great West and Middle West are still open in sympathy and to conviction. This rankles in a quarter where it can do us most harm. A great victory has been won in Poland. The battles about Lodz will probably go down as among the decisive successes of history. We hear nothing of them—for London and Petrograd do not wish us to. The creation of the impression in this country that Germany is waging a losing war is but the preliminary to attempting to convince those who sympathize with Germany that it is their duty to counsel her to “peace with freedom.” England tells us what she wants us to know of Germany and tells Germany, through certain American papers, what she wants her to think of us. I do not think that the German people are to be fooled more than we are. Were our sympathies to those of the last man, woman and child, to be thrown against her—which is exactly the opposite of what will ever happen—she would go on fighting in a cause which she knows, as we must, is just. The British campaign is doing Britain no good—and we are to pay the bill. When peace once more returns to the Continent of Europe we do not want to feel that we have injured anyone of the peoples whose friendship we shall then wish to claim. Can we allow ourselves to be made the tool of Great Britain against Germany—and then go before Germany and say that

we have not injured her? The German people will achieve "peace with freedom" whatever our counsel to them might be. We have no counsel—for they do not need it; but if we had it would be to continue to do exactly what they have done and are doing.

PULPIT AND PRESCIENCE.

A great deal of unnecessary importance has been ascribed, in my opinion, to the sermon preached by the Reverend Newell Dwight Hillis from Plymouth Pulpit, Brooklyn, last Sunday night. The assertion of Dr. Hillis should be taken at par and not a premium. We all say what we think, and Dr. Hillis is amongst and of us. The fact that he occupies an historical incumbency means nothing. The fact that he has lectured on Germany "for the last five years" means nothing. The opinions which he has expressed are his own personal opinions—the opinions of an individual man, which have nothing at all to do with his holy calling, and which may be challenged by anyone who feels differently from Dr. Hillis. I have the greatest respect for Dr. Hillis, as I had for Henry Ward Beecher and Lyman Abbott, who preceded him in the same pulpit. Dr. Hillis is a learned scholar. He has studied Germany and lectured upon the lessons which we in the United States might learn from her. He has, therefore, a right to speak on Germany in the present war without being "heckled" by those who cannot agree with his point of view.

When, however, any pulpit is turned into a political

rostrum it opens itself to the challenge of those who cannot subscribe to the views which it expounds. I think it unfortunate that the Times should have seized upon Dr. Hillis' address to buttress its leader "For the German People, Peace with Freedom." It introduces an extraneous element which has no place, apparently, in Dr. Hillis' position or in the position of those who cannot agree with him.

The argument of Dr. Hillis is open to free discussion by those who do not see in Germany the menace which Dr. Hillis claims to discern. "I was for Germany five months ago," says Dr. Hillis. "For five years I had been lecturing on the lessons we might learn from Germany. But I have changed my mind. I have seen that I was mistaken. It was only in the middle of September that I realized what a German success would mean to the world—how there could be nothing else but a world of armed camps; how we, in this country, too, would have to adopt militarism in order to live."

These words are not taken from Dr. Hillis' sermon but from his subsequent interview in regard to it. They are referred to as emphasizing the statements of the sermon itself.

There is no law in this country against changing one's opinion. When, however, one who stands in Dr. Hillis' position and proclaims as his excuse for discussing the Germany of to-day the fact that he believed in Germany for five years and lectured upon the lessons which we might learn from her, it behooves him to give his reasons for the *volte face* involved in the assertion that a triumphant Germany would be a menace

to the world; that even in this country we shall have to live by militarism alone. The reason has apparently been given, and amounts to this: "This is an age of steel. Without hematite iron deposits Germany cannot build her steamships, her railways, her factories. German engineers have been saying for five years that another five years would see Germany's iron exhausted. A short time ago French engineers discovered the largest and richest body of iron ore in Europe. The German army is now within twenty-five miles of those coveted mines, and if the army fails to take them and the Germans lose the war, then Germany will be reduced to a second-rate power industrially and politically. Germany wants to supersede England on the seas, and Germany wants the iron mines of France, and this is the whole situation in a nutshell."

The nutshell and the situation which it encloses are, however, of Dr. Hillis' creation. Admitted, that, as the *Times* takes pains to point out, "like Dr. Eliot and Charles Francis Adams and President Butler and President Hibben, Dr. Hillis is a representative American," I still hold that there are other "representative Americans" many of whom see more in this war than the desire of Germany for the hematite iron mines of France—which are not worth to Germany an army corps. She has already lost in the neighborhood of fifteen. Allow me, therefore, to quote a few other Americans—and quite as purely such as Dr. Hillis—on the causes of the war.

While Dr. Hillis was presenting his views to his congregation in Brooklyn, Dr. Thomas C. Hall, Pro-

fessor of Christian Ethics in the Union Theological Seminary, was uttering in St. James Church these words: "The real cause of the war, from the German viewpoint, are to be found deep in the roots of European history. They believe that the war is the real outcome of the bold and aggressive policy of the Russian Empire, based chiefly on the known desire of Russia, as many other Germans think also, for an ice-free port. Servia has been her willing tool. Russia desires to crush Austria because that country defeated Russia's Balkan policy. Russia is also attacking Germany because Russia dreads the influence of Germany's democracy and social thought on the fate of the Russian oligarchy. England has, with France, taken the side of Russia to crush a commercial competitor."

I give you, as well, the view of Professor John W. Burgess: "I knew (in 1907) that there was only one thing which could rescue Germany from a combined attack upon her by Great Britain, France and Russia, sooner or later, and that one thing must be a representation by the United States to Great Britain that an alliance between Great Britain, France and Russia was an unnatural thing, dangerous to the peace of the world and injurious to the interests of the United States."

I give you, too, Professor George Stuart Fullerton, of Columbia University, who has known Germany and Austria for the last thirty years. Says Professor Fullerton: "I saw without hesitation that no class, either in Germany or in Austria, desired to precipitate this terrible war. Peace was desired, and earnestly desired,

for economic reasons. But war was forced upon both nations. That the war came just when it did may be regarded as an accident, for the war was sure to come in any case."

I give you, finally, though many other "representative Americans" could be quoted in a like sense, Judge Grosscup, than whom there is no American better qualified to judge of the situation. "What led France and England to back Russia, wrong," says Judge Grosscup, "in this Austria-Hungary matter against Germany, right, was, undoubtedly, their apprehension that Germany successful over Russia would be Germany not simply pre-eminent, but preponderant, both politically and economically, among the nations of the Continent."

It will be observed that in the opinions of the Americans which I have quoted, Americans with the same right to speak on the subject as Dr. Hillis, and in every case as well, if not better, qualified than he to address the American people on the subject, the "hematite iron mines of France" do not figure largely as a cause of the present war. I think that the American people will conclude with me that Dr. Hillis has chosen a very narrow reason for changing the convictions of "five years" in regard to Germany. As his subsequent dilation upon German militarism was based apparently upon his assumed reason for the war, it may be dismissed without comment.

I do not wish to give the impression that I have not the highest regard for the sincerity and ableness of Dr. Hillis—for I have regard for both. I do not be-

lieve that any man could succeed Henry Ward Beecher and Lyman Abbott in the pulpit of Plymouth Church without being a good pulpit man. A principle of the Liberal faith holds, however, that a man may be defective in one sense and yet helpful to the state in another. Conversely, a man may be helpful to the state in one way and not necessarily so in other ways. A good minister may be a very poor interpreter of Germany. Dr. Hillis has given us his views. So have other equally representative Americans. We must choose between them. Apparently Dr. Hillis has fallen under the spell of England. I cannot help recalling that there was a time when the incumbent of the same pulpit attempted, at the behest of President Lincoln, to bring England to her senses. I allude to Henry Ward Beecher, who went to England during the War of the States to attempt to adjust British opinion to the truth. Only partial success attended his efforts. The American who is interested in knowing what the English people, whom Dr. Hillis now holds up to us as the opposite of the Germans, thought of the man of whom we think most, will find it in "The Education of Henry Adams." The following words are taken from this diary of the son and secretary of the then American Minister to the Court of St. James. "London was altogether beside herself on one point," wrote Mr. Adams, "in especial; it created a nightmare of its own, and gave it the shape of Abraham Lincoln. Behind this it placed another demon, if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was useless; explana-

tion was vain. One could only let the passion exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular faith.

"Thackeray's voice trembled and his eyes filled with tears. The coarse cruelty of Lincoln and his hirelings was notorious. He never doubted that the Federals made a business of harrowing the tenderest feelings of women—particularly of women—in order to punish their opponents. On quite insufficient evidence he burst into reproach. Had he (Adams) carried in his pocket the proofs that the reproach was unjust, he would have gained nothing by showing them. At that moment Thackeray, and all London society with him, needed the nervous relief of expressing emotion; for if Mr. Lincoln was not what they said he was, what were they?"

It is apparent that Dr. Hillis stands in need of this same "nervous relief of expressing emotions." It should not be denied him. Only it should be remembered that even in Plymouth Pulpit, which for years has been associated with political and social discussion, the man who leaves the gospel to preach politics removes his robes before he does so. Dr. Hillis' remarks carry with them the weight of an intelligent American—and nothing else. As such they must be weighed in the balance with the opinions of other equally intelligent Americans. Weighed thus, they are found wanting.

XMAS THOUGHTS.

There are evidences of a white Christmas; the snow-flakes are flying and the Xmas Carols will mingle with the merry sleigh-bells. It is too much, however, to hope that we will celebrate a merry Christmas to-day. Those of us whose thoughts will stray to the Fatherland and the saddened Christmas gatherings around the jeweled trees will wonder when our beloved Germany will ever again enjoy the happiness of peace. Will it be to-morrow, or must days or months or years elapse before the nations will understand that they cannot crush the proud spirit that animates the entire Teutonic world. Or will it be to-morrow or days or months or years before German arms triumphant will decide the peace that has already been too long in the coming.

The Christmas festival is essentially Teutonic in origin. I believe that the idea of "peace on earth and good-will to men" gave rise to the first Christmas celebrations in the German forests fifteen hundred years ago. Scarcely a German family to-day but has its tree, scarcely a family but gathers its members from the four corners of the earth to celebrate its re-union around the Christmas tree.

Four millions of German soldiers will gather in the trenches to celebrate a martial Christmas. It was impossible, even for a day, to win a truce in this desperate war. The business of killing cannot be stopped for a few short hours. The Pope with all the influence of the great organization of the Catholic Church could

not prevail against the military necessities of the many nations.

What a gloomy picture for us to dwell upon. It is fifty years since we last spent a Christmas Day under the shadow of a great war. Let us hope that another fifty years at least will pass before Europe shall find itself saddened as it is to-day.

A year ago the German Emperor was the recipient of messages of cheer and comfort from every capital in Europe. It is indeed strange that in the short space of five months all that was good and noble and great in German life and German thought seems to have been forgotten by her enemies. Yesterday the German universities attracted the talent and genius of the world, to-day German intellectual life is vilified by the very ones who so recently considered themselves privileged to be able to enjoy the spirit of German culture. So war blinds reason. Much that has been written against Germany is not believed even by those whose pens have been most violent in their denunciations. Everything is unfair in war.

The law of compensation demanded a reaction in this country after the bitter tirade to which Germany was subjected at the hands of British writers. The pendulum of public opinion has reached, I believe, its furthest point from the center of fair play. It is swinging back along the course of justice. It is too much to hope that it will ever remain fixed at the dead center of impartiality and absolute neutrality.

This war has served one purpose in America. It has brought those of German blood into a closer bond

of sympathy. It has united those who should long ago have stood shoulder to shoulder. Many who had forgotten the traditions of German life felt a new and sudden pulse of sympathy for Germany. Others from a tacit understanding of the great problems of the Fatherland found themselves patriots. The vast majority of German sympathizers now realize the bond of common ancestry.

It is difficult to describe the bitterness which Germans feel at the attitude of a certain portion of our press. It is easy to understand the reason for it. It is in the main an outrage to their sense of fair play. In German families, in German societies it is the one theme of discussion. And the inevitable conclusion is invariably "but it is all so unfair."

We German sympathizers must be patient. Our load is light compared to that under which the German nation is staggering. Our families are gathered about the tree—and none is missing. If some of the editorial writers of our New York press and Dr. Hillis were to steal upon any one of a hundred thousand German-American homes to-day in New York, and similar hundreds of thousands of homes throughout the country, they would hear the melody of "O Tannenbaum" mingled with the martial strains of "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles," and we would not read so much silly nonsense about prying loose the devotion and loyalty of the German sympathizers towards Germany.

These people write the way they do because they do not understand. It seems hopeless to try and give them our point of view. Not satisfied with their own

they would prescribe their ideas, their theories, their beliefs for us. The German bazaar would have opened their eyes—but they were not there. German meetings or concerts or, in fact, any assemblage of German sympathizers would convince them of the utter futility and hopelessness of their plea. Let us forgive them and forget them.

Let me extend a word of Christmas cheer to my many readers. Germany is doing wonders. No nation has ever made a nobler sacrifice and won greater victories. In another twelve months I believe that triumphant Germany and Austria will celebrate a Christmas of peace over a greater Teutonic Empire. In the meantime let us not be discouraged by the false reports which fill a hostile press. Such reports do not change the course of events by a hairbreadth. We, German sympathizers, like the great German nation must stand shoulder to shoulder and fight for the fair name of Germany. That is our duty and our right.

“WAR AGAINST THE BARBARIANS.”

I have before me a copy of the Illustrated London News of Saturday, February 11th, 1854.

The leading article is entitled “*The War Against the Barbarians.*” The present campaign waged against Germany and the German Emperor is but an echo of the vilification which was hurled against Russia at that time.

“The publication of the two interesting and important Blue Books . . . effectually removed many errors

and uncertainties from the public mind. The rise, progress and present state of the Russian aggression against Turkey have been fully stated . . . Englishmen have now no reason to suspect that the Statesmen who have successively administered the affairs of this country from 1850 to the present time ever betrayed the high trust reposed in them. It is proved, at last, that they have never acted with subserviency to the wicked designs of the Emperor of Russia . . . More important State Papers were never given to the world. Everything in them is fair and open . . . It is evident that the conduct of the ministers and diplomatists of England has been prudent yet patriotic . . . They were slow to believe that a crowned Emperor could say that which was not and that a man who had given repeated proofs to Europe of sagacity and of moderation, could all at once belie his character and commence a crusade against Mohammedanism, for the sake of territory, even although the penalty of the act should be war against all the civilized states of Europe . . . In every stage of these long negotiations he (the Czar) stands condemned. Wherever such a thing as public opinion exists, public opinion has declared against him. Whatever may be their form of government, the people of every European state are opposed to ambition so nefarious, and every selfishness so abominable. The instinct as well as the reason of nations is alarmed, and the Czar stands without a friend before the supreme tribunal of mankind.

“There are many names in history that are never mentioned without disfavour and condemnation. I.

this black list the present Emperor of Russia promises to stand pre-eminent. The memory of the first Napoleon will shine like that of an angel of light in comparison with the blackness of guilt which will enshroud that of Nicholas. The one had many national and high excuses for his ambition, the other has none but the meanest and the most personal. He is the most selfish of warmakers that modern times ever saw. To find his parallel, we must look to the dim traditions of savage ages. Civilized nations show nothing like him.

"The question has often been asked, 'Is the Emperor Nicolas in his right mind?' (Sir Gilbert Parker please take notice). If he were a sane man, it is likely that he would yet find means to extricate himself and his country from the perils that a war will bring upon both.

"Yet though it is highly probable that the Emperor will persevere in his projects, and that the war will be a disastrous one, we cannot imagine that it will be disastrous either to Turkey, or to the Allies who have honestly and fearlessly resolved to fight it out. . . The Allies take upon themselves the high office of the judges of European law, and the executioners of its justice. . . It must not be forgotten in the calculation of chance against the Emperor, that the restoration of the ancient kingdom of Poland has long been considered necessary. . . It may be urged, that it is possible the Czar will yield at the last moment, and sue for peace on the best conditions he can make. Such a result is possible, but not probable. If the Emperor be so prudent, the prestige of his power will be lost, and Russia will be disgraced in the eyes of a people as proud as

they are barbarous. In such a case, Nicolas will never again have it in his power to trouble the peace of the world. A pre-emptory demand for his abdication would be the least of the perils that would threaten him."

And this is the Russia to which England is allied to-day by bonds closer than the English people know! This the Russia for which thousands of Englishmen are going to their graves in Belgium and France! The short space of sixty years—short when we measure it in terms of race history—has wrought a remarkable change. "Adam-zad" is no longer "the bear that stands like a man!" The lion and the bear have found the same bed.

Is there not a lesson in all this for us? Are we to blind ourselves to the hypocrisy of a nation which but sixty years ago could write as it wrote of Russia—and has written more recently in a much stronger strain—and yet will ally itself to that same Russia in an effort to crush the highest civilization of Europe? I confess, when I reflect upon these facts and upon the dream which a great many Americans are solacing themselves with that England stands for a rejuvenated Europe, a feeling akin to chagrin. I can see but one Russia—the Russia of the British mind of 1854, which has not advanced one verst in the meantime—but I can see many Englands. The latest avatar was developed by Edward VII and Sir Edward Grey.

When we reflect upon the questions involved in the present war we must remember that as a military unit is not stronger than its weakest member, the Allies

are not more advanced than their least advanced component part. We may throw our sympathies with England when she wars upon the Zulus or the Afriti—for there can be no doubt that hers is the superior civilization. When, however, she wars upon Germany with Russia for her strongest ally, may we logically do the same? I do not think there is anyone in this country or in the advanced countries of Europe who wishes to see German influence crushed out of Europe that Russians influence may take its place. That, however, is what England is striving at the present moment to accomplish.

Old England takes to bed with her from time to time varied and various playmates—and comes up smiling the next morning to ask the approbation of the world. The enemy of yesterday is the friend of to-day. Will the world stand for this forever? There must be some standard by which to judge nations as individuals. The Russian nation has been judged by England and by ourselves. Shall we, at the behest of England's temporary necessities, alter what we have thought of Russia? I think not. Standing together, England and Russia will fall together.

A man is known by the company he keeps. A nation cannot escape the same test. We cannot think of England in her war upon Germany other than as championing the seventeenth-century culture of her ally. As Kipling has attempted to extricate himself from the arms of Adam-zad, so England would like to be free from the strictures which she herself has written around Russia. But the impossible cannot be

accomplished. We know that a nation that will ally itself with Russia against Germany is ready to accept Russian domination—if it can be effected—in Berlin, and with such a nation we can have no sympathy.

“WHAT HAVE I DONE TO-DAY?”

It is well for those Americans of German extraction to ponder on the many grave problems which confront them owing to the war. The drift of public opinion driven by a press unfriendly towards Germany requires a closer bond of sympathy between the friends of Germany. As the day draws nearer the Allies, hard pressed, forced by their necessities, will demand of the United States even a more active co-operation than they are receiving at the present time. Against that day we must be organized to fight. Each single and individual German residing in the United States or the descendant of a German must play his or her part in preaching the gospel of German justice and German fair play. Let an endless chain of discussion help to swing the balance back in favor of the cause we know to be just. There must be no shirkers, no drones in this campaign. The responsibility lies evenly on every one of you. We cannot resort to conscription but must rely upon universal service of a voluntary character.

Let each German sympathizer ask himself every night: “What have I done this day to aid in correcting the false impressions which have been circulated in regard to German ideals and Germany?” After all,

that is what we are striving for. We want no unfair advantage but we wish to be understood. Do not rely upon a few leaders and feel that the German cause rests solely in their hands. There are powerful voices raised against us and none should try to shift the burden to another.

There are over two thousand German societies of one kind or another in Greater New York. Practically every German-speaking American, as well as thousands of others in New York, are members of one or more of these societies. Similarly in each great town, the Germans and their descendants have proved loyal to the traditions upon which their lives are based. These societies form strong rallying points for a campaign of education. It is greatly to the credit of the Germans that this immense power has never been used in a political way to the detriment of any man.

The German newspapers are after all but the servants which minister to the needs of the membership of these German societies. Let a German newspaper offend by act or word and the result is its sure destruction. I speak as a publisher of considerable experience when I say that there is no power among German circles in the United States, no single German newspaper or group of papers, which can lead the German-speaking people in the United States in any channel save that in which it is urged by feelings of love and patriotism for the United States and love and patriotism for the Fatherland.

It is the most arrant nonsense to assume that these people could be led to even think a thought of disloy-

alty to Germany, much less to send word to the Fatherland that it should lay down its arms before it has won a decisive victory. Any German newspaper which preaches such a doctrine might as well close up its doors at once. No man or group of men shall ever dictate to me personally or to you or to any of us or to us altogether what message we shall send to Germany. There have been no traitors to the German cause either among the 66,000,000 Germans in Germany or the many millions of Germans and their descendants in the United States. I have received many threats during the past months. I have received many solicitations from well-meaning but deluded people asking me to urge German-Americans to be unfaithful to the German cause; I suppose all of you have had the same experience. An answer is unnecessary.

We must not overlook, however, the immense wealth and power at the disposal of the Allies. Should it so happen, and God forbid that it may come to pass, that Benedict Arnolds should be found amongst us and that smooth-tongued hypocrites should greet us with the kiss of Judas and the dissimulation of Caiphas, or assuming even that the entire German press should fall into hostile hands, even then we could rally in our German societies and we would build anew, beginning the fight from the beginning. Just as Germany could lose all else—but no nation be able ever to crush the spirit that has produced the forty richest years of creative effort in the fields of science, art and commerce—so also the entire weight of England's influence in the United States will fail to move us one hair's breadth from our loyalty to the German cause.

The last five months have proven a revelation of joy to me. They have shown that the German-Americans stand as one man in the fight. It is true that nothing else was to be expected. Our differences seem to have been composed with the same ease and felicity with which party lines in Germany were merged in the interest of the whole. The battle, however, is not yet won. This nation is being assailed by the adroit and unscrupulous methods which precipitated Europe into the present cataclysm. The German has been condemned because he has spoken his mind, openly and without fear. He has been accused of "conducting a campaign." The time is approaching, however, when he can no longer refrain from doing so. This country has never had and will never have cause to fear the German element in it. The traditions of honor and frankness which characterize the German in Germany characterize him no less in the United States. These are qualities which no man or no nation need fear. It is the snake in the grass which gives just cause for alarm. There are many such about us to-day. And it is against their desire and their essay to coil their loathsome thought about the mind of the American people that the German-American must be on his guard.

I am not preaching sedition. I am preaching the highest form of loyalty that I know. We are a mixed people in the United States. We have come from the ends of the earth. We have all given our mite to the building up of this great country. We all deserve equally of it and it of us. There is no reason, there-

fore, why its destinies should be swayed more by the people who think as England thinks than by those who think as Germany does. I have always thought that there was an American system—that we broke with Great Britain because we could not live under the British system. It would seem, however, that I have been wrong, and that we are still at the beck and call of the British Government. The call grows louder as the war wears on and England wears out. Against the efforts being made to embroil us in this conflict on the side of the Allies, it is the duty of every German-American not alone to Germany but to the United States to fight as strenuously as it is in him to fight. Only in this way can the flood of British influence in this country be stemmed.

I cannot subscribe to the doctrine that "born in Germany" carries with it in this country any disqualifications. It has been said that if the German in the United States does not like what the United States think, he should return to Germany. And those who have said this forget that the German, just as well as the Englishman, the Frenchman, the Russian, the Serbian and the Montenegrin, who has come here, is not only in but of the United States; and his opinion is as much a part of the opinion of the United States as is theirs. There is no question of "liking what the United States think." The Germans here are as loyal to American thought as they are to the American flag. And what America thinks will in a very large measure depend upon what the Germans in America think and make others think. The greatest duty of the German-

American to-day is to stand solidly and strongly for the creation of a public opinion which will not only keep the United States out of the war but will remedy the injury done to Germany by the British campaign. The German societies have it in their power to lead in this movement.

GERMANS MILITANT.

"And those who spent in Germany, as I did, the month of August 1914, mingling freely in the crowds on the streets during the two weeks of the mobilization, when the public excitement was greatest, can only wonder that a people so peacable and self-restrained should be capable of the daring courage which has since stormed fortresses and has gathered laurels on land and sea in a way which compels the admiration of all who have not been kept in ignorance of the facts."

Thus wrote Professor George Stuart Fullerton, who has known Germany and the German people for thirty years, at the beginning of last month.

Since the inception of the present war we have been asked, by parties not disinterested in the trend of American opinion, to alter in two very different connections the historical opinion of the German nation. We have been asked, firstly, to regard a people which through all the centuries has stood for peace and the arts of peace as blood-lusting barbarians, exponents of "instructed savagery"; and, secondly, as cowards before "the British bayonet" and the Cossack's sabre.

The allegations by which the first charge is supported may be overlooked. They have been disproved and condemned by every responsible and dispassionate writer who has written from the front. They are the "war measures" of an intensely angered and scared England.

The stories of German troops running from British bayonets—that wonderfully illiterative and useful phrase—may with similar ease be disposed of. The same organs of publicity which revel in these tales present us occasionally with reports that such and such a town or village or farm-house in Belgium has been captured and recaptured at the point of the bayonet five or six times in a day. I may be wrong, but such reports do not impress me convincingly with the fact that the German is very much alarmed by the British or by the bayonet. The story of Poland is sufficient to dispel any apprehension as to his fear of the Cossack's sabre.

The part which modern artillery of tremendous range and immense destructive power has been called upon to play in this war, and which has been advertised as a new feature of warfare, has given a widely accepted impression that battles are won or lost by artillery alone—that they have lost that manly feature which they contained in the days when men fought with axe and mace and the best man, physically, won—that hand-to-hand fighting is no longer possible or permissible. This impression is wrong. A new element has been introduced by modern artillery—and introduced largely by German science, but it has not

robbed even the war of to-day of the old man-to-man struggle. We hear of "fist-fights" between the contending troops in the west and of a fifteen-mile "butts-front" engagement between the Germans and the Russians about Lodz—in which the Germans won. The trenches in the West have drawn so close to each other that artillery fire is no longer possible. Only hand grenades and the bayonet can be used. And yet, somehow, the Germans "stick." There is hand-to-hand fighting going on along the whole line, and wherever it is going on the Germans are there "with the goods". The story of Teutoburger Forest is being written again today—despite the efforts of Germany's enemies to write something very different. The German is no coward, and all efforts to prove him such fall as easily to the ground as any effort would to prove his enemies such. The effort should not in the first instance have been made. The German soldier wants only to get at the enemy and it doesn't matter whether with butts or bayonets.

An attempt has been made to characterize as "theatrical" the action of the crews which stood on their decks off the Falklands, hopelessly beaten in a battle in which they had no chance of victory, and went to their watery graves with the songs of the Fatherland upon their lips. Could they have done better? Caught, as they would have caught, in the service of their country, and doomed by a stronger enemy, what more appropriate thought for their minds or words for their lips than those of praise for a country which they served and all that it held dear for them? The battle in

which Admiral Count von Spee's squadron was largely destroyed will remain in the annals of the present war a tribute to German heroism—and patriotism. It is a poor-minded enemy that challenges the manner in which the foe goes to his grave.

The German troops which are opposing six nations on the fields of Europe are animated by the same spirit. There is but one thought in their minds: the Fatherland and its safety. And they go to their graves with the same willingness and the same dignity. A correspondent, writing to a London paper, relates this incident in connection with the Austrian sorties from Cracow: "A lieutenant told me that the force which took part in the sortie was 15,000 strong, and though they inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy, not 2,000 of them got back. They marched out of Cracow one evening at seven o'clock, encountered the Russians at two o'clock in the morning, and charged them three times on a front of three kilometers around the outer fortifications." This is the temper of the Austrian allies of Germany. Another correspondent, writing from the front in Russian Poland, has this to say of the German's fear of the "sabre of the Cossacks"; "In one of the operations around Lodz occurred the celebrated 'cutting off' of two German army corps, which, after being entirely surrounded by the rapid advance of the Warsaw reserves, turned and cut their way out, and brought with them 12,000 of their would-be captors. The scene of this exploit, which a member of the General Staff characterized as one of the most brilliant of the war, was Strykow, ten miles to the

north-east of Lodz." This is the temper of Germany itself. I might go on and repeat the stories of German and Austrian heroism and sacrifice which have come from the battlefields of the east and west ad infinitum. We who have known the Germans so long do not require them.

And it is not the German soldier alone that is giving his life and his all to the Fatherland. The German officer is built of the same stuff. The fashion of caricaturing the "Iron Cross" in this country is new. There have been many given in this war—and as many deserved. That some of them have fallen to high officers and even to members of the Emperor's family does not need to qualify this statement. This is a war in which "Prince and Peasant" are equally joined and equally willing to do the best that is in them for the cause in which the heart of both is wrapped up. When Prince Eitel Fritz grabbed a drum from the hand of a fallen soldier and rolled out the command to charge, there was nothing but the German left in him. The Prince was gone. When Prince Joachim, wounded in action against the Russians and succored by a corporal, wrote to the man who had given him first aid and ended with these words: "Did private Ewe get a new package of bandages? I have reproached myself for having taken his. And now farewell and remember me to all the boys of the 83rd, my Cassel friends, and tell them, that I shall be back as soon as I am able to get on my feet again. Your thankful comrade Joachim, Prince of Prussia"—when Prince Joachim wrote these words, he wrote the first and the last commentary on German

unity, German heroism and German self-sacrifice in the cause of the Fatherland which Germans love and wherever they are never forget. A nation built of men like these is not afraid of "British bayonets" or "Russian sabres". A nation built like this can never be conquered.

Three months fighting on German soil, says Hilaire Belloc, and the war will be over—and Germany beaten. The war is five months old and the Allies have yet a long way to go to this goal, and when they reach German soil they will find that the German is just beginning to get his temper up. I do not think the Allies will ever reach any advanced position on German soil—but if they should the war will not be ended in Kitchener's three years nor in three hundred years, if it is fought to the end which England promises—the crushing of Germany.

The German soldier has been tested in the trenches—the German commander in the tent and council-chamber, and neither has been found wanting in strategy or courage, in the manipulation of the scientific instruments of warfare or in hand-to-hand conflict. "With such soldiers," said von Hindenburg of the Poland campaign, "I cannot but win". With such soldiers, he might have said, Germany can never lose.

BRITAIN AND AMERICAN COMMERCE.

The instruction sent to the American Ambassador at the Court of St. James to lay before the British Government the protest of this country against the

treatment which its commerce has been accorded by Great Britain during the last five months, marks a decided and welcome step forward in the assertion of our rights. And of the rights, too, of all neutral countries. I do not suppose that there has been, since the days when England and France played battledore and shuttle-cock with neutral trade during the Napoleonic wars, a time when a well-minded and peaceful people have been called upon to tolerate from a belligerent the insults and injuries to which we have been subjected by Great Britain in these months. Coming to us for what she needed to prosecute her war on Germany, she denied us the right to trade even in commodities held to be "conditional contraband" with countries as neutral as ourselves. Ruling the waves, Britannia would also rule the world. Since the inception of the war no statement of policy has come out of Washington so valuable to ourselves or to the rights of neutrals in general as this.

It is said that the protest will be taken by Great Britain "in good part". We all hope it will be. We don't want war. Great Britain has attempted to apply to the United States her historical policy of bulldozing and intimidation, and she will probably make her historical apologies and retraction, and that is all we want—except damages for what she has already accomplished in the way of injury to our trade. That is all we want for the present, at least; but in this protest lies a potential beginning for the assertion of the principle that neutrals as well as belligerents have rights in times of war and that if we wish to relegate

war to a shelf in the museum of discarded historical fallacies, the rights of neutrals should be given preference.

The attitude of Great Britain has been as absurd as it has been untenable. One has only to go to British authorities on the rights of nations to confound her. The surprising thing is not that the English are shocked at the protest, but that it was not lodged sooner. The denial of our right to trade freely with Holland, Italy and Scandinavia is perhaps the most flagrant exhibition of international impudence to which the world has been treated in modern times. We are not at all interested in assisting England to starve out Germany. We are interested, however, in not being starved ourselves, and it is apparent that at last even Washington has become alive to the dangers in the policies enunciated and put into practice by our cousins across the water. We are a tolerant people, but there is an end to toleration in all things.

The "polite language" in which the protest is said to have been couched is meet and fitting. It should not be misunderstood, however. It will probably accomplish its purpose, and if it does there will remain no cause for unpleasantness. A sugar-coated pill may be as hard to swallow as any other, but it tastes better. There should be no attempt made, however, to minimize the meaning of what we have to say to England or of the seriousness with which it is said. A protest is a protest, and if found to be just must be met by remedy. We do not want to fight England, but we fought her just one hundred years ago and for just

the injuries against which we are protesting to her to-day. We can do it again.

The recognition contained in the action of the State Department of England's "friendly attitude" toward this country should be valuable to those who wish to erect on Boston Common a statue of British valour. It should be valuable, as well, to those who have harped upon militarism so long that they have forgotten the dangers of navalism. A large standing army in Europe may be a menace to the immediate neighbors of the nation which maintains it, but the octopus of navalism stretches its countless arms into every corner of the world and throttles every trade but that which serves it. We have had lessons before, but they have been forgotten. The lesson of the present, however, is sufficient to teach us that this country is not menaced by European militarism but by British navalism. A navy which roams and rules the seas and stands forever between us and our markets, breaking up or seriously delaying our trade, is more to be feared than a hundred standing armies anchored to their respective soils.

We shall await Great Britain's reply to the protest with interest. It has been intimated from London that the British Government will defend its actions. What defence it proposes to oppose to the claim of a neutral nation to trade with other neutral nations free from the interference of belligerent Powers we have no manner of foreseeing. That it will be conclusively effective—from the British point of view—is a foregone conclusion. Will it be from ours? We ask only what is given

us by international law and the comity of nations. We can be denied this only by violating the law of nations. Will England admit that she has wronged us and pay the bill, or will she throw overboard that public law for which she has posed as being so solicitous? The British Government would be very foolish indeed to attempt to argue a point of this sort against the interests of the neutral world.

The British press has sought to conceal its chagrin over this obvious exhibition of independence on the part of the United States, and we wish them well in the endeavor. The great danger, as London sees it, is "not from the British Government, which recognizes the legitimacy of America's agitation, but in raising an unfavorable opinion here, which is likely to turn in the direction of considering America's action unfriendly and to lead to accusations that American sympathy is governed by commercial profits." I do not think the American people need worry very much about public opinion in England. It has always been hostile. A little more hostility will not do us half so much harm as the interference with our trade has already accomplished. We are dealing with the British Government—not with British public opinion—and it is a cause for satisfaction that the British Government "recognizes the legitimacy of America's agitation." It is a pity that recognizing the legitimacy of the "agitation" steps were not taken earlier by the British authorities to render any occasion for it unnecessary. It would seem as if England had been caught again in the attempt to "put one over on us." We can only hope that in se-

curing amends it will not be necessary to drag her again to Geneva—or to Ghent.

NEW YEAR'S GREETINGS TO GREAT BRITAIN.

Whatever New Year's greetings we have had to offer Great Britain during the past few years, our message to-day can be capsuled into three words—"Repression or reprisal."

The Times of London, seeking for a ray of sunshine in the clouded skies of our relations with Great Britain as developed in the protest recently lodged against interference with American trade, has this to say: "The note is dated December 24th, and, although the idea may seem fanciful, we cannot help imagining that it was by no accident that the eve of the great festival of peace and goodwill was chosen for the dispatch of this friendly communication from one of the great branches of the English-speaking communities to the other." The Times should not delude itself, or attempt to delude England, with an idea so fanciful. If there was any significance in the date on which the note was dispatched, it is this: it was so timed that the British Foreign Office might have time in which to consider it, and make its New Year's resolutions to treat us more fairly. We can only hope that it was well timed.

The cabled reports of the British attitude toward the protest are not what we had good reason to expect them to be. There is apparently a desire on the part of the British people to evade the responsibility which

attaches to them. The British, in other words, seem to have gotten their backs up and wish to discuss the matter. We do not wish to discuss it. We are wrong—and the answer is to retract our protest; or we are right, and the answer is for Great Britain to call off her sea-hounds. It has been admitted that the British Government recognizes the legitimacy of our “agitation”—mark the word “agitation”—and admitting the legitimacy can Great Britain ask for time in which to discuss points on which discussion has been rendered useless by her admission of our rights in the premises?

The suggestion that Great Britain will fall back upon the “breathing spell” of twelve months allowed under Mr. Bryan’s recent treaty of arbitration with Great Britain is not at all reassuring. We have stood for England’s violation of our rights for five months—and that is long enough. What we have endured during these months is the basis of our complaint. We are certainly not going to wait another year for the remedy of these conditions. We want it now. We want our rights and we don’t want to have to wait for them until it suits Great Britain to give them to us. An unmeasurable amount of harm has been done to our trade by the irresponsible conduct of the British navy, and we want this stopped, and stopped now.

Another suggestion, emanating from the British press, that we must await relief from the things of which we complain until Great Britain has secured “watertight” agreements from Holland, Italy, Scandinavia and Switzerland that no contraband articles will be dispatched from their territories to Germany is equally unsatisfactory.

We have a perfect right to trade with whomsoever we please. Only Great Britain challenges this right. Are we to accept it?

The protest sent from Washington to London was the work of the best diplomatic minds in the service of the American people for the time being. It will have the support of the American people. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. We were ready to fight for Olney's Venezuela Declaration and we are just as ready to fight for our rights in the present instance.

As I said yesterday, it was to be hoped that England would see right and meet our friendly request for friendly treatment on the seas in a friendly manner. If she will not do so, the responsibility is upon her own shoulders. This country is not going to lend itself to a policy of "starving out" Germany or any other nation. We could just as easily starve out Great Britain, if we wish. Our interest is with ourselves. We have been accused of sympathies dictated by "commercial profits" and that by a people who prided themselves upon being "a nation of shopkeepers." We are at last coming to a point where we can truly appreciate British friendliness for the United States. Swamped as we have been during the past few months with British pro-American literature, so different from what we have heretofore read from the same British sources for years—there was a danger that the American people might be misled. The danger is over now. We know on what side of the North Sea our true enemies lie.

I am frank to say that I do not like the tenor of the

British press. Some of it is conservative and some of it is hostile. There runs through it, however, a strain of that "impeccable British self-righteousness" which ill comports with our ideals. We can stand for much but we cannot stand for all things. The British Government should understand this. We do not want delay or discussion—but remedy.

I wish we might send another New Year's wish to England, but under the circumstances I can see only this: "Repression or reprisal."

THE SOLITARY SWORD-WALKER.

Spectacle counts, attracts, commands. A four-ring circus is bound in the nature of human things to compel a larger measure of attention than the solitary performer who plies his profession on the street corner. And when the circus is brought to our very door and the lone performer is far away, the relative disproportion of their attracting power is increased in direct ratio to the distance which separates them from us.

We are having staged for us to-day in Europe, at our very door as it were, a four-ring circus—though only in the sense in which the word was applied by the ancient Romans to their blood-soaked arenas; and the tremendous and terrible spectacle of it all holds and has held us wrapt in horror. There is nothing, however, save its magnitude, to differentiate the present European conflict from anyone of the many other wars that have been waged on the Continent since its history began to be written. There is nothing involved in it

to bring it nearer home to the American people than the Napoleonic wars, for instance. Yet our ears and our eyes and our voices are hopelessly charmed by it. We refuse brusquely and with ill concealed impatience to listen to the suggestion that another performance is going on in the world which should have a place in our thoughts. We close our eyes and shout down any voice raised in such a suggestion. And yet, all the while, out beyond the crossroads of the Pacific, a single sword-walker is performing his trick, unnoticed save by the East, without the advertisement he merits but seeks to avoid. The performance is still on, and the best part is yet to come. It holds much more for us than the events that are transpiring in Europe. We should patronize it with our closest attention, for when the curtain rings down it will be too late.

The sword-walker is Japan. With consummate art he has nimbly mounted and descended over the swords of Kiaochow and the German possessions in the Pacific which lie so close to our own. He runs his finger along their edge to show that they are sharp. They are good swords and useful in his trade, and he will keep them. The promise to present them to the audience is not to be respected. We are—or should be—represented in that audience and we have a right to demand that the promise be made good. Will we?

When Japan was called into the war by Great Britain, or called herself in—there seems to be a wide difference between the London and Tokyo versions of the story of Japan's entrance into the conflict—the British papers did not attempt to conceal their appre-

hension that this participation of a yellow race in a white man's war would meet with but scant approval in the United States. The British press was not blind to our interests in the Pacific, and called frankly upon the Government for assurance from Japan to allay any suspicions which might arise in this country as a result of the action of its ally. I have always been under the impression that these assurances were given, and that they consisted in a promise to return Kiaochow to China—"eventually," it is true; and not to extend her operations "to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lines in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, or to any foreign territory except to territory in German occupation on the continent of Eastern Asia." Whether or not these assurances were given by Japan, there can be no doubt that they were given by Great Britain, in its note of August 17th. And Great Britain stands in the eyes of the world the sponsor of Japan in this war.

There was consequently some surprise caused by the announcement that Japanese forces had occupied the German possessions in the Marshall, Caroline and Ladrone Islands, considerably "westward of the China Seas." It was explained at the time that this action had been taken for military reasons—but no explanation was given as to why it was taken by Japan rather than by Great Britain. It was further stated that the islands thus occupied would be held by Japan only until the end of the war. At best, there was but little consolation in that. We do not know how long the war

in Europe may carry on—and we may be in war with Japan before it is terminated. But we swallowed it and said nothing. Then came the story of Japanese expeditions being fitted out to visit these islands and determine upon their fitness for Japanese colonies. What little hope we had that our own possessions in the Pacific would not remain boxed by our one inveterate enemy vanished with this report. The necessity for further explanations and assurances led to the rumor that Japan had decided to turn over all the islands to Australia. This found a prominent place in the British press—ever on the look-out for some handle to American “moral support”—and ran its little day. It now develops that Japan will deliver to Australia—or says she will—only those islands which lie below the equator, and will retain everything to the north of the equator which she has seized or may seize. Thus Japan will continue to occupy the Marshall, Ladrone and Caroline Islands, precisely those which we do not want her to possess.

So much for “Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas.” A growing feeling among the Japanese people, discernible in the cables from Tokyo since Kiaochow was occupied, that this territory should be retained, seems to have culminated in the Government’s reply to an interpellation in the Diet a few days ago to the effect that Japan was under no obligations to return it to China. The Oriental mind runs in channels “measureless to man,” and it is possible that the Japanese Government will be able to mentally wriggle to its own satisfaction out of the obligation undertaken in its ul-

timatum to Germany, in which it demanded the surrender of Kiaochow "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." The argument advanced for this latest *volte face* is that the promise of eventual restoration to China was contingent upon the peaceful delivery of the territory to Japan, that it cost Japan much in men and money to secure the delivery, and that she is consequently freed from the promise. That may be good enough logic for our little brown brothers—but it is not good enough for the rest of the world. The promise was not made to Germany and was not contingent upon anything. It was made to the world in general and to China in particular. The seizure of Kiaochow was a piece of gratuitous altruism—from the Japanese point of view—or it was nothing but robbery. China did not call upon Japan to effect the restitution to her of a territory which she had in due form leased to Germany. I am quite sure, had she been asked, she would have preferred that Kiaochow remained in German hands. There would have then been the certainty that at the end of the lease it would return to her. She knows very well that it is now lost to her forever. The possession of Kiaochow means to the Japanese mind compensation for the loss of Wei-hai-wei, in the same province, from which Japan was forced after the China-Japanese War. The sound of guns in the fight for Port Arthur was distinctly heard on the Shantung Promontory. The possession of Shantung is complementary to that of Port Arthur. The one will be surrendered as soon as the other—and that will be never.

We pity China, but the lesson for us in Kiaochow is that Japanese promises are written in the ashes of the hibachi. We shall see the Pacific possessions which were once Germany's regained by Germany or retained forever by Japan, unless we take them from her by force and at great cost. There are not wanting signs that the usefulness of Japan to Great Britain is being widely questioned in England and that the end of this war will see the end of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and with the dissolution of the alliance England will wash her hands clean of responsibility for the conduct of her erstwhile ally and hold them up to us in horror when we suggest that she has betrayed us. That however, is just what she has done. If not at her request, certainly with her connivance, Japan entered the war and has possessed herself of points of strategic importance the occupation of which by Japan is a direct menace to our legitimate interests in the Pacific. England promised us that Japan would not make these territorial acquisitions. She now countenances them, and is apparently preparing to walk from under the responsibility which attaches to her double-faced action. If she is sincere in her protestations of friendship for this country, there is still time for her to influence her ally to make amends for their jointly broken promises by withdrawing from territory which she guaranteed Japan would not molest. Unless England does this she will call in vain upon this country for its goodwill.

WHY GERMAN-AMERICANS TAKE UP THEIR
SPEECH.

I have been asked why it is that the Germans and the German-Americans are so solicitous for the goodwill of the American people that they have been impelled to a strong protest against the obviously anti-German attitude of a considerable element of the American press.

I have long foreseen that this question might be raised, but have all along hoped it might not be. The answer in a word, or a few words, is this: The German in Germany is as alive as is the Englishman in England to the value of the friendship of neutral peoples, and the German-American, as prominent and as essential an element in the American nation as the English-American, claims for himself and for his parent-country the privilege of not being misunderstood.

The train which fired this war was laid from Belgrade to Vienna, and yet both Serbia and Austria-Hungary seem to have been forgotten in the British campaign to induce the American people to believe that it is a conflict only between the "democracy" of Great Britain and the "autocracy and militarism" of Germany. The true causes of the war have been merged, at the behest of England, in a maze of fictional causes written by her own and her allied writers. Germany has been made the "goat" for all the horror and misery of Europe which has resulted from this world conflagration. I do not think that the veriest German

would give the matter a second thought, if these traductions had been confined to Great Britain and had served her only as a measure for drawing recruits to her standards of empire. When, however, they are extended throughout a neutral world there is just cause for reply.

They have been used in this country largely as a measure to secure not only our "moral support" but to create a sympathy that will support the overtime running of our arms and ammunition factories that we may turn rifle barrels and mold bullets for the destruction of Germans—men as good as the British and more friendly to ourselves. Were this element of the British campaign of seduction eliminated, much would be accomplished; but there would still remain the evil which would inevitably result from the subversion of American opinion to the service of one of the belligerent nations—and that the one to the service of which we can least well afford to be subservient.

There is apparently an unfortunate impression in the mind of certain people that there are in the United States at the present time "an American opinion" and "a German-American opinion". There are not. The German-American is, and feels himself to be, as much a part of the American people, socially and politically, as any other racial element in it. I do not think that his right to be and to so feel can be questioned. A consignment of British protéstants inaugurated the foundations of the United States, but it was very different elements which secured and perpetuated the institutions for which we stand at the present time.

Among these the German and the Irish have been pre-eminent. This nation can no longer call or regard itself as English. When we reflect upon the numbers of Italians, Scandinavians, Irish, Germans, Austrians and peoples from Southeastern Europe which have joined our population, merged themselves in it and striven and fought and are still striving and fighting for our ideals, this truth becomes very apparent. We are a very mixed people. And amongst this mixture the German is now alone denied the right to voice his opinions.

The formulation of a concrete and consistently national opinion in regard to the merits of this war or in regard to the justice of the claims of the various belligerents seems no longer possible. The best that can be accomplished is the evening up of the German-American opinion with the opinion of those elements in the American populace which have other origins. That, as I see the matter, is the aim of the German-American. The desire to have his voice heard in the councils of a nation of which he is a part, on a subject in which he is vitally interested, is all that he asks. I would not deny him this. I do not think that any well-thinking American will deny it to him. The German-American has the same right to claim a portion in the expressed opinion of a country which he has worked to establish as any other person or persons. It is only the attempted denial of this claim that has called forth the protest alluded to. The German-American wishes to see this country placed upon the sure foundation of the ideals which he came here to find. He does not

wish to see it subverted to the uses of England or of any other nation. When all the signs of the times point to such subversion he protests, and strongly, against it.

I recognize that the Austrians have been comparatively silent upon the subject of American opinion. And well they may be. The burden of recrimination has had to be borne by Germany—and why? We have had to submit to a flood of British literature on the war—and Great Britain sees and can see but one enemy—the enemy which Lord Northcliffe has pictured to the British people for a decade or so. The original causes of the war have been forgotten in Great Britain's attempt to confuse our minds. The invasion of Belgium—an incident subsequent to the essential facts of the case—has been made "the all" of the war—and Germany has been made to bear the total responsibility therefor. To allow this to pass unchallenged would be to admit Germany to be in the wrong—which no right-thinking neutral will admit. We, German-Americans, can see beyond the thin veil of England's duplicity, and we wish of our fellow Americans only that they, too, should see the light. We do not ask all to agree with us, but what we do ask is that we should be allowed a chance to present the facts cogently to them and that they should judge by the facts.

We have the same right to formulate or to attempt to formulate or to have a part in the formulation of "American opinion" as others, and we do not intend to surrender this right to Americans of any other origin or ancestry. We are firmly convinced that no good can come to this country, which we all love and

respect and wish to maintain unimpaired, from the domination of its "public opinion" by any one European people. We are willing to admit the right of those who think as England thinks to express their views—we ask only that we who think as Germany thinks be allowed the same right. There is a large body of "un-hyphenated Americans" who think with us, not only on the subject of this right, but as well upon the merits of the war in general. I do not feel that we need worry essentially as to the ultimate opinion of the American people either as regards the outcome of the war or as regards the attitude of the German or the German-American in the matter of the discussion of it in this country.

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE VS. PARTISAN SENTIMENT.

There is one angle of the American protest to Great Britain which has not been overlooked in England but which has been given very little publicity on this side of the water. I refer to the fact that it has become plain to Great Britain, as it has to Washington, that, even if our press overlooks the matter, the interests of the United States clash directly with those of Great Britain. The situation which now confronts us, judged by large aspects, is one wherein the interests of the United States for the present are identical with those of Germany and are opposed to those of Great Britain.

The feeling against Germany in this war in the United States is largely sentimental. It had its be-

ginning in the violent utterances of British writers against the personality of the Emperor and in the greater feeling of pity for Belgium—harped so largely upon by England. But whenever the interests of a nation are at stake, sentiment and sympathy begin to lose their force.

The American trade centers affected by the attitude of Great Britain are beginning to look at the matter from a personal viewpoint. Thousands of American workmen engaged in our trades suffer directly from the repression of Great Britain, and they begin to see through the thin fabric of misrepresentation with which Great Britain has attempted to blind us. It may take months, it may take years, but if this war should last that long, the day will come when public opinion in the United States will be directly hostile to Great Britain because public opinion in the long run follows the channels of national interests and we will not permit Great Britain or any other country to sacrifice us to achieve their own ends. It is not that we love Germany the more, but that we will not allow England to fool us the less.

If there is any single characteristic of the American which more than another stands out boldly, it is the spirit of independence. It is necessary for Britain in her attempt to "starve out Germany" to violate our spirit of independence. Great Britain's policy can only be successful if we are an active ally of hers. Clear-thinking minds, such as Dr. Eliot and others of the Boston School, have understood this matter from the beginning, and they have urged that we take decisive

and vigorous steps in this war. They realized that we could not remain neutral and submit with dignity to the crushing repression which England was about to lay upon our commerce. They saw that to be consistent, it would be necessary for us to be belligerent. Each day brings us nearer to the point where we will have to choose between serving England's cause and having her dictate our policies, or standing upon our own feet and being our own master.

I have no hesitation in feeling or saying that the spirit of independence in the United States—independence of one and all the countries of Europe—will carry us safely through this world war. I wish only that we may emerge from it stronger and safer than ever. We can do this only, however, by a true appreciation of the assaults made upon our "public opinion" by the various warring powers. The British have taken the lead in this—but we should not be fooled by England. Our interests lie deeper and are more national than those pointed out by London. We are threatened by a re-action in the national sentiments of the British people toward ourselves. Should we worry? Have we not experienced and survived similar "re-actions" in the past? When, for example, has British opinion been friendly to Americans? When has German opinion been other than friendly? The "United States of Central North America"—mark the "Central"—is the manner in which a high official of His Britannic Majesty's Government alludes to this country. We must be blind indeed to overlook these evidences of British superiority and impeccability, and

to throw the weight of our opinion on the side of Great Britain and her allies.

The question of sentiment is, however, one of secondary importance. The question of national interest is one which must come "front and center" in our minds and hearts. It was long ago pointed out to us that our one friend in Europe was Germany. We scoffed at the suggestion—but day by day and month by month, the truth of it has been brought more and more to our attention. The enemy of the United States is not to-day Germany—but England. And the England which not only supports Japan on our Western coast but throttles our trade in the Atlantic.

We cannot close our eyes to the results of this war. We cannot forget that if England comes out of it with her fleet intact our commerce will be as much indebted to it for the privilege of crossing the open oceans as it is to-day. A victorious Germany holds no such prospects for us. The only reassurance which England can give us against this anticipation will be contained in the immediate and absolute reversal of her policy on the seas. Unless such reversal of policy is at once entered upon, we must recognize England as an enemy—not alone to ourselves but to all neutrals.

The attempt of the Times of London to write a chapter of discourtesy into the exchange of notes between Washington and London has failed. The attempt, on the other hand, to stricture Mr. Bryan for allowing the sense of his instruction to Mr. Page to leak out, has been equally futile. There was neither

discourtesy nor oversight in the matter. Diplomatic documents are written for record—expressions of public opinion are of greater value in interpreting them. We told Great Britain all we could, officially, in the note under reference. We have told her much more in the public discussion of it. What she may accept as our feeling is this: that we want redress, and that if we have couched the request for redress in “polite language” it is for diplomatic reasons only. If she wants to know our true intentions, she may read them in our newspapers.

When one scans this mild and diplomatic protest, he cannot but come to the conclusion that we have been gentle with England, nor can he come to any other conclusion than that our interests do not and never can lie with Great Britain. Betrayed by her, alike in the Pacific and the Atlantic, our interests lie from now on with Germany. May the day soon come when the American people realize this!

NEW YEAR THOUGHTS FOR AMERICANS.

The New Year's season has come, by immemorial custom, to be regarded as the psychological moment for making good resolutions. The war which began last August and the end of which is not more nearly in sight than it was five months ago, offered in certain quarters this year a wide scope for such. There was, therefore, no surprise at the amount of good intentions in regard to the war and the ending of it which were given to the world from London all the way to Petro-

grad. We have not heard from Tokyo, but when we do the stones which she contributes to that proverbial pavement of which we have heard so much will undoubtedly be inscribed with the same legend as those presented by Japan's occidental allies. The pity is that this season of good cheer could not have brought less thought of "crushing the enemy" and more of bringing peace again to a torn and lacerated world.

Whatever Europe may think or resolve, however, is no measure or standard by which we may or should allow our own resolutions to be gauged or guided. We stand apart from the immediate horrors of the war. We cannot with any approach to reality visualize them. Could we but do this, I am sure that long ago we should have begun to avail ourselves of the power which we have to bring them to an early termination. The British are beginning, when they tardily recognize that the war is "some of our business", to tell us that it is not. This should be for us the psychological moment to tell them that it is. And to tell them why. I say tell the British, because it was the British Government which engineered the war, has more than any other functioned its continuance this long, and claims the sole right to say when and in what terms peace shall be written.

There are two very strong reasons why the American people wish to see the war brought to an early end. One of them may be described as commercial and the other as humanitarian. A people so unused as we are to war—so firmly imbued with the conviction that in peace alone can the highest in the arts and sciences be

attained to—so sensitive to the human suffering which war entails—cannot continue to look on at this wholesale slaughter of the best flesh and bone and intellect of a continent with complacency. We cannot, on the other hand, countenance the indefinite perpetuation of the havoc which the war is working with our domestic industries and foreign commerce. The interference which the conflict in Europe has created with our access to foreign markets which we have long enjoyed and to which our merchants have become habituated is not to be regarded lightly. The imposition of a war-tax, when we are not at war, of \$100,000,000 is no measure of it. The irresponsible seizure of American cargoes and bottoms at sea is no measure of it. The damage which we are suffering industrially and commercially from Europe's "Roman holiday" is immeasurable.

Those who make clothing to warm the armies of the Allies or arms for their hands or cartridges to fit those arms or who sell horses to mount them and saddles to fit those horses, point to the immense increase in our export figures for these particular items and cry: "On with the war, let slaughter be unconfined." There is, however, only avarice, illogic and inhumanity in the cry. So violent an opponent of peace in this war "until Germany is crushed" as Dr. Eliot even admits that he hopes that this war will be the last great war with which the world is to be afflicted. I join in the hope—though not with Dr. Eliot's apparent sanguineness—and if we are true to our professed ideals we are committed to work to the end that it may be realized. We

are in the meantime, however, staying the hand which might stop the war, that a few industries, among which are not those in which in the normal times we place the greatest stock, may be unhealthily fattened, only to collapse when normal times return again. The advent of peace will bring with it a return to normal figures of our present inflated exportation of war materials. But what of those industries which have nothing to do with the arming or feeding or clothing of soldiers in the field which are being sent to the wall because the war has and is continuing seriously to interfere with our markets abroad? Will they return to the normal when the war is over? "What goes up must come down", but the reverse is not true. The industries in this country which have grown up on the war, and they may be counted on the fingers of a man's hand, will not be better off than they were before it began, while those which have been and are being ruined by it will not for a long time rise again. What then is our duty, to our own, under the circumstances? The answer is plain: to do the utmost that within us lies to bring the war, with all its concomitant injuries, to the earliest possible conclusion.

This reasoning, I think, is logical. The British do not like it, as they have on several occasions already told us, and they don't like it because having set out to crush one great commercial competitor they wish to see the struggle continued until they have ruined two. But must we stand idly by and watch our own destruction effected that England, who has not and has never had one kind word for the United States or the

American people save when by flattery she sought to use them for her own ends, may wax fat?

I think I have shown why we may justly regard this war as being "some of our business" and why our interests lie in the immediate cessation of hostilities. Can we effect that desirable end? One way in which we certainly cannot effect it is by politely protesting occasionally against individual infringements on our rights—and between times sucking our thumbs and talking peace. Things have gone too far in Europe for talk on this side of the water to effect them. We have had sufficient evidence of this to convince us that the time has come for words to be replaced by action. Writing in the *Sun* of the day before yesterday, Prof. William Milligan Sloane ventured the statement that in three months peace would return to Europe if the United States went properly about the legitimate seizure of the foreign markets which the warring nations have been temporarily compelled to abandon. I have seen no saner words since the war began. They contain not only the way to bring peace again to Europe but as well the way to recoup our own losses resulting from the war. The conflict which is going on in Europe is nothing more nor less than a naked and unadorned exhibition of England's greed—a greed for shillings and pence which has so long ruled the world that it cannot brook a rival commerce. I do not think that we need allow England to sneer any compunctions into us on the score of "sympathies dictated by commercial profits". We have a right to take in the way of trade what we can. Were we seriously to set about

doing so, and at the same time to place an embargo upon the exportation to all the warring nations alike of war material, I believe that Professor Sloane's three months would be reduced considerably.

The good which would come of the carrying out of such a policy would not be confined to this country or this war. It would benefit all the neutral peoples of the world, and would, more than anything else, tend to discount war in the future. The appreciation with which President Wilson's recent communication has been received in Italy and the other neutral states of Europe points clearly to the fact that the neutral world is beginning to weary of the presumption of belligerent claims. The surest way in which to bring the war to a close is for the powers who are not involved in it to demand that the rights of neutrals be given preference over those of belligerents, to deny to belligerents the sinews of war and to set about gathering up for themselves the bones of commerce which the war-dogs have dropped in their endeavor to get at each other's throats. Only by the establishment of these principles can I see any hope of making war unpleasant for those who make it. Only in this way can I see any remedy for the injuries which the present war is entailing upon ourselves and other non-warring states. With the support of the still neutral powers on the Continent and of South America, upon the support of both of which we can depend, the end suggested could be obtained.

STAYING GLORIFIED MURDER.

The hearing given to the German-American and Irish-American delegations from New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Baltimore by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Monday, on the subject of the pending House and Senate bills providing for an embargo on the exportation of war material, marked the awakening by a large element of the American people to the duty which we owe to ourselves and to humanity to end this nefarious traffic which is doing so much to continue the war in Europe.

The delegations included many of our prominent citizens, whose motives are above suspicion. What effect upon the hastening of the bills from committee to floor the hearing will have cannot be foretold, but it may be hoped that it will not be inconsiderable. The gentlemen who went to Washington on Monday to express to the Committee this new spirit of neutrality and sane peace propaganda should not be allowed to carry on the fight alone. The matter demands the widest attention and most cordial support of the whole nation—for it is a matter which affects this country as a whole and all other neutral countries. Our troubles with England on the sea are directly traceable to it; for were no contraband exported there would arise no occasion for the searching of American cargoes. Our industrial troubles are and will continue to be traceable to it; for we are materially assisting to prolong the conditions which threaten our industries. Our consciences should be troubled by it; for by it we are made

an accomplice before the fact in the wholesale murder in which Europe is revelling.

Dr. Eliot wants the war carried on until "the Allies arrive at fighting Germany on her own soil". Hilaire Belloc says that three months of such fighting will see the end of the war. I doubt it. The point to be noticed, however, is that neither Dr. Eliot, American, nor Mr. Belloc, British, wishes to see it brought to an earlier conclusion. In the meantime this country must suffer. The way to German soil is a long one.

I can appreciate Mr. Belloc's point of view. When Professor George Stuart Fullerton asked the American to think himself into the place of the German when he assumes to judge Germany in connection with the war our anglophile press jeered at the suggestion. I like to think, for the moment, when I have occasion to criticise the Englishman in this mad conflict, as the Englishman thinks himself. It is not so very difficult for an American to do so. Our school histories have laid an excellent foundation. I can, therefore, thinking as Mr. Belloc and other Britishers think, see why England should want the war continued, with its inseparable and concomitant injury to this country. I have been trying for sixty odd years, however, to think as an American, and yet I cannot bring myself to see the thing as Mr. Eliot professes to see it.

I should suggest as a pertinent subject for a noon-hour cogitation by Harvard's doyen the following question: "Is this propaganda for the indefinite continuance of the war, with all the horror and misery it entails upon the combatants and all the injury to our-

selves, dictated by a regard for the recognizedly vacuous protestations of England or for the good of our own country?"

We have it in our power—and when I say “we” I mean the United States and the rest of the neutral world, which will follow our lead—to stay the hand of the glorified murderers of Europe. We are admitted by Italy—and Italy is the next most powerful—to be the greatest nation not now at war. Our right and our duty to point the way to the other neutral nations is accepted and the exercise of the right and the performance of the duty is urged upon us. Shall we overlook the opportunity? Without our aid England could not mount another army nor clothe nor feed nor arm it. We have but to withdraw this aid and it will not be long before the “dictator of peace” will dictate it—or be dictated to. The British Empire can live and carry on this war only so long as we allow ourselves to be counted a part of it. I have not much against England—except my dislike for her quibbling and hypocrisy—but I have a very strong feeling for this, my native, country. I do not like to see it drawn into the maelstrom by the flattery and adulation of British temporists. And that is the danger it faces today.

There are only two paths legitimately open to us: one leading to participation in the war and one leading to the reattainment and perpetuation of peace. Thus far we have walked only in the former. We have for some time scarcely even talked of the latter—though for years past world peace has been on every American lip and the hope of it in every American heart. Why

have we thrown over all these words of peace and all these hopes of years to serve the moment? Shall we return to them and attempt to be consistent, or shall we admit that they were no more than the expressions of a nervous and restless national larynx? If we wish to write peace treaties and proclaim a desire for peace on earth, let us work for peace. If we cannot work for peace, let us cease the idle babble. We cant of and cartoon "Kruppism", and would call down upon the city of Essen the fate of Sodom and Gomorrha. Yet we sanction our own Essens and our own "Kruppism" and build them up to hide the ravages made in other industries by England's command of the seas and the manner in which she exerts it. We gloat over the increase in our foreign trade—in war materials. When anyone points out the inconsistency of it he is shouted down as a pro-German. The evil which we are doing is not so great to Germany, however, as it is to ourselves. This spirit must be exorcised or we must give up the championship of the ideal of peace. Which shall it be? I think it will not be the latter. We want peace in Europe, on this hemisphere, throughout the world, and we want it as soon and for as long as we can secure and preserve it. We can have it by simply stretching out our hand for it. We can never have it, however, if we continue to feed its enemy.

We have seen enough of the horrors of war—have we not?—enough of harm done to neutral trade—to call a halt? The prohibition of the exportation of war materials would more certainly and more effectively produce that end than any other step which we could

take. We do not need to consider what has been the policy or the practice of the past: nor whether international law permits of the exportation to belligerents by neutrals of the means of carrying on their conflicts. The continuation of an evil does not justify it, any more than two wrongs make a right. The time has come to write several new chapters into "international law"—that ancient misnomer codified by Grotius in 1625, which has given the world a year of war for every month of peace and which is so lacking in consistency and logic that it is invoked by Great Britain to condemn the German invasion of Belgium in 1914 and to justify her own assault upon the neutrality of Denmark in 1807. Unless the relations of states and their rights and duties in peace and war are put upon a more rational and modern basis at the end of this war it will spell stagnation or retrogression. At the present outlook 5,000,000 lives will be given in this war—unless it is stopped at an early date. Will they, or those already given, be sacrificed for nothing? England says that they are an offering on the altar of "the sacredness of the public law of Europe". I say that from the sod manured by their bones and watered with their blood should spring a newer, more sacred and more just law not of Europe or for Europe alone but of and for the world—a law which will make war no longer a pastime for a few puppets whose heads appear on shilling pieces "dei gratia". This hemisphere has grown since Grotius wrote, and we have a right to a voice in the framing of this new international law. And the chapter which we should write into it, as the contribu-

tion of the Americas, should make it forever impossible for those who would war upon each other to fall back upon those who would not for the means of carrying out their murder.

We can stop this war—we can write this chapter into the dusty leaves of Grotius—if but we will. Our interests, domestic and foreign, lie with immediate peace. Can there not be created among the American people a sentiment of consistency with our proclaimed ideals which will outweigh the bribes of birth or blood or bourdes and demand that 1914 be forgotten in the endeavor to advance another step or two in the centuries of human progress? Unless it can be done I shall be compelled to confess for the first time in a long life that I have seen my fellow countrymen fallen in their actions below their words.

“THE AMERICAN WANTS TO KNOW.”

Barry Pain was not far wrong when he wrote in the (London) Chronicle: “The American wants to know. If he is told the truth, he will believe it. If he is told something not true, he may possibly believe it.” This purposed compliment might have been made less obvious, however, by saying that the American, like everyone else, believes generally all that he reads in those periodicals of his which pass as reputable and authoritative. As a matter of fact, he must do this or believe nothing which appears in them—for he has not the means of checking up their statements, assertions and allegations.

This fact, if it has escaped the notice of Mr. Pain, has not apparently escaped that of the British press agency and has been availed of by this organization to its fullest possibilities for the dissemination in this country of those tales of "German atrocities" with which we have been regaled for the past five months—tales which those who know the German people know to be the fabrications of an enemy's mind, but which carry their shafts of potential hatred and malice into the hearts of millions who do not know them.

Barry Pain was writing to urge upon the British Government the necessity of giving the American people the truth about the war; for, says he, "what we need is the goodwill of America." The argument which he employs, of more truth and less fiction, contains an element of reason. The goodwill of the American people can never be secured and permanently retained by defaming the name of the German Army or Germany.

All lies will out—but when the process is retarded by "military requirements" assisted by an ingenious press service, a great deal of harm may be done by them before they come out. A realization of this latter fact seems to have blinded the British Government to the inevitableness of the former truth, and to have underlaid the policy of passing through its censor the stories to which I allude.

We have had our fill of defamatory stories. They have done immeasurable harm in this country already. They have, on the other hand, done no one any good. When they have been run down they have invariably

proved to be false. Some of them have been retracted—but retraction never carries with it the weight of original assertion. Others have been refused retraction, even when proved to be false; and in still other cases retraction has been impossible or inconvenient.

I have before me as I write copies of four letters which passed during last November between Mr. M. L. Chamberlain of this city and the Frank A. Munsey Company. The subject of the correspondence was a statement which appeared in an article published in Munsey's Magazine to the effect that Prince Albert of Schleswig-Holstein had, at the beginning of the war, resigned his commission in the German Army and offered his sword to England. The obvious purpose of the writer was to show that a spirit of disunion existed in the German Empire and to build thereon a claim for anti-German sympathy. The statement was taken up by Mr. Chamberlain, who put himself in touch with members of the Prince's family and convinced himself of its erroneousness. Writing to Messrs. Munsey, Mr. Chamberlain pointed out the inaccuracy of the statement—for the sword of Prince Albert is still being used to good purpose in the German cause; and asked that it be corrected in an early edition of the magazine. The Munsey Company replied that it had questioned the author of the article as to his authority for the statement to which exception had been taken, and added: "He cannot identify it beyond stating that he followed some reputable periodical. He is as concerned as we are to learn that he was betrayed into inaccuracy." In their second letter to Mr. Cham-

berlain, they declined to make the correction suggested, on the ground that it could not appear in a number of their magazine before February and that "it would then be useless to revert to the matter. Things move so fast these days that practically everyone who noticed the mistake will have forgotten it, and it does not seem necessary to dig it up again after such a lapse of time."

There is much, of course, to be said in defense of the Munsey Company's contention, and not a little to be said against it. The most eventual of retractions or corrections would have opened the eyes of Americans, in a degree, to the fact that in these abnormal times they should not believe all they read. In this particular case, however, the misstatement was isolated and of no great importance. We have all seen the attempt to show the fact untrue that from prince to peasant they are standing together for the defense of the Fatherland "to the last drop of blood and the last morsel of bread."

Within an entirely different category, however, fall the repeated repetitions of tales of "German atrocities" committed in Belgium. These are spread by the daily newspapers, which do not have to wait months before the chance presents itself of retracting them, and the common sense of the editors of which should make it impossible at this late date for them to appear therein. Yet the printing of them goes on, despite the denial by Americans abroad and by Americans who have returned home from Europe of their truth.

The American people pity the Belgians, as a people who for years have been induced into a status in-

consistent with their professed perpetual neutrality, and eventually betrayed by England and France. It was entirely unnecessary to bolster up this sympathy by stories of German inhumanity. We have assumed the burden which England and France should have borne of supporting the Belgian populace. We have done it gladly, but we do not wish to do it under false colors and we do not wish to be forced to it by tales of "German atrocities" in Belgium—which do not exist. Yet England, attempting to walk from under her obligations, asks us to pity Belgium because Belgium is feeling "the iron heel" of Germany. She does it largely by pointing to "German atrocities" perpetrated on the Belgian people. One of the most common "leads" is that of "mutilation."

This particular form of "barbarism" stories should long ago have been discarded from the columns of the American press. We ought to know enough of history to know that it rings false. The following questions suggest themselves to me, and should suggest themselves to all well thinking Americans: In what previous war, of the many in which German States have been involved, have the German people, as represented in their army, cut off the hands and feet of their foes? Why in this war have they done so only in Belgium—and not in France and in Poland? Why does this cry of mutilation come only from Belgium and Belgium's friends?

The answer is at hand. The practice of the amputation of human extremities as a punishment is one of long-standing among the native tribes of the Congo.

It was adopted or connived in by their Belgian overlords, as was sufficiently shown by the revelations a few years ago of Belgian atrocities in the Congo country, as may be read or seen pictured in the British and American reports on the subject. It is not and has never been a German practice. Wanting for a theme on which to write and talk down the Germans, Belgians sought only in their own minds for it. We have had it presented to us in all possible and revolting forms. We have been told that a prominent American lady in England had two mutilated children in her charge, and her husband has since denied the story absolutely. We are now told that the wife of our late Ambassador to Paris, who was said to have seen such cases, absolutely denies having seen one. We, who know the Germans, know that there are no such cases.

The following letter taken from the New York Herald of recent date not only places the seal of falsehood upon such tales, but develops as well the source from which they spring and the fact that there is at least one man in New York who is gentleman enough to correct an error of statement into which he had been unwittingly led by those in whom he reposed confidence, rather than allow the German army to continue to be misunderstood by the American people. The letter speaks for itself—and against the brood of mobilized pens which, not content with writing “from the front” similar stories of “German brutalities” come home to wager that a Scotch Colonel does not know what he is writing about the “dum-dums” issued to him by the British military authorities.

The letter which Mr. Walters wrote to the New York Herald on January 1st, should be reprinted in every paper in this country, and should be used to nail down every similar tale of German atrocities in Belgium and elsewhere.

The letter follows:

To the Editor of the Herald:

On November 14th you published in your columns a letter which I had sent you, headed "German Atrocities" and reading as follows:

"I quote from a letter I received from my sister in London:—'We went to a crowded meeting * * * last Friday and one of the ministers there said that if we could not believe what we heard about the inhuman way in which the Germans treat the Belgians, to go to the Alexandra Palace * * * where there were ten children with two hands between the lot and men with their eyes gouged out'."

I wrote this letter in good faith, believing the contents to be true, as the information given emanated from a minister, and by signing this communication with my full name I have assumed the responsibility for its publication.

A German gentleman of this city has taken up this matter and made an investigation of it, which resulted in his receiving a statement from the War Refugees Committee in London, of which Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Verdome is the president and Her Royal Highness Princess Christian of Schleswig-Holstein the chairman, reading as follows:

"Having heard that many stories have been circulated with regard to the treatment the Belgians have received at the Germans' hands, and that there are many cases of mutilation at Alexandra Palace, I write to say that I have been working at the palace the whole time that refugees have been there and during that time there has not been a single case of mutilation, either of man, woman or child.

"If you care to write to Dr. Cuff, head of the work at Alexandra Palace, he will confirm what I say. *Ella M. Kastor.*"

That letter speaks for itself.

In justice to the German army, I request you to please publish the letter in order to right a wrong, which it is the duty of every correct thinking man to do in a case like this.

"ARMS, AND THE COUNTRY," I SING.

The bills which have been introduced in the Senate and the House to place an embargo upon the exportation from this country to the belligerents of Europe, without respect to nationality, of materials of war have caused no very great stir in quarters others than those recognizedly dominated by British influence. They have been accepted as only a legitimate expression of our desire for an early termination of this war and a step toward making war in the future unpleasant and unprofitable to those who would make it. The leader in the campaign for the defeat of these measures is

unquestionably the New York Times—which has led so many of England's forlorn hopes in her present struggle for the wiping out of any and all commercial competition the world over.

There must be something more than "illogical neutrality" involved, when the Times calls for assistance upon Professor Canfield, of the Columbia Law School, and Professor de Lapradelle, expounder of international law in the University of Paris and at present Visiting Professor at Columbia. Their expositions of the questions involved appeared in the Times on the 6th and the 9th instant, respectively.

There is nothing in M. de Lapradelle's statement to be considered. There is no argument—only a Gallic appeal for our sympathy and assistance. We knew, before Professor de Lapradelle informed us of the fact, that we have a right, long established by what is known as international law, to export arms and ammunition and all the other things which go to make war easy for those to whom our assistance is possible. There is no answer, therefore, to his appeal.

There is argument, however, in Professor Canfield's brief, but it is the hackneyed and thread-bare argument which we have so often seen advanced to defeat these measures, and which no longer has the power of convincing anyone. The fact that we have a right to do a thing and have done that thing through the whole of our history does not compel or urge us to continue the exercise of the right when we have become convinced that the interests of the country and of humanity demand that we desist from exercising it.

We are told by Professor Canfield that we have the right to ship munitions of war to those belligerents to whom we can ship anything; and that to cease to do so would be a violation of our neutrality, in that it would diminish the advantage which the Allies have over Germany by virtue of their command of the seas, and would, moreover, involve this country in a breach of contract. Both of these arguments are, however, illogical and fallacious.

There can be no exact neutrality in any war: for neutrality does not mean "the good old rule, the simple plan, that he should take who has the power and he should keep who can". It means rather that the people who profess it should give no more advantage to one belligerent than to another. The fact that Great Britain commands the seas does not compel us and should not influence us to further increase her advantage over the foe. We have been told that we should not even up this advantage: yet we are urged to enhance it. Wherein lies the "neutrality" of this?

I admit readily, quite as readily as those who would see this war carried on indefinitely to the greater injury of Europe and America by the exercise of our right to keep certain of the fighting nations supplied with the wherewithal to fight, that we have a legal right to do so. I deny, on the other hand, that we have the moral privilege of doing so. We cannot consistently profess a desire for peace and at the same time furnish war with its accoutrements.

The continuation of the exportation of war materials to the Allies means nothing more nor less than the

continuation of the war, which in turn means the continued disruption of our industrial organization and continued harm to our trade. Our interests lie with its estoppage. But, say the advocates of England—that England so solicitous for our welfare that it loses no opportunity to seize and detain another ship when it can find the least suspicion for doing so—we have no right to prevent this traffic. I say we have.

Our trade with Italy and Holland and the other neutral countries of Europe has been made by Great Britain contingent upon guarantees from these countries that there shall be no exportation or re-exportation of contraband from their territories to Germany. When England can demand that independent European states shall waive their right to trade in contraband with a belligerent nation, are we not justified in waiving that right in our own behalf? There is no question of breach of contract involved. We hold war to be inhuman and consequently immoral, and we have a perfect right under municipal and international law alike to break any immoral contract which may have been entered into by parties in Europe with parties in this country.

The sum and substance of the whole matter is this: we are assisting in carrying on a war which England cannot carry on by herself, to the destruction of our own interests; we are doing this, moreover, at the expense of our professed desire for peace; and we are asked to continue to do it on the ground that we, like other nations, have done it in the past and have a right to do it in the future.

When we consider that to carry on this policy is to perpetuate throughout the war the right of England to search and detain and possibly to confiscate our cargoes and bottoms; that, furthermore, it assists in the continuation of the war; and that it means rendering comfort and aid to one belligerent against another, I confess I cannot see either logic or reason in the position adopted by those who oppose its cessation. We might just as well ally our fleet with that of England or our small but efficient army with that of France or Belgium, as to allow our arms factories to ally themselves with the cause of England and France and Russia.

It has been said that the profits which are being made on war materials will counterbalance the losses suffered by other industries. I have already pointed out the fallacy of this argument. These profits are but temporary. The other losses are irretrievable. And in seeking temporary profits to recoup permanent losses we are helping to carry on a war which works and must ever work to widen the abyss between the two. When the war is over and we take account of stock, we shall find things stand exceedingly poorly with us, unless we do what we have the power now to do, and that is bring the war to an early termination by ceasing to feed it.

I appreciate the influence that is being brought to bear upon Washington from English and French and Russian sources to defeat the attempt of the American people to be true to their professions of faith and to their own interests. We should not hark to these syren

voices. We know well enough what will be our mead when England comes out of this war victorious, if she ever does—and God forfend that she may. She cares no more for this country than she ever did—and that is not at all. She is professing just now the greatest friendship for us, and all the while working “military necessity” to our undoing. Are we to continue forever to put up with this?

The polite protest recently addressed to the British Government in the matter of the treatment by British vessels of war of our over-seas trade has apparently fallen upon ears deaf to everything but the cry of “crushing Germany”. The matter cannot be allowed to rest there. If England can crush or starve out Germany she is at liberty to do so, but she must not be allowed to crush or starve out this country in the attempt. We have no quarrel with England, but we are not going to be ridden over rough-shod by her or by any other nation. There is the possibility of a *quid pro quo* here as elsewhere. Even admitting all other arguments futile, we should stop the exportation of war materials to Great Britain until she stops her unwarranted interference with our trade with the neutral countries of Europe.

I should like to feel, however, that the American people are prepared to place the matter on a higher ground and to regard it from the point of view of humanitarianism. We have it within our power to “put our foot down” now and for good on the principle which compels neutral peoples to support war even though they are traditionally opposed to war, in theory

and in practice, and to say that we will have nothing to do with it. When war comes to us, if it ever does, we will take care of ourselves, and we can best prepare for that eventuality by beginning now to conserve our own resources, instead of wasting them abroad. Our duty is plain and the right to perform that duty is not proscribed by any law of man or of nations. Shall we do our duty, or shall we go on cringing before the threats or adulations of England to our own destruction? I have sufficient trust in the independent spirit of the American people to feel that I can say how the question will be answered.

BELGIUM'S BETRAYAL.

I have repeatedly pointed out the historical status of the present Kingdom of Belgium as a state erected as a buffer to the coast of England and the close co-operation which has existed to the end of the maintenance of this status, between the British and Belgian governments. The extent of this co-operation, long ago sensed by the other Powers of Europe, was first made known to the world generally by the publication of the documents recently discovered in the archives of Brussels. These documents leave no room for doubt in any unbiased mind that with or without Belgium's consent England was prepared and determined in the event of a war with Germany to meet the German armies on Belgian soil instead of on her own.

I regard the confidential memorandum of General Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, which

is reprinted below from the documents discovered, to be the most convincing proof of Belgian complicity with the British and French governments in preparing for a general war on Germany that has yet seen the light of publicity.

“Confidential Letter to the Minister
“Concerning the Confidential Conversations.

“Brussels, April 10, 1906.

“Mr. Minister:

“I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications.

“The first took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

“The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety would be less complete.

"This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railroad transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces.

"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the English troops—which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered him that the places Namur and Liège were protected from a 'coup de main' and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and I were, up to the present, the only ones

informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign has been consulted.

* * *

"In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other military attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two army corps, four cavalry brigades and two brigades of horse infantry would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liège, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief command.

"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully.

* * *

“Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (one to two and one half months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

“Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

“As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated.

* * *

“The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one-half of the English army could be landed within eight days; the rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the exception of the Horse Infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

“In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day.

"The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely :

"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the Press ;

"(2) The advantage, which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops.

* * *

"In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

"Other secondary questions which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or the Military authorities might exert on the Press.

* * *

"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first Corps would be disembarked on the 10th day, and the second on the 15th day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first Corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the 11th day, and that of the second on the 16th day.

"I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea-transport so that the English troops could be with us between the 11th and 12th day. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be done.

* * *

"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that at the time, he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea.

* * *

"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our Eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, in time of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our Legations had no military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

"Major-General, Chief of the General Staff.

(Initials of General Ducarme.)

"Note. When I met General Grierson at Compiegne, during the manoeuvres of 1906, he assured me the

result of the re-organization of the English army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

"Concluded September, 1906."

(Initials of General Ducarme.)

An attempt has been made by the British Government to explain away these arrangements on the ground that they were no more than "academical discussions"; and in this country to discount their importance on the ground that the arrangements were to be carried out only in the event of the invasion of Belgium by a German force. When one reflects upon the history of Belgium and of her relations in late years with England and France, the hollowness of these contentions is self-damning. What reason had Germany, or we, to assume that they would not be carried out to her own destruction?

The papers found at Brussels do not prove all that Germany knew of these arrangements, but they do constitute irrefutable confirmation of this knowledge in the eyes of the world; and they show that when she took time by the forelock and entered upon Belgian soil she was not encountering the small Belgian nation, but Belgium, France and England combined. When we regard "the Belgian case" in the light of these revelations a great deal has to be retracted of what has been said of Germany's conduct in the premises.

"1812—1915."

The preliminary reply of the British Government to the recent note of protest addressed to it by the American Government, in the matter of the treatment by the British naval authorities of American ships and cargoes destined for various neutral ports in Europe, which was made public in this country, and simultaneously in Great Britain, on Sunday, is as disappointing as it is unsatisfactory.

The reply is entirely friendly in tone, as was to be expected from the friendly tone of the protest, but it fails in being only tonic. There was reason and there were conditions calling for redress behind our protest: but we seek in vain in the British reply for any suggestion that these conditions will be altered or improved in the immediate future. The principles of international law for the recognition of which we contended are admitted, but no relief under them is promised or even suggested. Great Britain holds out strongly and irrevocably for the privileges of the sea which it claims by virtue of "our own national safety."

This plea, in extenuation of the unwarrantedly severe treatment which our trade has suffered during the last few months from British policy, was scarcely to be expected from Downing Street. When the Chancellor of the German Empire, addressing the Reichstag on a matter which involved the preservation of the German nation, used the words: "Necessity knows no law," they were snatched from his mouth and cabled from one end of the world to the other as

a sample of "Prussianism," "Treitschkeism," "Bernhardism," and the Lord knows what.

True, it was used to condone the seizure of the Turkish vessels then building in British yards. True, it has since been used to condone the British seizure of Egypt. True, it was long ago used to explain the seizure of the Danish fleet and the bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. But from the outburst of British protest against the enunciation of such a policy by a German we might have assumed that England was ready to relegate it to the limbo of forgotten doctrines. It is now revised, however, and with not only the consent but with the sanction of the British Government. We, who know England, knew all along that she not only entertained this principle but was ready to put it in practice whenever the opportunity presented itself. The question for us, Americans, is: How long shall we allow the right or privilege of British "national safety" to interfere with the right or privilege of our own American safety?

A further and more detailed reply to our protest is promised. When it will come, I do not know. Perhaps, when the war is over; which, if we follow Dr. Eliot, will not be for years to come. During the interval, American trade must carry on under British supervision—and we know what that means.

Out of the British argument, I pick this as an example of the British stand and British policy:

"With regard to the seizure of foodstuffs, to which your Excellency refers, his Majesty's Government are prepared to admit that foodstuffs should not be de-

tained and put into a Prize Court without the presumption that they are intended for the armed forces of the enemy or the enemy Government. We believe that this rule has been adhered to in practice hitherto, but, if the United States Government have instances to the contrary, we are prepared to examine them; and it is our present intention to adhere to the rule, though we cannot give an unlimited and unconditional undertaking, in view of the departure by those against whom we are fighting from hitherto accepted rules of civilization and humanity and the uncertainty as to the extent to which such rules may be violated by them in future."

I should like to dilate upon this point. The British Foreign Office apparently wishes to make our exportation of foodstuffs to the neutral countries of Europe contingent upon the conduct of war by its enemies according to the recognized rules of civilization and humanity. This sounds, in the first place, very much like the "atrocities tales" which were long ago discounted in this country. It sounds, in the second place, like a fictitious argument raised to offset a legitimate one. Assuming for the moment—what no American will assume—that the Germans are not conducting their war as becomes a civilized people, what have we to do with that? Are we to be held responsible for the actions of others? Are we to be penalized because a people with whom we have nothing to do chooses to prosecute its war in a manner distasteful to England?

I say: No! We are dealing solely with England, and with England under rules written largely by herself, on

a matter which concerns no one but ourselves and England.

The British note contains one further interesting point: namely, that Great Britain does not propose to be embarrassed in her treatment of neutral European nations, notably Norway, Sweden, Holland, Italy and Greece, and that Great Britain would prefer to have her troubles with us rather than with these other nations; and that she would prefer to prevent contrabands from going to these neutral nations rather than prevent them continuing on to Germany.

Great Britain does not want to complicate her diplomatic relations with the European nations. She prefers to treat us with whatever degree of severity is necessary. She assumes we will not demand our rights.

It might be interesting to know what arrangements exist between Sir Edward Grey and our Secretary of State bearing on the extent to which Great Britain can go in this proceeding and that at some future date Sir Edward Grey may present to the British Cabinet and the British people.

The one live question involved in the whole proceeding dissolves itself into a matter of policy, as to our stand in the treatment of neutral trade. Great Britain can definitely and absolutely regulate our commerce with Norway, Sweden, and the other countries of Europe. Then we are in nowise different in position from Canada. If, with the control of the sea, there goes the absolute right of England to determine what shall be carried on the seas and to what port

of destination it shall go, then let us bravely face the fact that the seas belong to Great Britain and that we must abide by her decision.

The British note might have been compressed into a few sentences, as, perhaps, as follows:

"Dear Secretary:

"As has been arranged with you, we shall jolly well do as we please. Do not, however, let the American people think this. The best arguments we can make are those of 'national necessity' and charges of 'uncivilized conduct' on the part of our enemies. Can you make any suggestion for our formal reply to be delivered at some future date?

"God bless neutrality. It's working fine.

E. Grey.

"P. S.—How long can you hold up public opinion in America, and how soon can we get the war material we need?"

It is not what England says but what England does that will finally determine public opinion in America. An exchange of correspondence between Downing Street and our Department of State will not alleviate conditions in our trade centers unless our cargoes actually reach the destinations to which they are consigned; and the time is not far off when a protest will be handed to the Administration at Washington from the American public which will leave no question of doubt as to its meaning.

We asked the British Government to desist from its fooling with our trade. We asked it in the politest of terms. We have been replied to in terms equally polite. But Britain still maintains her "right" of search—the quotation marks are taken from a British author, G. H. Perris—annoying and distasteful to ourselves and to all neutral nations.

The question for the American people is: How long are we going to put up with this unwarranted interference with our legitimate privileges upon a sea that is supposedly free to all? There must come a day when we shall be compelled to tell England that she does not own the waters of the world—that we have rights upon them equal with her own. Is that day so far distant?

THE CASE OF THE "DACIA."

The steamship "Dacia," formerly a Hamburg-American liner, was recently purchased by Edward N. Breitung, a Michigan mining-engineer. She was duly admitted to American register, and at the present time flies the American flag. She is manned by an American crew, loaded with cotton at a southern port, and intends to sail from there to Bremen, Germany. We have been advised by Great Britain that if this intention is carried out the "Dacia" will be seized and taken before a British prize court. I am sure that the American people would like to know why.

The British contention is apparently based on the ground, already intimated, that the sale was not bona

fide. "Breitung" sounds like a German name—and England can hear German sounds in every breeze these days. Were she as solicitous for the friendly treatment of American trade as her recent reply to our protest against her unfriendly treatment of it would seem to have been worded to infer, she would give us an eyeful of proof of the illegitimacy involved in the transfer of the "Dacia" from the German to the American flag. As long as she refuses to or refrains from doing so, we cannot but regard the vessel as having been legitimately purchased and registered.

Assuming that it was so purchased and registered, what claim has England to the asserted right that she can properly prevent it from taking a legitimate place in the over-seas commerce of this country?

The Declaration of London of 1909—although England threw it overboard as soon as the war began and we soon after—remains the latest and highest expression of international legal opinion on the point involved. The case of the "Dacia" is specifically covered by it. Article 56 of this Declaration, so often quoted, reads as follows:

"The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag effected after the outbreak of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed.

"There, however, is an absolute presumption that a transfer is void:

“(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port.

“(2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor.

“(3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing, have not been fulfilled.

There is no “absolute presumption” under this rule that the “Dacia” was not properly acquired and admitted to register. Great Britain must therefore fall back upon the phrase “to avoid the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed.” What, then, are these consequences, and what does the phrase mean?

The “Dacia” was, until a few weeks ago, a German ship, flying the German flag, which, to escape capture on the high seas, was compelled to intern in an American port. She could have rested and rusted there, until the end of the war. That was the only consequence to which as an enemy vessel she was exposed, which her owners could wish to escape. While she rotted or rusted there, American cotton and other non-contraband commodities, might, for all England cared, rot in other American ports. We have been told that England was gracious to us in not placing cotton upon the list of her self-declared contrabands. We should undoubtedly be thankful for this, and for all the small favors which we receive from her hands. We should like a few man-size favors, however. When the North

Sea is mined by British command, preventing cotton from going to Scandinavia, and when we are forbidden to purchase ships in which to transport it to other neutral countries in Europe, the importance of England's graciousness is diminished.

Allow us for a moment to forget that the world is at war, and think that it is still at peace. Allow us to imagine then that an unprecedented demand comes from Europe for our cotton and other crops. There are not enough bottoms in which to ship the cargoes necessary to meet the demand. What does the American merchant do? Permit the demand to pass un-met? Certainly not. The bottoms are secured by "begging, borrowing or stealing." Would Great Britain assume in times of peace to deny us the right to acquire ships wherever we could or whenever we pleased? We are at peace to-day. We hold that we are not to be governed by the dictates of the European war. Our commerce demands that we have more vessels than readily present themselves. The internment of the German mercantile fleet and the conversion of many of the British vessels to naval use has robbed American commerce of the carriers on which for years it has been accustomed to depend. We must have substitutes, or starve—commercially. We are told—by Great Britain, that we cannot have them.

This is not a matter between England and Germany, but a matter between England and ourselves. Were we to buy up all the German ships interned in our harbors the purchase price, even if it went into the Imperial Exchequer, would not enable Germany to

prosecute her present military operations over a week. The plea, therefore, that we would be aiding an enemy of England by purchasing and paying for such ships at the present juncture is too hollow in the light of the aid that we are giving England herself, to be listened to. What England really has in mind is the repression of American trade along with the destruction of Germany's.

The problem which England has on her hand is a double one. She would come out of this war in not better shape than she entered it, if in place of German competition she found herself face to face with a still more powerful American trade enemy. With her left hand, therefore, she feels compelled to deliver us a blow, while with her right she is attempting to strangle Germany. Whatever luck certain Americans may wish her in the latter endeavor, I do not think that there breathes the man in this country who does not feel it his right and his duty to protest against any admission that she may continue in the former.

The policy of England has during the last few months been dictated by a desire to annihilate German trade and repress the American. It is, of course, to the disadvantage of Great Britain to have us supply Norway, Sweden, Greece, Holland and Italy with the products and manufactures which they were wont to obtain from that country. In attempting to befog the issue with regard to our trade with foreign nations, she has the purpose of reducing that trade to the minimum and using the excuse of active belligerency against

Germany in order to stifle our rapidly growing trade with neutral European nations.

I ask any American whether we shall permit Great Britain to dictate how large or how small our trade between nations or between states or between cities shall be. If Great Britain can decide that we are doing entirely too much business with Italy, she can also step in and say that we are doing too much business with China, because the British cruisers sweep the seas. There is no reason under international law or morality why we should permit England to dictate to us in this or in any other matter.

I can foresee the day, and it will be at no far distant time, when we shall be obliged either to submit to the fact that Great Britain does not want us to be a world power in trade or to insist upon our rights in a manner so firm that even England will heed the warning.

HUMBUGGING AMERICA.

It is no secret that of all the countries of Europe Great Britain has through the time of our existence as an independent nation been the least friendly to ourselves. Although France assisted us in the securing of our independence from the British crown—she did so only because she wanted to deal another blow to England. Although Russia stood by in the War of the States to offset British designs, she did so only because she could not forget the Crimea and England's historical enmity to herself. Alaska and Louisiana were alike sold to us because they would otherwise

have come into the possession of the arch-enemy of Europe. We can forgive France and Russia for these hollow protestations of friendship: but can we forgive England for her recent attempt to call us to her "standards of Empire" on the ground that she has always been our friend? All history tells us how fatuous have been her promises and her explanations.

The developments since the outbreak of the present war have served only to confirm Great Britain's contempt for the United States when she cannot use the United States for her own purposes. We cannot but recall the early solicitation of British writers for "the goodwill of America"—that ultimate desideratum which was to do so much for Britain in both a moral and a material way.

We—and now I speak as a New Englander—gave England our moral support. We—and I speak not as a New Englander—reap the reward of having done so.

I quote a cable despatch from London to the New York Tribune of yesterday:

Widespread investigation shows a great change in sentiment among the English people toward America following and consequent upon the American note of protest against detention of ships and cargoes. This change is much more marked and important in the provinces than in London.

The feeling has grown up, especially in the provinces, that America was a great country of the same people, the same language and the same aspirations, which would stand always behind England in her

struggle. It was felt that if America had not actually stepped in and taken a hand in the war, at any rate she was always there ready to lend a hand if England became too hard pressed. Indeed, not infrequently was heard the query: "When is America coming in?"

The war, in fact, is a more serious matter throughout the provinces, a more intimate and important part of daily life, than in London, where the favorite word is "business as usual," and throughout the provinces the people have found particular comfort in the feeling that America stood behind them in their great endeavor and, if need be, America would stand with them.

Those in touch with official affairs knew for a long time that a certain amount of friction was growing up over the question of the treatment of neutral shipping, but this was carefully kept from the people at large, and, consequently, the American note came as a great shock to the vast majority of the people, who had been deriving such comfort and feeling of security from the belief that America was with them hand in glove.

First amazement, and then resentment, characterized the reception of the note. The people, who had never studied the questions of commerce and shipping and were ignorant of the facts on which the note was based, jumped to the conclusion that America, which they had believed was actuated by altruism and a sentiment of friendship, in reality cared only for the dollar. The most unfortunate part is that the facts behind the American protest have never been placed before the English people, and the feeling of resentment is growing rapidly as discussion continues.

This is the situation in the provinces, and one which is fast spreading in London—a rapidly growing feeling of resentment caused by the American note of protest and undoubtedly due in considerable degree to ignorance of the facts on which the protest was based.

On the other hand, in better informed quarters, notably the London financial district, the feeling is better described as one of somewhat amused toleration, with a large mixture of contempt. Financial men, who are better acquainted with the facts, while naturally taking the British side, feel that America has some basis for her protest. There is no question in their minds that an amicable settlement will be reached, and this is the reason for their toleration. But they also express amusement that America's first real action in connection with the war should come over a question of dollars and cents and ask, "Why should this great country, such a stickler for treaties and conventions, raise no whisper or protest against Germany's breaking of treaties to which America is a party, make no protest against the destruction of cathedrals and laying waste of an innocent country, but protest so vehemently and strongly when the dollar comes into question?"

Everywhere that question is asked and in each individual case in which resentment is analyzed that is the final answer every Englishman brings all arguments.

Soft, honeyed words, these, and friendly! When, may I ask, were the British ever assured that "America stood behind them in their great endeavor"—when, save by Dr. Eliot's vapid and un-American utterances?

I like "resentment"—because it sounds so "bally English" and so really truthful. "Amused toleration" is another term which comes well from British mouths to American ears. But of all the cable contains what the American will most like is the suggestion that his perspective, so far as this war is concerned, is governed by the Almighty Dollar. There is something about the phrase that appeals to me. Something so reminiscent of the almighty shilling and pound sterling for which the British are fighting in this war.

While British journals are flooding us and the rest of the neutral world with stories how best Englishmen can seize the German markets—when free plots are being given away in London to those who will erect thereon factories to compete against German factories—when we know, in short, the war to be one on the part of England to destroy German trade, and consequently German dollars and cents, or "marks," if you will, we can well put up with being twitted with seeking for dollars. Will the English press tell us, then, what England is after, if England is not after the English equivalent of these monetary units?

The cable of the Tribune was apparently an outcome of the recent protest against the treatment of American trade by the British naval authorities. I can readily understand why in this connection the English should be angered. We do not, as they expected us to do, agree to their domination of our overseas trade. The English are consequently surprised—surprised that anyone should assume to question their right to

rule the seas common to all the world. And when one surprises an Englishman he angers him.

What we should like to know is: What are we getting out of a war prosecuted by Great Britain for the crushing of a commercial rival, a war which has cost us millions of dollars in charity—which England herself should have borne, in industrial disturbance and in interference with our foreign commerce; a war in which we have seen a million men, against whom we have no enmity, go to their deaths; a war alike disastrous to ourselves and the whole world? I am glad that England has spoken as she did in this cable to the Tribune. We know what she thinks of us. We can now discard the promises of the Cambridge School and readjust our policy toward Great Britain on the basis of a rediscovered appreciation of her historical attitude toward this country. We know now what England thinks of us: shall we allow the hour to pass without telling England just what we think of her?

HUSTLING FOR ENGLAND.

Apparently it is a much more simple matter for the British Government to get what it wants from our own Government than it is for the American Government to get what it wants from the British. The present Carranzista imbroglio is an exemplification of this new truism. Certain British oil people in the Panuco District of Mexico have refused to pay a levy made upon them by the *de facto* government of the district, and, in consequence, an embargo has been

placed upon their exportation of oil from Mexico. Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Britain's Ambassador to the United States, whose name rolls so succulently around the tongues of Washington just now, presents a demand that this country take action in the premises. And we take it. We immediately wire to our Consul-General at the front to threaten the local government with "serious consequences" if the British interests are not respected.

The man in the street is not unacquainted with Britain's reason at the present juncture in demanding that her oil supply be kept open. I may venture the suggestion that he is equally acquainted with the interference with our own oil trade abroad from which we have suffered at the hands of Great Britain. The humorist, once more, comes front and centre with his "I don't care who wins, so long as Germany is beaten." We don't care where oil goes, apparently, so long as it does not go to Germany. We have overlooked all England's demands in the matter of our own oil cargoes destined for neutral ports of Europe, because possibly they might eventually find their way into Germany or allied territory. We are ready enough, in the present contingency, to help England out of her predicament by admitting her right to stop all American cargoes of oil destined for countries contiguous to Germany. We strain a point, however, when we call upon a *de facto* government in Mexico—a government we worked to establish—to abandon its fiscal policy in order that Great Britain may feed her vessels of war with oil from this continent.

The British regard for the Monroe Doctrine is clearly developed in the communications, written and otherwise, which have passed between the British Embassy in Washington and our Department of State, in connection with this case. We have been told explicitly enough that unless we at once over-ride the de facto laws of a certain section of Mexico in the interest of Britain's present military necessity Great Britain will over-ride them herself. We have sent a protest, which we should not have sent, in this sense. What attention will be paid to it I do not know; but are we going to go to war with Mexico or with Carranza in Mexico in order that Great Britain may have oil for her vessels of war?

I recognize our obligations under the Monroe Doctrine—but I realize as well our immunities and the immunities of other countries in this hemisphere. Great Britain has no right to demand that we should ride rough-shod over the law of Mexico—and Carranza's law is the law of Mexico in the district which he controls for the time being—simply because she wants oil. Any action on her part of a hostile nature against Mexico on this ground must be regarded as *casus belli* in defense of the Monroe Doctrine. There is no other answer to Great Britain in this connection.

The surprising activity of the State Department in the matter of the British demands upon Mexico might better have been exerted in the interest of an elucidation of the questions involved in the case of the "Dacia." She still lies at her dock, legitimately purchased by an American citizen, regularly admitted to Amer-

ican register, commanded and manned by Americans, loaded with a non-contraband cargo and destined to sail for a port in Europe—anchored there by a British protest as firmly as if the strongest steel hawsers held her to her moorings. There is no divergence of opinion in this country—outside of Washington—as to her right to sail to her port of destination. There is divergence of opinion in England, however. The (London) Daily News a day or so ago advocated the concession by the British Government of our claim not only to despatch the “Dacia” but to purchase and operate the other German vessels interned in our ports. Other British papers, alarmed at the “reaction in American sympathy” as a result of Great Britain’s treatment of our trade, have advocated the same thing. But the British Government is immovable in its determination that the “Dacia” shall not sail for Europe, even though we ourselves have unwarrantedly conceded a point in the British contention by offering to change her destination from Bremen to Rotterdam. The right of the “Dacia” to sail wherever she will on the seas and into what ports was given to her by the fact of her admission to American registry. She stands to-day in no respect different from any other American vessel, and her rights as such should be respected and conserved by the authorities in Washington. When the American people are one on this point and the English divided in the matter of their protest against the right of the “Dacia” to sail the seas, it would seem that there is cause for determined action on the part of

the American Government to uphold our right in the case.

I admit that the present Administration stands in a difficult position. It has to choose between serving the American people and serving the British people. I have known administrations which would not have found, and did not find, it hard to make the choice. A question which forces itself upon me at the moment is this: Is President Woodrow Wilson representing British interests or American interests? We blundered under him into Mexico; and under him we blundered out—and took our hands off the country. We were told at Indianapolis recently that so long as he captained the team no other country should lay hostile hands upon it. Assuming that we are correctly informed from Washington the day is not far distant when we must do one or another of a few things. We shall have to sacrifice another score or more of “blue-eyed boys” to Mexican lead; or we shall have to allow a few blue-eyed Britishers to be sacrificed in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine, and then send a great many Americans to their death to re-establish our right to the largest voice in this hemisphere. The prospect is not alluring. The hour is at hand to tell Sir Cecil Spring-Rice that if Mexico or any part of Mexico wishes to establish laws for its own benefit—which it has a generally recognized right to do—those laws will not be questioned nor over-ridden by this country in the interest of the present military necessity of Great Britain. The British companies about Tampico should pay their taxes—or take the consequences. It is not

a matter with which the Government of the United States should, or legitimately can, interest itself.

We have been asked by the British Government to investigate the alleged violation by certain South American countries of their proclaimed neutrality, in connection with the operation of wireless stations; we have been asked to allow the British naval authorities free play with our commerce to neutral Europe; we have had and still have our own ports blockaded by British cruisers; we have had our mails tampered with by Great Britain, our citizens detained and subjected to insult and injuries, and others of them shot by irresponsible Canadians; we have been denied practically all news of the war but what England chose to give us; we have been flooded with British propagandist fabrications; we are now being urged by British lecturers to enlist to fight England's battles for her—and for all this we have fallen. We are not allowed to buy a merchant ship and sail her with 'an American and non-contraband cargo. We are not allowed to suggest our right to occupy the markets which the belligerents have abandoned. We are called a nation which bows its knees to the Almighty Dollar. And for all this we stand. And all the while we are having our knees forced down in compelled suppliance to Almighty Britain.

When it is a matter of protecting British interests Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan are immediately and always "on the job." But when our own interests are involved they are either absent on the Chautauqua circuit or are oblivious of their duties. One half of the energy that

has been expended during the last five months in serving England, sanely expended in the service of the United States, would have rendered unnecessary any allusion to the mooted point as to whether Mr. Wilson regards himself as President of the United States or His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to this country. While Great Britain is destroying our commerce on the seas, we content ourselves with addressing to her pink chits which neither demand nor require an early reply. The process goes on at England's pleasure. When, however, British war interests are affected we send a peremptory note to a friendly nation and threaten it with "serious consequences." We even offer Great Britain the right to take her own measures against Mexico—in connection with which Mr. Wilson's Indianapolis promises, so well received in Mexico City, assume the color of the chameleon. We throw the Monroe Doctrine to the wind that we may serve an hour—and an enemy.

I say frankly that I voted for Woodrow Wilson for President of the United States. I say with equal frankness that I regret having done so. I am a firm believer in the general principles of the democratic party as they were urged in past years by the great leaders of that political belief; but I cannot subscribe to the willing surrender of my country to any other. I believe that Mr. Wilson has departed not only from the principles of democracy but as well from those of Americanism. Whether I am right or wrong another few months will give the American people a chance to decide. They should not wait this long, however, to

protest firmly and unmistakably to Washington against the continuance of a policy of subservient truckling to a people who have always, since the time when we refused to further accept dictation from them in matters in which nature gave us the right to dictate to ourselves, been the inveterate enemies of this country.



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